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Summary 
This thesis contains four papers in the area of Public Economics. 
Chapter 1 looks at producers' taxation in a model of vertically related oligopolies. 
Both ad valorem and specific taxes are considered and formulae expressing their effects 
on prices and profits are derived, showing how these depend on factors such as demand 
conditions, technology and market structure. Conditions for taxation to cause price 
overshifting and to raise profits are given. Also, tax instruments are compared in terms 
of the amount of revenue collected and the effect on the price for the final good. 
Chapter 2 applies the results of the previous paper to the analysis of tax reforms. 
Vertically related oligopolies result in welfare loss for two reasons. Firstly, upstream 
oligopolists set the price of the intermediate good above marginal cost and this causes 
aggregate production inefficiency. Secondly, downstream oligopolists introduce an ad- 
ditional price-cost margin. The analysis focuses on tax reforms, where the government 
aims at reducing the welfare loss by levying taxes and subsidies on producers while 
raising no revenue. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the design of income tax enforcement policies in a principal- 
agent framework. The existing literature assumes risk neutral taxpayers while this 
chapter considers the case of risk averse agents by assuming a kinked linear utility 
function. When individuals have the same attitude towards risk, it is shown that the 
optimal policy is such that income reports below a given threshold are audited at the 
probability level just sufficient to induce truthful reporting, whereas those above it are 
not audited. This makes the effective tax schedule to be quite regressive. Instead, 
if attitudes towards risk vary across taxpayers, the numerical results show that the 
optimal audit policy causes only a limited regressive bias, for income reports above the 
threshold meet a positive probability of audit. 
Chapter 4 examines the Presumptive Income Coefficients (PIC) audit policy, a 
scheme recently introduced in the Italian tax code and aimed at reducing tax evasion 
in the non-corporate sector. The tax agency applies the PIC to observable production 
costs to get an estimate of taxpayer's income, or presumptive income. The probability 
of audit is then dependent on the gap between presumptive and reported income. 
This issue is examined in a setting where the game between the taxing authority and 
taxpayers is modelled in a principal-agent framework. 
V 
Introduction 
This thesis contains four papers in the area of Public Economics. Chapters 1 
and 2 deal with tax incidence and welfare improving tax reforms in a model 
of vertically related oligopolies. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the optimal design 
of income tax enforcement policies in a principal-agent framework. Although 
each chapter can be read independently from the others, chapter 2 is the natural 
continuation of chapter 1. The order of presentation follows the chronological 
development of my research. 
Tax incidence and tax reforms 
Chapter 1 examines the impact of ad valorem and specific taxes levied on pro- 
ducers in a model of vertically related oligopolies, where a downstream industry 
produces a final good using the output of an upstream industry as an input. 
The scope of the analysis is twofold. The first objective is to characterize tax 
incidence on producers' net prices and profits and to determine the conditions 
under which taxes are overshifted and profits are increased. The second goal is to 
compare the various tax instruments in terms of revenue collected and the effect 
on the price of the consumption good. 
Market structure is modelled following Katz and Rosen (1983), Seade (1985) 
and Stern (1987). These authors examine the effects of taxing producers in the 
1 
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homogeneous-product conjectural- variation oligopoly framework. With perfect 
competition price overshifting never occurs and therefore also the possibility of 
profits raising with taxation is ruled out. When the market is monopolized tax- 
ation may increase producer's net price but a positive effect on profits can never 
occur. Their main finding is that in oligopoly both the net price and profits may 
increase with taxation. 
In accordance with these previous studies, which consider only the down- 
stream stage of production, tax incidence in the downstream industry turns out 
to be governed by final demand conditions and downstream market structure. 
The novel results concern the effects of taxation on the intermediate good price 
and upstream profits. These are shown to be related to upstream and downstream 
market structure, final demand conditions and input substitution in downstream 
production. Also, specific taxation is more likely to cause price overshifting and 
to raise profits than ad valorem taxation. 
Central to the analysis is the comparison between ad valorem and specific 
taxes. Suits and Musgrave (1953) compare ad valorem and specific taxation un- 
der monopoly, showing that if a specific and an ad valorem tax result in the same 
final good price, then the latter raises a higher revenue. ' Chapter 1 generalizes 
this approach to the case of vertically related oligopolies. It is shown that the 
revenue from an ad valorem tax is always higher than the revenue from a specific 
tax levied in the same industry, when both taxes result in the same price for the 
consumption good. This result holds also when downstream producers price at 
marginal cost, provided that upstream producers price above it. The compari- 
son between taxes of the same type levied in both industries is made assuming 
Leontief technology and isoelastic final demand. The revenue from downstream 
'The recognition that they are not equivalent under monopoly dates back to Cournot (1838) 
and Wicksell (1896). 
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ad valorem taxation can be higher or lower than the yield from upstream ad 
valorem taxation, and which case applies depends on upstream and downstream 
market structure, production coefficients and the elasticity of final demand. Fi- 
nally, it is shown that upstream and downstream specific taxation J always raise 
the same revenue, when both taxes result in the same price for the consumption 
good. 
Chapter 2 applies the framework of the previous chapter to the problem of 
tax reforms. The market allocation generates two kind of inefficiencies that re- 
sult in welfare loss. Firstly, upstream oligopolists set the price of the intermediate 
good above marginal cost and provided that downstream technology allows inputs 
substitution this causes aggregate production inefficiency. Secondly, downstream 
oligopolists introduce an additional price-cost margin. The analysis focuses on 
tax reforms, where the government aims at reducing the welfare loss by means of 
distortionary commodity taxation while raising no revenue. Both ad valorem and 
specific taxes levied on producers in both industries are considered. The pattern 
of actions the government has to take in order to improve welfare are shown to 
be related to downstream and upstream market structure, final demand condi- 
tions and input substitution in downstream production. Also, it is shown that 
under some circumstances the tax reform improves overall market performance 
by introducing additional aggregate production inefficiency. 
The contents of chapter 2 are closely related to those of a recent work by Myles 
(1989), who considers in a general equilibrium framework the two polar cases 
of downstream (upstream) monopoly and upstream (downstream) competitive 
sector. His model is general equilibrium because it takes account of the impact 
of monopoly profits on final demand. In the model presented here distributed 
profits are assumed not to enter final demand but a wider range of downstream 
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and upstream market structures are considered. 
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The results are summarized as follows. When downstream oligopolists price 
above marginal cost and the upstream industry is competitive, then specific taxa- 
tion cannot improve welfare. Instead, ad valorem taxes are effective: the welfare 
loss can be reduced by taxing the final good and subsidizing the intermediate 
good. 
When both downstream and upstream oligopolists price above marginal cost, 
and under exponential final demand, specific taxation may improve welfare. The 
condition under which taxing downstream producers and subsidizing upstream 
firms raises welfare is shown to depend on the elasticity of final demand, the 
elasticity of input substitution and the degree of market power in the downstream 
industry. 
When both downstream and upstream oligopolists price above marginal cost, 
and under isoelastic final demand, ad valorem taxation may improve welfare. 
The design of the tax reform is shown to depend on the values of the elasticity of 
final demand and the elasticity of input substitution. Welfare can be improved 
also when downstream technology is Leontief and downstream producers price at 
marginal cost. Moreover, when the elasticity of input substitution is low, the tax 
reform may improve welfare by raising the price of the intermediate good and by 
doing so generates additional aggregate production inefficiency. 
The design of income tax enforcement policies 
The theory of optimal income taxation in the presence of costly enforcement has 
been the focus of a seminal paper by Reinganum and Wilde (1985). Subsequent 
works include Border and Sobel (1987), Cremer, Marchand and Pestieu (1990), 
Sanchez and Sobel (1990) and Chander and Wilde (1992). These authors assume 
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that taxpayers are risk neutral and are endowed with different pre-tax incomes 
which are exogenously given. Since the taxing authority cannot directly observe 
taxable incomes, taxpayers are required to report their own income by filling in 
an income declaration form. The audit policy consists of a function which gives a 
probability of investigation for each level of reported income. The objective of the 
tax agency is to maximize total tax revenue net of audit cost while taking taxes 
and penalties as given. ' The standard result is that the optimal audit policy is 
a step function which divides taxpayers into two groups on the basis of reported 
income: reports below a given threshold are audited at the probability level just 
sufficient to induce a risk neutral taxpayer to behave honestly whereas income 
reports above the threshold are never audited. 
Clearly, the optimal audit policy makes the effective tax payments to be quite 
regressive. On one hand, the relatively poor individuals (with income below the 
threshold) are forced to behave honestly so that they pay in full the legislated 
income tax. On the other hand, the relatively rich individuals (with income above 
the threshold) report an income just sufficient to escape the audit (the threshold) 
and safely evade the difference. 
All papers referred to above assume that taxpayers are risk neutral. Chapter 
3 considers the case of risk averse agents by assuming a kinked linear utility 
function. This specification implies that the marginal utility of the prospective 
gains from evasion is lower (in absolute value) than the marginal disutility of the 
corresponding prospective losses. The kinked utility function can be given two 
economic interpretations. One is in terms of non-pecuniary costs of evasion. The 
other is in terms of portfolio selection theory, where the measure of risk is the 
expected value of loss. 
'When considering the general problem, the government controls taxes and penalties as well 
as the audit instruments. 
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When individuals have the same attitude towards risk, it is shown that the 
nature of the optimal audit policy under risk neutrality is preserved under risk 
aversion: income reports below a given threshold are audited at the probability 
level just sufficient to induce truthful reporting, whereas those above it are not 
audited. As illustrated above, the outcome is that the effective tax schedule is 
quite regressive. 
Instead, if attitudes towards risk vary across taxpayers, the numerical results 
show that the optimal audit policy causes only a limited regressive bias, for 
income reports above the threshold meet a positive probability of audit. 
A recent innovation of the Italian tax code gives rise to chapter 4. In 1989 the 
Italian government introduced a tax enforcement mechanism, called Presumptive 
Income Coefficients (PIC), with the objective of reducing tax evasion in the non- 
corporate sector. 
Consider a homogeneous group of professionals or firms operating in the same 
sector of activity. The rationale of the mechanism is simple and is based on two 
considerations. The first is that sales revenues are easily concealed to the taxing 
authority whereas production costs are not. The second is that when examining 
various firms, one observes a similar relation between production costs and the 
corresponding revenues. Hence it is possible to estimate actual revenues and 
income by applying simple algorithms on observed production costs. The choice of 
the Italian tax administration has been that of determining the PIC by regressing 
revenues on production costs over a sample of taxpayers. 
The PIC audit policy works as follows. For each group of taxpayers the 
taxing authority publishes the list of PIC, one for each type of expenditure. The 
application of the coefficients to production costs then determines the so called 
presumptive income. If reported income is at least as high as the presumptive 
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income, the taxpayer is subjected to random audits. Otherwise the taxpayer is 
expected to pay the tax on presumptive income, unless he or she demonstrates 
that the actual income is lower than presumptive income. 
The purpose of chapter 4 is to provide a theoretical analysis of the PIC tax 
enforcement policy. Following Reinganum and Wilde (1985), the game between 
the taxing authority and taxpayers is modelled in a principal-agent framework. 
The audit policy is restricted to the simple mechanism where income reports 
below and above a given mark-up on production costs are audited at different 
probabilities. When the mark-up coefficient is meant to give an estimate of 
taxable income, its interpretation is that of presumptive income coefficient. 
When labour supply is fixed, it is shown that the net revenue maximizing 
audit policy is such that income reports below the the corresponding mark-up 
on production costs are audited at the probability level just sufficient to induce 
truthful reporting, whereas those above it are never audited. Also, when the 
mark-up coefficient is constrained to be a presumptive income coefficient, the 
best audit policy may collapse into random audits. 
The numerical computations of the model with endogenous labour supply 
show that the properties of the optimal policy crucially depend on the size of 
taxpayers' average income relative to the size of unit audit costs. If average 
income is relatively high the best policy is random audits. If average income is 
relatively low, the two probability policy is effective: income reports below the 
corresponding mark-up on production costs meet the probability of audit just 
sufficient to induce honest behaviour, whereas those above it face a lower, but 
positive, level of enforcement. Also, the optimal mark-up coefficient is generally 
low and is lower than the presumptive income coefficients. This is an important 
result, especially when one considers that in taxpayers' minds a high value of the 
mark-up is likely to be perceived as unfair. 
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Chapter 1 
Ad Valorem and Specific 
Taxation in a Model of 
Vertically Related Oligopolies 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of ad valorem and specific taxes levied on pro- 
ducers in a model of vertically related oligopolies, where a downstream industry 
produces a final good using the output of an upstream industry as an input. 
The scope of the analysis is twofold. The first objective is to characterize tax 
incidence on producers' net prices and profits and to determine the conditions 
under which taxes are overshifted and profits are increased. The second goal is to 
compare the various tax instruments in terms of revenue collected and the effect 
on the price of the consumption good. 
Katz and Rosen (1983), Seade (1985) and Stern (1987) examine the effects 
of levying specific taxes on producers in the homogeneous-product conjectural- 
variation oligopoly framework. The basic model assumes a fixed number of identi- 
9 
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cal firms and constant returns to scale. With perfect competition price overshift- 
ing never occurs and therefore also the possibility of profits raising with taxation 
is ruled out. When the market is monopolized taxation may increase producer's 
net price but a positive effect on profits can never occur. Their main finding 
is that in oligopoly both the net price and profits may increase with taxation. 
Within the same framework, a recent paper by Delipalla and Keen (1992) fo- 
cuses on the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation, showing that 
the latter is more likely to cause price overshifting and to raise profits than the 
former. 
In accordance with these previous studies, which consider only the down- 
stream stage of production, tax incidence in the downstream industry turns out 
to be governed by final demand conditions and downstream market structure. 
The novel results concern the effects of taxation on the intermediate good price 
and upstream profits. These are shown to be related to upstream and downstream 
market structure, final demand conditions and input substitution in downstream 
production. Also, specific taxation is more likely to cause price overshifting and 
to raise profits than ad valorem taxation. 
Stern (1987) condiders also a model with free entry where in equilibrium prof- 
its are zero and the focus is on the effects of taxation upon output per firm, price 
and the number of firms. The impact of entry for tax incidence is also analyzed 
by Besley (1989) and Delipalla and Keen (1992). They show that taxation may 
induce entry and that price overshifting is more likely in the free entry case than 
with firms fixed in number. Myles (1987) explores the effects of taxation in an 
oligopolistic industry with free entry when taxes are levied in a related compet- 
itive industry, the interaction between the two markets arising via consumers' 
tastes. 
Tax incidence (only specific taxation) in vertically related industries has been 
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analysed by Myles (1989), who considers in a general equilibrium framework' the 
two polar cases of downstream (upstream) monopoly and upstream (downstream) 
competitive sector. He then focuses on tax reforms, where the government aims at 
improving welfare by levying taxes (and subsides) on the final and intermediate 
goods while raising no revenue. Konishi (1990) examines a model in which a 
number of competitive industries supplies inputs to a free entry Cournot oligopoly 
producing a final good, showing that market performance can be improved by 
taxing the intermediate inputs. Tax reforms within the framework developed in 
this chapter are examined in chapter 2. 
Central to the analysis is the comparison between ad valorem and specific 
taxes. Suits and Musgrave (1953) compare ad valorem and specific taxation under 
monopoly, showing that if a specific and an ad valorem tax result in the same 
final good price, then the latter raises a higher revenue. ' This chapter generalizes 
this approach to the case of vertically related oligopolies. Propositions 1 and 2 
show that the revenue from an ad valorem tax is always higher than the revenue 
from a specific tax levied in the same industry, when both taxes result in the 
same price for the consumption good. This result holds also when downstream 
producers price at marginal cost, provided that upstream producers price above 
it. The comparison between taxes of the same type levied in both industries is 
made assuming Leontief technology and isoelastic final demand. The revenue 
from downstream ad valorem taxation can be higher or lower than the yield from 
upstream ad valorem taxation, and which case applies depends on upstream 
and downstream market structure, production coefficients and the elasticity of 
final demand, see proposition 3. Finally, proposition 4 shows that upstream and 
'Myles's model is general equilibrium because it takes account of the impact of monopoly 
profits on final demand. 
2The recognition that ad valorem and specific taxes are not equivalent under monopoly dates 
back to Cournot (1838) and Wicksell (1896). 
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downstream specific taxation always raise the same revenue, when both taxes 
result in the same price for the consumption good. 
Delipalla and Keen (1992) address four different issues regarding the compar- 
ison between ad valorem and specific taxation. First, they examine how changing 
the balance between the two forms of taxation, while raising the same revenue, 
affects prices and profits, the result being that a local shift towards ad valorem 
taxation reduces both the consumer price and profits. Second, taxation is used 
for correcting market inefficiency due to imperfect competition, and it is shown 
that both ad valorem and specific taxes can be used to attain marginal cost pric- 
ing, provided that the government is unrestricted in its ability to levy lump sum 
taxation. Third, they look at a Ramsey type problem, where the objective is to 
determine the balance between the two forms of taxes that minimizes the welfare 
loss of raising a given revenue. Finally, they search for the mix of taxes that 
maximizes government's revenue. 
Kay and Keen (1983) look at the optimal balance between ad valorem and 
specific taxes in a model of perfect competition with endogenous quality and in a 
model of monopolistic competition with product variety. They show that prices 
are affected more by specific than ad valorem taxes, while ad valorem taxes are 
more powerful in controlling product quality and variety. Diericks, Matutes and 
Neven (1988) compare specific and ad valorem taxation in a model of Cournot 
oligopoly where firms differ in productive efficiency, showing that ad valorem 
taxes are more likely to improve aggregate productive efficiency by raising market 
shares of low cost firms. 
The work is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model and de- 
rives equilibrium prices and profits. Comparative statics begins with section 1.3, 
which illustrates the effects of taxation on the final and intermediate good prices. 
Section 1.3.1 gives the conditions for price overshifting. To illustrate the role of 
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market structure, final demand conditions and downstream technology for tax 
incidence, section 1.3.2 examines three typical final demand curves, namely isoe- 
lastic, exponential and linear demand. The formulae expressing the impact of 
taxation on profits and the conditions for profitable tax increases are contained 
in section 1.4. The comparison of tax instruments in terms of revenue collected 
and the impact on the final good price is made in section 1.5. Conclusions are 
given in section 1.6. 
1.2 Equilibrium prices and profits 
The model consists of two vertically related industries, where a downstream in- 
dustry produces a final good using two inputs: labour and an intermediate good 
produced by an upstream sector. Labour is the only input in upstream produc- 
tion. In both industries product is homogeneous, technology is constant returns 
to scale and no entry / exit occurs so that the number of firms is fixed. ' Each 
oligopolist has a conjecture about the way the other firms in the same industry 
will change their output levels in response to changes in its own output. These 
conjectural variations capture the degree of competition among oligopolists be- 
longing to the same industry. This approach has the merit of encompassing a 
wide range of market structures as particular cases, including the two polar cases 
of monopoly and competitive pricing. Symmetry is also assumed: oligopolists 
belonging to the same industry have identical cost functions and conjectures. 
Competition between industries is modelled assuming that downstream oligo- 
polists act as perfect competitors in the market for the intermediate good. This 
3Quoting Katz and Rosen (1983, p. 10): "One may think of the model in two ways. First, 
it can be viewed as a short run analysis of a market in which capital stocks are fixed. Second, 
it can be viewed as a long run analysis of a market in which existing firms can adjust the levels 
of all productive inputs but sufficiently high barriers exist to preclude entry of new firms". 
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means that upstream oligopolists move first by setting the price for the inter- 
mediate good and downstream oligopolists move second by setting the price of 
the final good taking the price of input as given. This is what Waterson (1980a) 
refers to as arms-length pricing. The model is solved in three steps. First, down- 
stream profits are maximized for given price of the intermediate good. Second, 
the derived demand facing the upstream industry is obtained and finally upstream 
profits are maximized. 
The market inverse demand function for the final good is 
4=q(mx) (1.1) 
where m is the number of downstream firms, x the output of each firm and q 
its price; mx is total output. It is assumed that q(mx) E C3, q(O) >0 and 
q'(mx) < 0. 
Each firm is assumed to maximize profits 
7rd = 
[(l 
- t)q(mx) - is - C(p, w), x (1.2) 
where p is the price of the intermediate good, w the wage rate and C(p, w) E C3 is 
the average (and marginal) cost function, which is assumed to be nondecreasing, 
linearly homogeneous and concave in input prices. Two kind of taxes are levied 
on downstream producers: a specific tax is and an ad valorem tax at a tax inclu- 
sive rate t < 1. The cost function embodies the assumption that downstream 
producers are price takers in the input markets. The assumption of arms-length 
pricing implies that in the market for the intermediate good there is no market 
power on the demand side. The labour market is assumed to be competitive and 
the supply for labour to be perfectly elastic, so that the wage rate is given. 
Each oligopolist conjectures that changes in its own output will cause the other 
firms to respond by changing outputs levels as well. Assuming linear responses 
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the conjectural variation is constant and is defined as 
ä(m 
- 1)x 
_dd 
vd = -1 corresponds to Bertrand behaviour or marginal cost pricing; Cournot 
conjectures give v d= 0; when oligopolists collude vd =m-1; if the industry is 
monopolized then vd =0 and m=1. 
The first order condition for a maximum of (1.2) is that perceived marginal 
profits are zero 
(1 - tv) 
[q(mx) + xq'(mx)(l + vd)] - is - C(PI w) =0 (1.4) 
This can be written as 
q(mx) 
C(p, w) + ts 
=0 (1.5) ýd(17LX) 1- tv 
where 7d = (1 + vd)/m, thus yd E [0,1]. ed(mx) = -q(mx)/[mx q'(mx)] is the 
market elasticity of demand, whereas each oligopolist perceives the elasticity to 
be ed(mx)/"Yd. 
The second order condition is 
Ed(mx) <d (1.6) 
where E'(mx) _ -mx q"(mx)/q'(mx) is Seade's (1985) elasticity of the slope of 
inverse demand. 
Eq. (1.5) implicitly defines the equilibrium output mx. The condition for this 
to be positive, Stern's (1987, eq. 5) existence condition, is 
ed(mx) > 1, 
d 
tv <1 
is > -C(p, w) (1.7) 
This requires the perceived elasticity to be greater than one; market elasticity 
can instead be less than one if -yd < 1. 
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Following Seade (1985, eq. 14), a stability condition can be the following 
Ed(mx) <d+1 
16 
(1.8) 
This ensures stability in response to common (symmetric) disturbances to the 
equilibrium. In other words, were all firms forced to expand (reduce) output 
away from the equilibrium by the same amount 6>0 (8 < 0), then the stability 
condition (1.8) would ensure that perceived marginal profits become negative 
(positive), thus giving the oligopolists an incentive to reduce (increase) output. 
Notice that 11-yd +1< 2/, yd, thus the stability condition implies the second order 
condition. 
The comparative statics below will make extensive use of the equivalent sta- 
bility condition 
F'd(9) 
d>1- (d ) 
'Y 
Ed 
where Fd(q) = 
qE9 q) 
Ed(q) 
(1.9) 
see Stern (1987, eq. 6); ed(q) - -q X'(q)/X(q) is the elasticity of the direct demand 
mx = X(q), e9 is the derivative of ed with respect to q and Fd(q) is the price 
elasticity of the elasticity of direct demand. The relation between (1.8) and (1.9) 
comes from e'(q)Ed(mx) =I+ Ed(q) - Fd(q), see appendix A. I. 
In terms of the final good price the first order condition (1.5) can be written 
as 
"' yd 
q1 
Sd(q) 
C(p, w)+is 
1 -t . f(q, p, w, tv, ts)=0 
(1.10) 
This is an implicit function of q. If the stability condition (1.9) is met, then the 
partial derivative of (1.10) with respect to q is positive (see (1.12) below), there- 
fore the conditions of the implicit function theorem apply and the equilibrium 
price can be defined as 
9= O(p, w, tv, ts) (1.11) 
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Letting subscripts denote partial derivatives (so f9 is the partial derivative of f (. ) 
with respect to q) 
fq = 1-ýd [1-Fd(q)]>0 (q) 
O_ 
fpCp (p, W) 1 
>0 P fq 1- tv fq 
ftv C(p) w) -+-is 1 Otv 
-- fq = (1 
- 
tv) 2 f9 
- 
ýts =. 
f 
is 
11>0 
f9 1- tv f9 
q 1- 
1- tv 
where fq >0 from the stability condition (1.9). 
7d 1 
6d(q) fq 
(1.12) 
The next step is to determine the equilibrium price for the intermediate good. 
Consider n identical upstream firms. Assuming that downstream oligopolists are 
the only customers of upstream firms, the market demand facing the upstream 
industry is given by the sum of downstream conditional input demands for the 
intermediate good. By Shephard's lemma the (direct) derived demand for the 
intermediate good is equal to ny = CC(p, w)X(q), where y is the output of each 
upstream firm. After substituting for (1.11) this becomes 
ny = Cn(p, w)X 
(«(p, 
w, tv, ts)) = O(p, w, tv, ts) (1.13) 
Derived demand is negatively sloped if 
oP(p) w, tv, ts) = CPpx + Cpx'q ,<01.14) 
A sufficient condition for Op to be negative and finite for each p>0 is that inputs 
are not perfect substitutes in downstream production. Then Cpp <0 (and finite), 
Cp > 0, Op > 0; also X' = 11q' <0 from (1.1). If p<0 then 
(1.13) has an 
inverse, the inverse derived demand 
p= p(ny, w, tv, ts) (1.15) 
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Let i3 be the specific tax and i the ad valorem tax levied on upstream pro- 
ducers. Profits of a representative oligopolist are 
7ru = 
[(1 
- iz1)p(ny, w, t, t3) - is - waLy] y (1.16) 
where waLy is the constant average (and marginal) cost of labour, which is as- 
sumed to be the only input. 
The first order condition for a maximum of (1.16) can be written as 
'yu waLy + 
v= 
9(p) 7-Vi tvi ts) Zvi is) =0 p1 
e" (p) w) tv) ts) 1-i 
where 
eu(pl w, tvl ts) 
and 
pip 
wc. (p, w) 
a(p, w) C(p, w) 
d 
wý9) =1>0 
1- [1 - Fd(q)] 
pCp(p, w) 
C(p, w)+is 
Ed(9)w(q) 
(1.17) 
(1.18) 
(1.19) 
E"(. ) is the price elasticity of the direct derived demand (1.13); 4 . yU - (1 + vu)/n, 
the conjectural variation of upstream oligopolists being defined as vu = a[(n - 
1)y]/ay, where -1 < vu <n-1 and constant; thus . yU E [0,1]. 01(p, w) is 
the elasticity of input substitution between labour and the intermediate good in 
'The elasticity of derived demand under profit maximizing monopoly has been first presented 
by Yeung (1972); Waterson (1980b) extends it to the constant returns, homogeneous-product 
conjectural-variation oligopoly model. Assuming isoelastic final demand they show that the 
expression for the elasticity of derived demand is identical to the corresponding expression 
under perfect competition. This point is taken up by de Meza (1982), who shows that with a 
general final demand curve market structure does influence the elasticity of derived demand. 
To see this in terms of eq. (1.18) notice that downstream market structure, represented by -yd, 
influences w(q) and q, see eqs. (1.19) and (1.10). If final demand is of constant elasticity then 
ed is constant, Fd =0 and w(q) = 1, thus (1.18) is independent of ya 
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downstream production, q= q5(p, w, tt t3) from eq. (1.11) and w(q) is positive 
by the existence and stability conditions (1.7) and (1.9). The elasticity (1.18) is 
derived in appendix A. 2. 
The existence and stability conditions are respectively 
6u > -yU, i3 > -waLy, i <1 (1.20) 
Eu eu 
(1.21) Fu >1- 
'Yu 
where F` -= 
p 
EU 
Ft` is the price elasticity of the elasticity of derived demand (1.13); E' is the 
derivative of eu with respect to p. 
When the stability condition (1.21) is met gp > 0, thus the conditions of the 
implicit function theorem apply and eq. (1.17) defines the equilibrium price for 
the intermediate good 
iý _ 
ý(Wltv)ts)Zv, is) (1.22) 
The equilibrium price for the final good is determined by inserting (1.22) into (1.11). 
Substituting for the equilibrium prices into the respective demand functions gives 
the equilibrium quantities. Finally, plugging equilibrium prices and quantities 
into (1.2) and (1.16) gives the equilibrium profits of downstream and upstream 
oligopolists respectively. 
This framework can now be employed to carry out the analysis of tax inci- 
dence. Eq. (1.17) determines the effect of taxes on the intermediate good price; 
the impact of taxation on the final good price is governed by eqs. (1.17) and (1.10). 
Katz and Rosen (1983), Seade (1985), Stern (1987) and Delipalla and Keen (1992) 
consider only one stage of production, which in the context of the present model 
corresponds to the downstream sector, and therefore their analysis is limited to 
the comparative statics of eq. (1.10) with p exogenous. The original feature of 
the model presented here is the introduction of the upstream oligopoly setting 
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the price of the intermediate good which makes p endogenously determined by 
eq. (1.17). 
1.3 The impact of taxation on prices 
The effect of taxation on upstream and downstream prices is shown in table 1.1. 
The first three rows contain the determinants of tax incidence. All these elements 
have been defined in the previous section. The first row shows the stability 
condition for downstream firms and the elasticity of the elasticity of final demand. 
The second contains the elasticity of derived demand. The third row gives the 
stability condition for upstream firms and the elasticity of the elasticity of derived 
demand. The rest of the table shows in the first column the partial derivatives 
expressing the impact of taxation on q and p. The second and the third columns 
contain respectively the indicator shifting coefficients and the conditions for price 
overshifting that will be described in subsection 1.3.1. 
The partial derivatives with respect to the taxes levied on upstream producers 
are all positive: i and i3 raise upstream costs, thus p raises as well and this in 
turn represents a cost shift for downstream oligopolists (provided that Cp > 0) 
who then increase q. 
Next consider the effect of taxes levied on downstream producers on the price 
for the intermediate good. Obviously, if upstream producers price at marginal 
cost (yU = 0) then t and is do not affect p. When upstream oligopolists price 
above marginal cost (7" 0) then ap/ate, '<- 0 iff u 5* 0 and ap/ät3 'z 0 if us -, >5 0. 
In words, a tax on downstream oligopolists raises p if and only if it lowers the 
elasticity of derived demand. The expressions for Et and Ets are 
CEd 
Etv -p 
(Fd(`ý + Q'W9) -otv (1.23) C+ is q 
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Table 1.1: The impact of taxation on prices 
21 
fq 
d 
= 1- d(1-Fd)>0, Fd= 
qEd ýd 
su _ 
wCv, (p, w) 
a(p, w) + 
pCC(p, w) 
sd(q)w(q), w(q) = 
1E 
C(p, W) C(p, w) + is 1- [1 - Fd (q)] 
gp 
u 
(1_Fu)>0, =1- 
ý 
Fu= 
Eu ý 
1 
U u 
1 
p 1 upütu ap >0 if Fd< 
. 
0° ät 2 (E) 9p 9t 
Op PEU 
= -rye` 
ts 
21 ()9 if Fd <0 then 
a 
at, > 
oa 
p 
ap v 
=1 
12 
psv 
v 
sv= 1- 
ýU 
ý gp 
sv>1 iff Fu< 0 
ap 
Cis -1s 
" 
1-v :s i s" = zs 
1 
g P 
su >1 iff zs Fu < 1 
(ýq 1 Cep d s q+C = d- s - 
q 
(1 
ý) + Cpa 1 
- 
d s >1 if d F< 6 o at v t p at 1-t vv tv q+CPöty fq tv 
aq 
1+C 
ap 
s ss= ss> 1 iff Fd < 1 ats p 1- tý, 0ts s fq 
äq 
aiv =11i pCps 
vs 
v 1 tv 1v sd = 
1 
fq s 
v> 1 if Fd < 1 
aq 
aas _11 
Cps ssd 
1- tv 1- iv 
91 = 
1 
. 
fq ss>1 iff Fd < 1 
(a) assuming that l Fw1 >1 qwq 
I 
(b) see appendix A. 3 
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its =- 
PCP 
e'dw 
(C+ t3)2 
22 
d 
PC' (Fdu' + qwq) 
- ots ( 1.24 ) 
c+ts q 
Consider first the tax tu. Eq. (1.23) takes the sign of Fdw + qwq: w and q 
are positive but Fd and wq may take positive and negative values. Notice that 
when final demand is of constant elasticity then Fd = 0, which implies w=1 
and Wq = 0, see eq. (1.19), thus E't =0 and t does not affect p. In general, 
a relation between the signs of Fd and wq cannot be found; also, there is no 
economic interpretation for w9, which contains the derivative of Fd and therefore 
the third derivative of the demand function X(q). However, if one assumes that 
Fdw 1>1 qwq 1, then et 'z 0 iff Fd 'z 0, which implies the condition ap/atz1 >0 
if Fd <0 shown in table 1.1. Section 1.3.2 below shows that this result occurs 
when some typical demand functions are considered. 
As for the specific tax t8, notice that if final demand is isoelastic (Fd = 0, 
Wq = 0) then e' <0 and is raises p. Assuming I Fdw 1>1 qwq I implies that if 
Fd <0 then E<0 and ap/äts > 0, which is only a sufficient condition because 
the first term in (1.24) is negative. 
Finally, consider the impact of t,, and is on the price for the final good 
aq 
= Ocv + op 
49P 
q1 
-ýdd + Cp 
ap 1 
(1.25) 
ät ätv 1 tv 6 at, fq 
aq 
= ýcs + ýp 
ap 
=1 
(I+ 
Cn 
ap 
Sd (1.26) ats at$ 1- tv at., 
In both derivatives, the first term is positive and expresses the effect of increased 
tax liabilities, or the direct impact of taxation. The second term represents the 
indirect effect that goes through the change in the price of the intermediate good. 
As illustrated above, if -y" =0 then this term is zero, thus (1.25) and (1.26) 
are positive. In general, since äp/ät and äp/ät3 may take negative values, 
it cannot be excluded that (1.25) and (1.26) are negative as well. However, 
this seems a remote possibility and one may reasonably assume that the direct 
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effect dominates the indirect effect so that q(1 - 7d/Ed) + Cp(ap/(qtz) >0 and 
1+C (aplats) > 0. 
For the sake of comparison, notice that if äp/at3 = 0, the expression for 
aq/at3 equals the corresponding expression in Seade (1985), Stern (1987) and 
Delipalla and Keen (1992). Also, if ap/at = 0, the derivative aq/ätz1 equals the 
corresponding expression in Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
1.3.1 The indicator shifting coefficients 
The derivatives in the first column of table 1.1 express the impact of taxation 
on producers' gross prices q and p. From the point of view of producers what 
really matters is the difference between the effect on the gross price and the tax 
induced cost shifts; in other words, the effect on the net price. 
Consider first the upstream industry. For each unit of intermediate good 
produced and sold the manufacturer receives p from his or her customer, pays 
is + i, p to the government and pays waLy to the workers. The price p is the 
gross price, or revenue per unit of output. Let Gu(p, w, is, z, ) - iS + 2vp + waLy 
be total outlays per unit of output, where p= ý(w, tv, ts, i,,, is), see eq. (1.22). 
The producers' net price is defined as the difference between the gross price p 
and total outlays G", or profits per unit of output. A tax is said to cause price 
overshifting if it increases producers' net price. 
Following Seade (1985) define the shifting coefficient of a tax TET= {iz , 
i3} 
as the ratio between the change in the gross price p and the change in total 
outlays G" 
dp aP/aT ST = dGu aGu ,TET= {iv, is} v aT + aT (1.27) 
Price overshifting occurs if and only if ST > 1. Applying the following monoton- 
ically increasing transformation to the shifting coefficients (1.27) one obtains the 
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indicator shifting coefficients which are reported in table 1.1 
ST _1-u 
iv)ST 
= (1 - iv) 
aý aT TET (1.28) I- 2v sU aG / aT 
Since iv < 1, the property of these coefficients is that sT <: 1 if and only if ST 
< 1; 
also, if i =0 then sT = Sur. The indicator shifting coefficients are convenient 
because they fit into the derivatives in the first column of table 1.1 and because 
they give the conditions for price overshifting shown in the third column. 
If upstream oligopolists price at marginal cost (y" = 0), then taxes do not 
affect the net price and s=su, = 1. If 0< -yu <1 then overshifting may occur; 
note that the stability condition (1.21) does not rule out this possibility. Specific 
taxation i3 causes overshifting if and only if F` < 1, whereas the corresponding 
condition for ad valorem taxation i, is Fu < 0. Hence specific taxation is more 
likely to cause overshifting than ad valorem taxation. 
Next consider downstream oligopolists. Let Gd(q, p, w, t3, tz, ) - is + tz, q + 
C(p, w) be total outlays per unit of output of each downstream producer, where 
p= ý(w, tti, ts, i,,, is) and q= 0(p, w, t,,, t3), see eqs. (1.22) and (1.11). Again, 
price overshifting occurs when a tax causes the gross price q to increase more 
than total outlays. For any tax TET= It,, t3, iT i3} the corresponding shifting 
coefficient is defined as 
Sd= 
dq 
=a 
aql aT 
aGd ET= 
{tv, ts, iv, is} (1.29) dGd tV ä+ cp ä+ aT 
so that price overshifting occurs if and only if Sd > 1. The indicator shifting 
coefficient is 
d= (1- tv)Sd _ 
ag/ar ST -1-t Sd = (1 - t") aý drT (1.30) VT cp a7- + ac aT 
Again, t <1 implies that sd 'z 1 if and only if Sd 'z 1; also, when t, =0 then 
Su=Su 
T T. 
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If downstream oligopolists price at marginal cost d= 0) then sd =1 for all 
TET. If 0< -yd <1 the conditions for price overshifting in the downstream 
industry depend entirely on the characteristics of final demand, as expressed by 
the price elasticity of the elasticity Fd. Table 1.1 shows that the ad valorem tax 
t causes overshifting if and only if Fd < 0. This result is not immediate, the 
proof and the assumptions introduced to obtain it are given in appendix A. 3. The 
taxes t3, i and i3 raise downstream unit profits if and only if Fd < 1. Therefore, 
specific downstream taxation is is more likely to cause price overshifting than 
ad valorem downstream taxation t, a result also noticed by Delipalla and Keen 
(1992, p. 357). 
1.3.2 The determinants of tax incidence 
It has been shown that tax incidence is governed by the price elasticities of final 
and derived demand. These factors are now examined in more detail. 
Consider first the final good price. The conditions for overshifting shown in 
table 1.1 are s4, >1 if Fd <0 and sd >1 if Fd < 1, r= is, i,,, is, where 
Fd(q) =1+ 6d(q) - Ed(q)ý 
d ii 
Fd _ 
qý9 Ed =_ 
qX 
d Xý 
(1.31) 
Ed is the elasticity of the slope of (direct) demand, see appendix A. 1. If final 
demand is concave or linear (X" < 0) then overshifting never occurs because 
Ed <0 and Fd > 1. Overshifting may occur only with convex demand functions 
(x" > 0). To illustrate, tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the results for three typical final 
demand curves: isoelastic (ISO), exponential (EXP) and linear (LIN) demand. 
The first two are strongly convex. ISO has the property that Fd = 0, thus sd =1 
and sd > 1, T= t3, i,,, is; EXP has the property that P=1, hence sd <1 and 
sd = 1, r= t3, i,,, i3; finally, LIN has the property that Fd >1 so that all taxes 
are undershifted. 
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Next consider the intermediate good price. Tax incidence is determined by 
the partial derivatives of the elasticity of derived demand (1.18). The derivative 
of Eu with respect to p is 
C 
2Cp + 
ýc (Fdw 
d 
(1.32) + gwq)5 Op Ccq 
This expression has been computed assuming that a, the elasticity of substitution 
between labour and the intermediate good in downstream production, is constant. 
Hence C(p, w) is a CES. When o=0 technology is Leontief, a=1 gives the 
Cobb-Douglas case, if a -+ oo inputs are perfect substitutes. The derivatives Etv 
and ets are shown in (1.23) and (1.24) respectively. 
Tax incidence on p is governed by (i) final demand conditions, expressed by ed 
and Fd, (ii) downstream taxes t,, and t, (iii) input substitution in downstream 
production a, (iv) downstream market structure -yd and (v) upstream market 
structure -y". With a general final demand curve though, it is difficult to identify 
the contribution of each factor, thus the three special cases will be examined. 
A common property of the three demand functions, see table 1.2, is that e' 
is independent of -yd. This means that downstream market structure does not 
affect the equilibrium price p as well as tax incidence. ' 
ISO implies that &u and p are independent of t whereas is raises p. EXP 
implies that is does not affect p, whereas t lowers p. With LIN both t, and is 
decrease p. These results show that the ad hoc assumption introduced on p. 22, 
namely that I Fdw 1>1 qwq 1, is reasonable. 
As for the ad valorem tax iv, table 1.1 shows that sy>1 if F" < 0. From the 
definition of F` an equivalent condition is sv>1 if -Fp < 0. With ISO demand 
,p<0 if (1 - ý)(ý - o) < 0, thus overshifting occurs if e>1 and 1<o<e 
or e<1 and e<o<1. With EXP and LIN demands e contains a term 
5The result that with linear final demand the elasticity of derived demand is independent 
of downstream market structure is also noticed by de Meza (1982). 
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(the second) which is positive, thus only sufficient conditions for undershifting 
(s v< 1) can be found, see table 1.3. 
As for the specific tax is, the overshifting condition is ss>1 if F" < 1, 
which can be written pep < , Fu. After some algebra one finds that 
ISO s iis >1 if 2) < 
wcw 
u+ 
pcp 
pcp WC 
EXP s3>1 ifi Ed -d-2< 
wcw 
pCp 
Both terms on the right hand side are positive, thus a sufficient condition for over- 
shifting is that the term on the left hand side is negative or zero. Corresponding 
conditions for LIN cannot be found. 
1.4 The impact of taxation on profits 
Taxation causes gross prices p and q to increase and this lowers equilibrium 
outputs, for final and derived demands are downward sloping. If producers' net 
price (profit per unit of output) falls then also profits must fall. But if taxation 
causes price overshifting (an increase in profits per unit of output) then the 
possibility of a positive impact on profits arises. 
Considering only one stage of production, Seade (1985) and Stern (1987) have 
shown that taxation has always a negative impact on profits in the two polar cases 
of monopoly and perfect competition. ' Profitable tax increases arise as a distinct 
possibility when the market is oligopolistic. Assuming constant returns to scale, 
Seade (1985) finds that specific taxation increases profits when the elasticity of 
the slope of inverse final demand is greater than two. The same condition is 
'Taxation decreases profits in perfect competition provided that equilibrium profits are 
positive, for which decreasing returns to scale are required. If constant returns to scale are 
assumed, then equilibrium profits are zero and taxes have no effect on profits. 
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expressed by Stern (1987) as F<1-e, where e is the elasticity and F is the 
price elasticity of the elasticity of final demand. 
1.4.1 Downstream profits 
Table 1.4 shows the derivatives expressing the impact of taxation on profits and 
the corresponding conditions for profitable tax increases, see appendix A. 4 for 
the computations. 
When producers price at marginal cost (syd = 0) then all derivatives are zero, 
because profits are zero in equilibrium.? If oligopolists collude, or if the industry 
is monopolized (yd = 1), then the derivatives are negative and taxation reduces 
profits. 
When the downstream market is oligopolistic (0 < -yd < 1), the taxes t, iv 
and is raise profits if and only if Fd <1- ed. As for ad valorem taxation t, only 
a sufficient condition can be found: if Fd < 'yd - Ed <0 then profits increase. 
With EXP and LIN demands Fd > 0, thus all taxes reduce profits. With ISO 
demand Fd = 0, hence t, lowers profits, whereas the other taxes are profitable if 
and only if e<1. 
1.4.2 Upstream profits 
iu, If yU =0 then ap/ate, = 0, ap/ats = 0, s, =1 and ss=1 so that all derivatives 
are zero. If ry' =1 taxation reduces profits. 
When the upstream market is oligopolistic (0 < . yu < 1), the taxes i2, and i3 
increase profits if and only if Fu < -yu - eu and F` <1- eu respectively. The 
effect of downstream taxes t and is is difficult to assess. The derivatives contain 
a negative term, the second, which represents the fall in profits that arises from 
'In terms of the formulae of table 1.4, this simply follows from sa = 1, r= tv, t i,,, i,. 
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Table 1.4: The impact of taxation on profits 
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Downstream profits 0< yd < 1 
a(m7rd) 
at - yd)s 
v- 1] q+ CP 
ap 
mx at 
if Fd < yd - 6d then 
a(mid) 
at >0 
v v v 
a(m7rd) 
- 
[(1 - yd)S 
s- 1] 1+ Cp 19P m2 
a(mid) 
>0 if Fd <1 - Ed ats ats ats 
assuming 1+ Cp(äp/ats) >0 
a(mrd) 
a - 
L(1 - yd)s 
v- 1] 
1, 
s , pCpmx 
a(m7rd) 
>0 if Fd <1 - Ed iv 1-2v aiv 
a(mid) 
- 
C(1 - yd)s 
s- 1] 
1s 
Cpmx 
a(mid) 
>0 if Fd <1 - Ed INS 1i-v ais 
Upstream profits 0< yu < 1 
a(niru) 
i) 
[(1 
- yu) 
ap 
+ if 
a( u) 
>0 
t then 
OP 
>0 at av av av 
p yu U (Ed - yd) 
1C 
Mx if 
ap 
<0 then 
a(t u) 
<0 1 tvE fq Otv av 
a(nlr") 
iv) 
ap 
+ if 
a(nýu) 
>0 then 
ap 
>0 
at, ats ats ats 
p yu Ed 
Ss Cpmx if 
ap 
<0 then 
a(nýu) 
<0 1- tv Eu q äts ats 
u a(n7r) 
- aiv 
ý(1 - yu)s v- 1]pCPMX 
u nom) 
>0 
aiv 
if Fu < yhL _ Eu 
ä(n7ru) 
_ - ý(1 - 'Yu)S' - 1]Cpmx 
a(niru) 
>0 if Fu <1 - Eu ai S ai , 
The stability conditions require Fa >1- Ea/-ya and F" >1- ý"/-yu 
The existence conditions require Ed > . yd and E1 > -y" 
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output falling: downstream taxation increases q and reduces final output mx, 
and this in turn causes a fall in upstream production. The first term can instead 
take positive and negative values, depending respectively on whether taxation 
raises or decreases p. Therefore the net impact is undetermined. With EXP and 
LIN demands oap/ätß, <0 and äp/ät8 < 0, thus upstream profits fall; with ISO 
demand tz1 reduces profits (because ap/atzt = 0) whereas is may be profitable 
(because äp/at3 > 0). 
1.5 Taxation and government's revenue 
The two preceding sections have examined the effects of taxation on producers' 
net prices and total profits. This section takes the view of the government. When 
comparing a pair of tax instruments, the taxing authority considers the amount 
of revenue collected and the effect on the price for the final good. When both 
taxes result in the same price, the criteria is to regard as a better tax that raising 
more revenue. This is the approach adopted by Suits and Musgrave (1953). They 
compare ad valorem and specific taxation in monopoly, showing that the revenue 
from a specific tax is always smaller than the revenue from an ad valorem tax, 
when both taxes result in the same final good price (proposition 1, p. 598). 8 
'They also show that this result bears two implications. Firstly, the maximum revenue 
that can be obtained with a specific tax is smaller than the maximum revenue obtainable 
with an ad valorem tax (proposition 2, p. 599). Secondly, when the same revenue is raised 
using a specific and an ad valorem tax, the former always brings about a higher final price 
(proposition 3, p. 599). Delipalla and Keen (1992) examine a local version, or tax reform 
version, of the latter approach, termed "P-shift", consisting of a tax change "which has the 
feature of tilting the balance towards ad valorem taxation whilst leaving total tax payments at 
the initial equilibrium price unchanged" (Delipalla and Keen, 1992, pp. 357-58). They show, 
see proposition 3, that a P-shift from specific to ad valorem taxation leads to a strict reduction 
in the consumer price. 
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Chapter 2 will focus on a different but related approach, where tax instruments 
are compared in terms of the revenue collected and the effect on social welfare. 
The first two propositions deal with the comparison between ad valorem and 
specific taxes levied in the same industry. 
Proposition 1 Consider a tax iv and a tax is resulting in the same final good 
price q*. Let R(i*) and R(is) be the corresponding revenues. Then R(iv) > R(is) 
if -'u E (0,1] and R(iv) = R(is) if -yu = 0. 
Proof. The equilibrium price of the consumption good is defined by eq. (1.11), 
q= q5(p, w, t,,, t3). If iv and is are to result in the same price q*, they must result 
in the same price for the intermediate good, say p*, so that q* = q(p*, w, tt t8). 
From eq. (1.17) defining the equilibrium price of the intermediate good 
waL 
p* 1-=y 
eu (p*, w, tv, ts) 1-i 
p* 1 
Eu(p*, wi tvi ts) 
= waLy + is 
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Therefore the condition for iv and is to result in q* is 
iv = 
2* 
s (1.33) 
p*ý1 - 'Yu/Eu(P*, w, tv, t3)] 
Tax revenues are 
R(Zv) = ivp*C, (p*, w)X(4*) 
R(i; ) = i: Cc(p*, w)X(q*) 
Using (1.33) 
R(i) - R(zs) _ (i p* - is)Cp(p*, w)X(Q*) _ 
yu 
= is 
ýu - 
Cp(p*, w)X(q*) >_ 0 (p 
wi tv7 ts) u 
and this completes the proof. Q. E. D. 
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Obviously, if upstream producers price at marginal cost -y" =0 and the two 
taxes raise the same revenue. When upstream oligopolists price above marginal 
cost, the yield from i,, is always higher than the yield from is, whatever market 
structure in the downstream industry. 
Proposition 2 Consider a tax t* and a tax t* resulting in the same final good 
price q*. Let R(t*) and R(t*) be the corresponding revenues. Let ptv and pts be 
the price of the intermediate good under t* and t* respectively. Then ptv < pt*. 
Also, R(t*) = R(t*) i ff j`' -y' =0 and y" = 0. In all other cases, i. e. if in at least 
one market producers price above marginal cost, R(t*) > R(ts). 
Proof. From eq. (1.10) defining the equilibrium price of the final good 
9* 1_ 
Yd 
- 
C(pty 
I w) 
ed(q*) 1- tti 
q* 1 
ed(q*) 
C(pt', w) + is 
The condition for tv and is to result in q* is 
t* 
_ v 
Q*ý1 - yd/Ed(q*)] 
Tax revenues are 
R(tv) _ 
R(ts) _ 
Using (1.34) 
t*q*x(q*) 
t, X(4*) 
R(tv) - R(ts) = (tvq* - ts)X(Q*) _ 
,, 
= is 
cd(q*) - ryd 
X(q*) 
c(pt°, w) - C(pt°, w) 
1- . 'd/Ed(Q*) 
(1.34) 
(1.35) 
The first term is greater than or equal to zero. The second term is positive or 
zero if and only if pt- > p'-*. The equilibrium price for the intermediate good is 
determined by 
C(pt W) - C(pty, w) + is 
u 
p 
waLy + 2s 
(1.36) 
u(plw) tv)ts) 1 iv 
CHAPTER 1 
where 
.6 
u(p)wltv)ts) _ 
wC. (p, w) 
(](p, w) (r(p, w) + 
pC, (p, w) 
C(p, w)+is 
ed (q*)w(q*) 
35 
(1.37) 
If yU =0 then ptv = pt5. When -y" E (0,1], from eq. (1.37) it follows that, for all 
p>0,6u(p, w) tv, 0) > e`(p, w, 0, ts). Therefore from eq. (1.36) ptv < pt . 
This 
shows that eq. (1.35) is positive or zero. Q. E. D. 
Both taxes result in the same final good price q* but ptv < pt° (provided that 
7u 54 0) because the elasticity of derived demand is lower under is than under 
tv. This result can be explained as follows. A variation, say an increase, of p 
represents a cost shift for downstream producers. From the first order condition 
for profit maximization (1.4), under ad valorem taxation a marginal cost shift 
Cpdp must be matched by a corresponding increase of the perceived after-tax 
marginal revenue MRt° = (1 - t) [q + xq'(1 + vd )] which, from the second order 
condition, is obtained by a reduction of output such that -dMRty = Cpdp. On 
the other hand, under specific taxation the perceived after-tax marginal revenue 
is MRt$ =q+ xq'(1 + vd) - t8, so that for any marginal reduction of output 
-dMRty < -dMRt9, the reason being that with ad valorem taxation part of 
the increase in marginal revenue is absorbed by the government. Therefore, a 
given marginal cost shift causes a larger output reduction under ad valorem than 
under specific taxation, i. e. derived demand is more elastic under ad valorem 
than under specific taxation. 
In terms of revenue collected, the two taxes are equivalent when both upstream 
and downstream producers price at marginal cost. Pricing above marginal cost in 
at least one market is sufficient for t;, to raise more revenue than ts. 
Notice that 
R(tv) > R(ts) also when downstream producers price at marginal cost, provided 
that upstream firms price above it. Recall that when only the downstream market 
is considered, with exogenous input prices, as in Suits and Musgrave's (1953) 
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paper, ad valorem and specific taxes are always equivalent if producers price at 
marginal cost. 
The next two propositions deal with the comparison between downstream 
and upstream taxes of the same type. To proceed, a pair of restrictions are 
imposed. First, assume that downstream technology is Leontief. Let C, (p, w) = 
ay,, and C,, (p, w) = aLx be respectively the units of commodity y and the units of 
labour services employed to produce one unit of the consumption good x. Second, 
assume that final demand is of constant elasticity E. Under these assumptions, 
equilibrium prices are 
q=e 
payx + waLx + is (1.38) 
dI- tv 
p= 
(waL' + is 
u+ waLy 
+ is 
(1.39) 
'yu aye 1 -in 
First consider the comparison between upstream and downstream ad valorem 
taxation. 
Proposition 3 Assume that downstream technology is Leontief and that final 
demand is of constant elasticity. Consider a tax t; and a tax i; resulting in the 
same final good price q*. Let R(tv) and R(i;, ) be the corresponding revenues. 
Then 
R(t; ) z R(Zv) if (1 
a yx 
a L. 
Ly 
<ý 'yd 
- , ý, 
d yu 
(1.40) 
Proof. Equilibrium prices are 
waLx -yu + waLy 
jý" ayx t; 
t' 
p°ay.. +waL.. 
Q --, Yd 1 -tv 
t. E waL1 ry" waLy pv =- 
E --yu ay, 1- av, 
Q* =d (p1°ayx + waLX) 
(1.41) 
(1.42) 
(1.43) 
(1.44) 
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Tax revenues are 
R(tv) = tvq*X(q*) 
R(iv) = zvp: °ayýX(9*) 
From eqs. (1.42) and (1.44) one gets 
tvQ 
d ayx 
(pIV - ptv ) 
Therefore 
R(tv) - R(zv) _ (tvq* - ivpivayx)X(9*) _ 
-- 
-yd 
(1ty -p v) - zp 1v ayxX(q*) (1.45) 
Substituting (1.41) and (1.43) into (1.45) one obtains 
du 
R(t*1 - R(i*1 = 
(aLy lY aLx 7 
wa i*Xýq*ý vl vl 1- iv E- yd ayx e-u yý v 
and this implies (1.40). Q. E. D. 
Condition (1.40) is a function of (i) upstream and downstream market structure, 
(ii) elasticity of final demand and (iii) technological coefficients. If 7yd =0 and 
,u=0 then the two taxes are equivalent. If 7d #0 and yu =0 then R(tv) > 
R(i;, ). If yd =0 and -y" 0 then R(tv) < R(i;, ). The tax tv is more likely to 
raise more revenue than iv the lower is the elasticity of final demand. As for 
technological coefficients, notice that aL., and ayxaLy are respectively the units 
of labour directly and indirectly employed to produce one unit of the final good. 
The higher is aL., relative to ayraLy, the more likely is iv to raise a greater revenue 
than tv. 
The last proposition is about specific taxation and shows that levying up- 
stream or downstream producers brings about the same revenue. 
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Proposition 4 Assume that downstream technology is Leontief and that final 
demand is of constant elasticity. Consider a tax t* and a tax is resulting in the 
same final good price q*. Let R(t*) and R(is) be the corresponding revenues. 
Then R(ts) = R(i; ) . 
Proof. Equilibrium prices are, see eqs. (1.38)-(1.39), 
t* 
(waLx+t*s 
v puay+ waLy (1.46) 
yx 
q* - d(ptsayx+waLx+ts) 
(1.47) 
wa 'y" 
pýv _ 
Lx + waLy + is (1.48 ) 
- Ayu ay, 
q* =-d (p3 ayX + waLt) (1.49) 
-y 
Tax revenues are 
R(ts) = tsx(q*) 
R(2s) = z3 yxX(4*) 
Substitute (1.46) into (1.47) and (1.48) into (1.49). Equating the resulting 
equations, one finds that is and 
i* bring about the same final good price q* if and 
only if 
is = ayxz3 
Therefore R(ts) - R(is) = 0. Q. E. D. 
Of course, one must bear in mind that this equivalence result is obtained under 
the restrictive assumptions of Leontief technology and isoelastic final demand. 
1.6 Conclusions 
The impact of ad valorem and specific taxes in a model of vertically related oli- 
gopolies has been examined. Following Seade (1985) the analysis of tax incidence 
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has focused on finding the conditions for taxes to increase producers' net price 
and profits. 
It has been shown that tax incidence on downstream price and profits is 
governed by the price elasticity of the elasticity of final demand and downstream 
market structure. Specific downstream taxation is more likely to cause price 
overshifting and to raise profits than ad valorem downstream taxation. Also, 
ad valorem and specific taxes on upstream producers are equivalent, in terms of 
incidence, to the specific tax on downstream production. 
Tax incidence on upstream price and profits has been shown to depend on 
the price elasticity of the elasticity of derived demand, which in turn depends on 
upstream and downstream market structure, final demand conditions and input 
substitution in downstream production. Taxes on downstream producers may 
raise or lower the price of the intermediate good, but the ad valorem tax is more 
likely to reduce it. Specific taxes on upstream producers are more likely to raise 
upstream unit and total profits than upstream ad valorem taxation. 
Following Suits and Musgrave's (1953) approach, tax instruments have been 
compared in terms of revenue collected and the effect on the price of the con- 
sumption good. The revenue from an ad valorem tax is always higher than the 
revenue from a specific tax levied in the same industry, when both taxes result 
in the same price for the consumption good. The revenue from downstream ad 
valorem taxation can be higher or lower than the yield from upstream ad val- 
orem taxation. Upstream and downstream specific taxation always raise the same 
revenue, when both taxes result in the same price for the consumption good. 
The next chapter will apply the framework developed here to the analysis of 
tax reforms in vertically related industries. 
CHAPTER I 40 
A Appendix 
A. 1 The relation between E(mx) and F(q) 
Let mx = X(q) E C2 be direct demand, with X'(q) <0 for each q>0. The 
inverse demand is defined as q= q(mx). To ease the notation let m=1. Then 
xo = X[q(xo)] and qo - q[X(go)]. Two properties concerning the derivatives of 
direct and inverse demands which will be used below are the following. For each 
(qo, xo) such that xo = X(qo) 
Q'(xo)X'(4o) =1 (1.50) 
Qºº(xo) 
X 90 (1.51) 
[X (90)]3 
The elasticity of demand can be expressed either as a function of quantity or 
as a function of price 
ý(qo) =- 
X'(go)qo q(xo) 
= 6(xo) 
X(9o) xoq'(xo) 
The elasticity of the slope of inverse demand is defined as 
E(xo) _ _q"(xo) Q, (x o) 
and the elasticity of the slope of direct demand is 
E(qo) _ _x(qo) 
Qo 
x (qo) 
(1.52) 
Using (1.50), (1.51) and (1.52) the relation between E(xo) and E(qo) turns out 
to be 
Xo X" . X/tqo X 
E(qo) 
E(xo) = -4 ,-= sXX =.. - 
(1.53) 
q (x) xx qo e: (qo) 
The price elasticity of the elasticity of direct demand is 
F(qo) =d s(qo) 
90 
_ 
(ex" +_ ýX' Qo = -E(qo) +1+ g(qo) d9 s(9o) X qo XE 
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Finally, using (1.53) 
F(9o) = -E(qo)E(xo) +1+ E(qo) 
which is the result given on p. 16. 
A. 2 The elasticity of derived demand 
The elasticity of the derived demand (1.13) is defined by 
SU(pl w, tv, ts) _ -pop - -pcpp - pX 0, (1.54) 0 cp x 
where Op is given in (1.14). 
The elasticity of substitution between labour and the intermediate good in 
downstream production is defined as 
_d 
1og(y/Ld) 
_ 
pCppC 
dlog(p/w) wC,, CP 
where L' and y are respectively the conditional input demands for labour and 
the intermediate good. Thus the first term in (1.54) may be written 
_pcppwcw Cp c 
Substituting for Op from (1.12) the second term in (1.54) becomes 
X1 0X'gpCp 
11 
Xý Xq1 -t fq 
Substituting for q from (1.10) 
PCP 
Sd(9) 1- 
.d1 
C+ is ed(q) f9 
Finally, to obtain the elasticity of derived demand (1.18) define 
d 
1- 
1= 
w(q) 6: (q) f9 
CHAPTER 1 42 
A. 3 Ad valorem downstream taxation 
The tax t causes q to overshift if and only if the corresponding indicator shifting 
coefficient is greater than one 
sd 
qý) -- Cpa1 
tv- >1 q+ Cnaty f9 
Assuming that q(1 - -yd/6d) + CC(ap/ät) > 0, so that aq/at > 0, see eq. (1.25), 
this condition can be written 
S>1 if ca ý ap dv 
(q+cp)Fd 
atv 
The term in brakets is positive. Assuming that I Fdw 1>1 qw9 1, see on p. 22, 
then ap/ät 0 if Fd `5 0, which gives sd >1 if Fd < 0. 
A. 4 Proofs of the results in table 1.4 
Downstream profits. The profit function is 
m7rd = 
{(1 
- t2, )4(w, T) - is -C 
(p(w, T), w) 
}X (q(w, T)) (1.55) 
where T= (t,, ts, iv, is) is the vector of tax instruments, p(w, T) = ý(w, t,,, ts, 2,,, i3) 
is eq. (1.22) defining the equilibrium price of the intermediate good and q(w, T) = 
q(p(w, T), w, tz , ts) 
defines the equilibrium price for the final good, see eq. (1.11). 
A preliminary result is the following 
[(1 - tv)q - is - C(p, w)]X' + (l - tv)X = 
-tv)Xý 4- 
c(p, w)+is +. X= 
1- t X 
1d 1d 
tv)X1 Q1-d+d- ýd - 
d- 
Ed 
tv)X'g7 - 
_ ý1 - tv)(l 7d)X 
C(p, w)+is 
1- tv 
(1.56) 
(1.57) 
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where (1.56) makes use of the first order condition (1.10) and (1.57) uses X'q = 
-6d 1(. 
Consider the tax t3. Differentiating (1.55) 
a(m_rd) 
tz)q - is - C(p, w) X' + (1 - tv)X 
aq 
+ 
at3 {} ats 
x-CP aapx 
s 
_ (1 -tv)(1 --t')xaq -1 +cpap ats ats 
Let X= mx. Substituting for aq/ät3 from table 1.1 
a(m7rd) 
_1+C 
ap 
ats - 
[(l_d)3d_l] 
pats 
which is the derivative contained in table 1.4. The condition for this expression 
to be positive follows from (1 - yd)s s>1 and from the definition of s s. 
The computations of the derivatives with respect to t, i and is are similar 
and are omitted. 
The sufficient condition for tz1 to raise rnird is obtained as follows. Consider 
ä(m7rd) 
- 1l + Cap atv 
[(l_d)3d 
J atv 
This is positive if and only if s v(1 - 'yd) > 1. 
Substituting for s4, from table 1.1 
this condition can be written 
d 
q-ýdq+CpaP 
) 
(I_ýd) i 
ät 
(1_4+F 
+cp 
dd at 
,E E 
and after some passages one obtains 
QýFd - -Yd + ed) + 
Cp 
ap 
(Fd 
-1+ ed) <0 at 
z 
(1.58) 
Price overshifting is a necessary condition for profits to increase: from ap- 
pendix A. 3 sd >1 if Fd < 0, assuming ap/att1 > 0. Notice that if Fd -, yd +Ed <0 
then Fd -1+ Ed < 0. Thus Fd < -yd - Ed is a sufficient condition for the unequal- 
ity (1.58) to hold. 
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Upstream profits. The profit function is 
n7r" = 
[(1 
- it, )p(w, T) - i, 3 - waLy] b 
(p(w, T), w, tv, ts) (1.59) 
where 0 is defined in eq. (1.13). 
A preliminary result is the following 
[(1 -i)p-i3-waLy]up+(1 - iv)' = 
,, /' 
waLy + is 
+ 
c/> 
= 1- iv 
Wp 
- iv) pp11+ 
waLy + is 
= 
Eu 'F" Eu 1- i 
u_ 
(1 - zv)l/ppy Eu 
= (1.60) 
_ (1 - iß, )(1 - 7")o (1.61) 
where (1.60) makes use of the first order condition (1.17) and (1.61) uses Opp = 
-Eu 
V). 
Consider the tax is. Differentiating (1.59) 
ä(n7fu) 
_ 
(1 
-i)p-is-waLy 2ýIp+(1 -iv)W}v7 -W 
ai3 
{ý a23 
_ (1-i)(1--MOa-0 
Let 0= Cpmx. Substituting for äp/äi3 one gets the expression in table 1.4 
ä(n7r") 
ais 
The condition for this derivative to be positive follows from (1 - -yu)s s>1 and 
from the definition of s s. The computation of the derivative with respect to i 
is similar and is omitted. 
Consider the tax ts. Differentiating (1.59) 
ä(n7ru) 
_ -v)p-is-+(1 -i)+ {[(i } at sS +I1- iv)p - is - waLy] Ots 
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Using (1.61), the first term is equal to 
(1-i)(1-7")apCpmx 
ats 
As for the second term, using the first order condition (1.17), it is equal to 
1- 2v)p 
uu 
yýts 
The expression for its is obtained differentiating (1.13) 
,, /' _11_ Wts = 
CPX 
1- tv f 
9 
= -EdCpmx 
111 
1 -tv fq9 
Finally 
____) (1-iv) (1-yu) Vatap y-1-p tv e uryuQEdsd 
ats - CpmX 
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which is the expression in table 1.4. The computation of the derivative with 
respect to t, is similar and is omitted. 
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Chapter 2 
Tax Reforms in a Model of 
Vertically Related Oligopolies 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines tax reforms in a model of vertically related oligopolies, 
where a downstream industry produces a final good using the output of an up- 
stream industry as an input. The basic framework is taken from chapter 1 and 
the analysis will make extensive use of the results on tax incidence contained 
there. 
The market allocation generates two kind of inefficiencies that result in welfare 
loss. Firstly, upstream oligopolists set the price of the intermediate good above 
marginal cost and provided that downstream technology allows inputs substitu- 
tion this causes aggregate production inefficiency. ' Secondly, downstream oligo- 
polists introduce an additional price-cost margin. The analysis focuses on tax 
reforms, where the government aims at reducing the welfare loss by means of dis- 
tortionary commodity taxation while raising no revenue. Both ad valorem and 
'The meaning of aggregate production inefficiency is illustrated in detail in section 2.4. 
47 
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specific taxes levied on producers in both industries are considered. The pattern 
of actions the government has to take in order to improve welfare are shown to 
be related to downstream and upstream market structure, final demand condi- 
tions and input substitution in downstream production. Also, it is shown that 
under some circumstances the tax reform improves overall market performance 
by introducing additional aggregate production inefficiency. 
Tax reforms (only specific taxation) in vertically related industries has been 
recently analysed by Myles (1989), who considers in a general equilibrium frame- 
work the two polar cases of downstream (upstream) monopoly and upstream 
(downstream) competitive sector. His model is general equilibrium because it 
takes account of the impact of monopoly profits on final demand. In the model 
presented here distributed profits are assumed not to enter final demand but 
a wider range of downstream and upstream market structures are considered. 
Competition among oligopolists belonging to the same industry is modelled us- 
ing the conjectural variations framework, which encompasses monopoly, Bertrand 
oligopoly (marginal cost pricing) and Cournot oligopoly as particular cases. 
With downstream monopoly and upstream perfect competition, Myles (1989, 
proposition 2) shows that specific taxation cannot improve welfare if the monop- 
olist produces with constant returns to scale. ' The same result is contained here 
in proposition 6, extended to the case of downstream oligopoly. However, a new 
result is given in proposition 1, namely that with upstream marginal cost pric- 
ing and downstream oligopoly, tax reforms with ad valorem taxes are effective. 
The welfare loss can be reduced by taxing the final good and subsidizing the 
intermediate good. 
With downstream perfect competition and upstream monopoly, Myles (1989) 
'With increasing (decreasing) returns welfare can be improved by taxing (subsidizing) the 
intermediate good and subsidizing (taxing) the final good. 
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shows that a) if downstream technology is Leontief then specific taxation can- 
not raise welfare (proposition 3) and b) if input substitution occurs then welfare 
rises by subsidizing the intermediate good and taxing the final good (proposi- 
tion 4). Assuming exponential final demand, the work presented here generalizes 
this result (proposition 7) to the case where both downstream and upstream pro- 
ducers price above marginal cost. The condition under which taxing downstream 
producers and subsidizing upstream firms raises welfare is given a more precise 
characterization, being related to the elasticity of final demand, the elasticity of 
input substitution and the degree of market power in the downstream industry. 
Assuming isoelastic final demand, propositions 2- 5 in this paper deal with ad 
valorem taxation when both downstream and upstream oligopolists price above 
marginal cost. The design of the tax reform is shown to be contingent on the 
values of the elasticity of final demand and the elasticity of input substitution. 
Proposition 3 shows that welfare can be improved also when downstream tech- 
nology is Leontief and downstream producers price at marginal cost. Moreover, 
proposition 5 shows that when the elasticity of input substitution is low, the tax 
reform may improve welfare by raising the price of the intermediate good and by 
doing so generates additional aggregate production inefficiency. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model and 
summarizes the results on tax incidence, contained in chapter 1, that are relevant 
for the analysis of tax reforms. Section 2.3 derives the formulae expressing the 
effect of taxes on consumer's welfare and government's revenue. The rationale of 
tax reforms is illustrated in section 2.4, where particular attention is dedicated 
to the concept of aggregate production inefficiency. Tax reforms with ad valorem 
taxes are examined in section 2.5, where the particular case of isoelastic final 
demand is also considered. Section 2.6 examines tax reforms with specific taxes 
and look at the special case of exponential final demand. Numerical computations 
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of optimal ad valorem taxes are presented in section 2.7. Finally, conclusions are 
given in section 2.8. 
2.2 The model 
The basic framework is taken from chapter 1. This section briefly describes 
the model and summarizes the results on tax incidence that will be used in the 
analysis of tax reforms. 
The economy consists of one consumer, two vertically related oligopolies and 
the government. The downstream industry produces a final good using two in- 
puts: labour and an intermediate good produced by the upstream sector. Labour 
is the only input in upstream production. Profits are distributed to the consumer, 
who demands the final good and supplies labour. The labour market is assumed 
to be competitive and the wage rate is taken as the numeraire. When in at least 
one market the producers price above marginal cost, the resulting allocation is 
not efficient. The objective of the government is to improve market performance 
by levying ad valorem and specific taxes on producers while raising zero revenue. 
In both industries product is homogeneous, technology is constant returns 
to scale and no entry / exit occurs so that the number of firms is fixed. Each 
oligopolist has a conjecture about the way the other firms in the same industry 
will change their output levels in response to changes in its own output. The 
conjectural variations capture the degree of competition among oligopolists be- 
longing to the same industry, encompassing a wide range of market structures 
as particular cases, including the two polar cases of monopoly and competitive 
pricing. Symmetry is assumed: oligopolists belonging to the same industry have 
identical cost functions and conjectures. 
Competition between industries is modelled assuming that downstream oligo- 
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polists act as perfect competitors in the market for the intermediate good. This 
means that upstream oligopolists move first by setting the price for the interme- 
diate good and downstream oligopolists move second by setting the price of the 
final good taking the price of input as given. The model is solved in three steps. 
First, downstream profits are maximized for given price of the intermediate good. 
Second, the derived demand facing the upstream industry is obtained and finally 
upstream profits are maximized. 
Let x be the output of each downstream firm, L the supply of labour, q the 
price of the final good, w the wage rate, m, 7rd and n, 7r" the number and profits of 
downstream and upstream firms respectively. The consumer solves the following 
problem: 
max U(mx) - /3L m x, L 
s. t. qmx = wL + mird + n7r" 
(2.1) 
It is assumed that U(mx) E C4, U'(0) >0 and U"(mx) < 0. The parameter 
,Q>0 is the (constant) marginal disutility of labour. 
From the first order conditions of (2.1) the inverse demand for the final good 
is 
w 
q=0 U'(mx) =- q(mx) (2.2) 
/3/w is the (constant) marginal utility of lump sum income, in this case profits. 
Direct demand is denoted by 
mx = X(q) (2.3) 
and the supply of labour is 
L=q X(9) - 
m7rd + nru (2.4) 
ww 
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Separability and linearity in labour supply of the utility function imply that 
distributed profits affect labour supply but not final demand. 3 
Profits of each downstream oligopolist are 
7rd = 
[(l 
- tT, )q(mx) - is - C(p, w), x (2.5) 
where p is the price of the intermediate good and C(p, w) is the average (and 
marginal) cost function. The production function is assumed to be a CES, the 
elasticity of substitution between the labour input Ld and the intermediate good 
input yd being a_ -d log(yd/Ld)/d log(p/w). When a=0 technology is Leon- 
tief; the Cobb-Douglas case corresponds to a=1; inputs are perfect substitutes 
when a -+ oo. Two kind of taxes are levied on downstream producers: a specific 
tax is and an ad valorem tax at a tax inclusive rate tT, < 1. Both is and t may 
be negative, in which case the government is subsidizing producers. 
In terms of q the first order condition for a maximum of (2.5) is 
d 
q1__ 
c(1I ) +is 
= f(q, p, w, tv, t3) =0 (2.6) (q) 1- tv 
where Ed = -qX'/X is the price elasticity of direct final demand and -yd = (1 + 
vd)/m is a term expressing the degree of market power, vd = ä[(m - 1)x]/äx 
being the conjectural variation. Thus -yd =0 (vd = -1) corresponds to Bertrand 
conjectures or marginal cost pricing; Cournot behaviour gives yd = 1/M (vd = 0); 
when oligopolists collude or the industry is a monopoly 7d =1 (vd =m-1 and 
vd = 0, m=1 respectively). In general . 7d E [0,1], a higher value representing 
a higher degree of market power. Eq. (2.6) defines the equilibrium price for the 
final good q= q(p, w, tT ts). 
'Since final demand depends only on own price, profit maximization by downstream oligo- 
polists is a simple problem. Suppose instead that distributed profits affect final demand. Then 
the profit function of downstream oligopolists have profits among its arguments, which makes 
profit maximization a more complex problem. 
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Let y be the output of each upstream firm. By Shephard's lemma the (direct) 
derived demand for the intermediate good is 
ny = Cp(p, w)X 
(0(. » = O(p, w, tv, t3) (2.7) 
Let waLy be the constant average (and marginal) cost of labour in upstream 
production, i3 the specific and i the ad valorem tax levied on upstream producers. 
Profits of each upstream oligopolist are 
7rß` = 
[(1 
- i)p(ny, w, t, t3) - is - waLy] y (2.8) 
where p(ny, w, t, , t3) is the inverse derived demand. 
In terms of p the first order condition for a maximum of (2.8) is 
up1 wa 
-- 
Ly + Is = 9(p) w7 tvi ts) zvi is) =0 (2.9) u (PIw)tV, t8) 1 -IV 
where eu - -pip/o is the price elasticity of the direct derived demand and -yu E 
[0,1] is the term expressing the degree of market imperfection in the upstream 
industry. 
Eqs. (2.6) and (2.9) define the equilibrium prices. ' Substituting for the equi- 
librium prices into the respective demand functions gives the equilibrium quanti- 
ties. Finally, plugging equilibrium prices and quantities into (2.5) and (2.8) gives 
the equilibrium profits of downstream and upstream oligopolists respectively. 
2.2.1 The impact of taxation on prices 
The comparative statics results about the impact of taxation on q and p are 
summarized in table 2.1. Rows 1-3 contain the determinants of tax incidence. 
'The existence and stability conditions for the downstream industry are respectively ed > td 
and Fd >1- ed/yd, where Fd = gedled. The corresponding conditions for the upstream sector 
are eu > y" and F" >1- ? "/y", where Fu = pep/E". The stability condition is sufficient for 
a maximum, for it implies the second order condition. 
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Table 2.1: The impact of taxation on prices 
54 
fq 
d 
d(1 - 
Fd) > O, Fd 
Ed 
= 
qd 
Eu = 
wc"(pl w) 
0'+ 
PC, (p, W) 
Ed (q)w(q), w(q) = 
1, d 1- 
C(p, W) C(p, w) + is 1- [1 - Fd( q)] 
gp= 
u 
1- ý(1-Fu)>0, F` 
Eu PE 
19P 
--, ý"ptu 
1 ap 
>0 iff Fd< Oa (Eu)2 gp atv 
ap s 
u 
=u 
Et 1 
(, u)2 g 
if Fd < 0 then 
ýp 
3 
> oa 
p 
ap 
li 
psv sv = 1- 
u 
rye 1 sv>1 if Fu < 0 v v gp 
ap 
Ö2S =1 ss 1- 2v 
ss =1 
gp 
ss>1 iff FU < 1 
aq ap 
sd =1q+C sd 
q C1 = 
) 
_tid c pa 1 
- s >1 if Fd < 06 ätv p 1- tv ätv a q+Gp- fq t" 
Oq 
01 is =1 
1+Cpap ss 1 tv 0t3 
d 1 
fq ss>1 iff Fd < 1 
äq 
aiv -11C su sd 1- tv 1- iv pp :v tv sd :v =1 fq sd >1 tv 
iff Fd < 1 
ag 
= s 
11. cpssss 1 tv 1 iv st =1 fq Sd >1 if F 
(a) assuming that I Fdw I>I qwq 
(b) see appendix A. 3 in chapter 
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The first shows the stability condition for downstream firms and defines the 
elasticity of the elasticity of final demand Fd. The second contains the elasticity 
of derived demand e". The third gives the stability condition for upstream firms 
and defines the elasticity of the elasticity of derived demand F". 
The second column of rows 6-11 contains the indicator shifting coefficients. 
For the sake of illustration, take s',: the way this coefficient is constructed is 
such that sý ,>1 
if and only if a marginal increase of the tax i causes upstream 
producers' net price, or profits per unit of output, to increase, in which case i 
is said to cause price overshifting. Producers' net price is unaffected if and only 
if sv=1 and it goes down if and only if s, < 1. The third column of the table 
gives the conditions for price overshifting and shows that these are governed by 
Fd and Fu. The indicator shifting coefficients and the conditions for overshifting 
will play a central role in the analysis of tax reforms. 
2.3 Consumer's welfare and tax revenue 
Consumer's welfare is measured by the indirect utility function 
V (q, m'rd, n7ru) = U(X(q)) - (ß/w)gX(q) + (ß/w)(mird + nlru) (2.10) 
Let T= {tz 
, t3, 
i,,, is} be the set of tax instruments. By the usual properties of 
indirect utility aV/äq = -(O/w)mx and äV/a(m7rd) = aV/a(n7ru) = ß/w. Thus 
the marginal impact on consumer's welfare of a tax 7ET is 
av 
(O/ w) MX 
aq 
+ PI w) 
)+TET 
(2.11 
aT aT aT aT 
A marginal increase of a tax instrument raises the price of the consumption good 
and this lowers welfare. However, as the analysis of chapter 1 has shown, taxation 
may increase profits and thus raise welfare. The partial derivatives expressing 
the impact of taxes on profits are given in table 1.4 of chapter 1. 
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The approach adopted herein is to express consumer's welfare in a form which 
is more convenient for the analysis of tax reform. Substituting m7rd and n7ru 
from (2.5) and (2.8) into (2.10) one finds that 
V (q, p, T) =U 
(X(q)) 
- 
[wC(p, 
w) + waLycp(Pi w)] X(q) + 
w 
-0 
1tz, 
q + is + (z, p + zs)Cp(p, w)] X(q) (2.12) 
w 
Under this alternative specification, each tax instrument affects welfare both 
directly and indirectly, the indirect effect going through the final and intermediate 
good prices. 
Notice that, excluding 0, the second and the third term of (2.12) must be 
equal to labour supply. In fact 
[Cw(p, 
w) + aLycp(p, w)l mx + 
tq + is + (vp + Z3)C (p, w) 
mx (2.13) Jw 
is labour demand, which in equilibrium matches the corresponding supply. The 
first term of (2.13) is total demand for labour from the private sector: Cwmx 
and aLyCpmx are labour inputs in the downstream and upstream industry re- 
spectively. The second term is government revenue evaluated in terms of the 
numeraire and this must correspond to the demand for labour from the public 
sector. This result is implied by Walras law and follows from the implicit as- 
sumption that the government does not to enter the markets for the final and 
intermediate goods. In other words, when the public sector raises a positive rev- 
enue, it demands labour services. Obviously, the government cannot run a budget 
deficit, for it cannot supply labour services. Notice also that a positive revenue 
causes a welfare loss, for the consumer supplies some labour services to the public 
sector which are transformed neither into tradeable goods nor into public goods. 
Government's revenue is 
R(q, p, T) = r(q, p, T)x(q) 
r(9, p, T) = tq+ is + (ivP + i3)CC(p, w) (2.14) 
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Table 2.2 shows the partial derivatives expressing the impact of taxation on 
V (q, p, T), R(q, p, T) and total profits II(q, p, T) = m7r' + n7ru. Proofs are given 
in appendix A. I. 
To illustrate, consider consumer's welfare. The formula shows that tax inci- 
dence is determined by two factors. One is h(-r), which is defined in the last row 
of the table. The other is a weighted sum of äq/är and äp/i9-r, the weights being 
°q and O Cp respectively. Notice that 9q depends on (i) the level of tz, (ii) the 
elasticity of final demand and (iii) the share of profits in national income. The 
term Op is a function of (i) the tax rate i, (ii) the elasticity of substitution and 
the share of labour costs in downstream production and (iii) the share of profits 
in upstream revenues. A similar interpretation applies to the formulae expressing 
tax incidence on government's revenue and total profits. 
2.4 Tax Reforms: the framework 
Vertically related oligopolies result in welfare loss for two simple reasons. Firstly, 
upstream oligopolists set the price of the intermediate good above marginal cost 
and unless downstream technology is Leontief this causes aggregate production 
inefficiency. Downstream producers are still on the frontier of their production 
sets but the input mix is not efficient for society because the quantity of primary 
factor (labour) directly and indirectly employed to produce the final output is not 
minimized. Secondly, downstream oligopolists introduce an additional price-cost 
margin. 
These points are illustrated in figure 2.1. The graph has final output (con- 
sumption) and labour inputs on the horizontal and vertical axis respectively. The 
line CBC is the Consumer's Budget Constraint 
mlyd + nlru L=-+q mx (2.15) 
ww 
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Table 2.2: 
The impact of taxation on consumer's welfare, 
government revenue and total profits 
aV 
-- 69mx eq = 
m7r 
d+ 
n7rU d+ tv 
aq w qmx 
av 
--0 9pcpmx 9p = 
u n7r wCw 
cT + iv ap w pny C 
av 
aT 
Ogaq+OpCpap+h(rr) 
w aT aT 
mx, TET 
R 
aq = P9'nx Pq = 
tv -rd 6 q 
OR 
= PpCCmx Pp _ 
ivp + is wCw 
Zv a ap pc 
OR 
aT 
h(7-)), TET aT aT 
all 
= (1 - Oq)mx 
all 
_ -9pCpmx aq ap 
arl 
- (1 - Bq) 
aq 
- epcp 
ap 
- h(T) mx, TET a 9 aT T 7 4 
h(t) =q h(i1, ) = pCp h(ts) =1 h(is) = Cp 
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The consumer's optimum is at E, the corresponding indifference curve being II'. 
The line LIR (Labour Input Requirement) is the equation of labour de- 
mand (2.13), which has slope 
L= 
Cw(p, w) + aLycp(p, w) + 
r(q, p, T 
mx w 
(2.16) 
When r=0 this gives the quantity of labour directly and indirectly demanded 
by the private sector to produce one unit of the final good at the current price 
p for the intermediate good. In equilibrium the labour market clears, thus LIR 
passes through the consumer's optimum E. 
Finally, PPF is the (aggregate) Production Possibility Frontier, which has 
slope 
L 
= 
Cw(aLy, 0+ aLyC (aLy, 1) 
mx 
(2.17) 
This gives the minimum quantity of labour services that are directly and in- 
directly required to produce one unit of the final good, given the state of the 
technology. To obtain PPF, set p= waL4, the price of the intermediate good at 
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its marginal (and average) production cost. By the homogeneity property of the 
cost function C, (waLy) W) = C,, (aLy, 1) and aLyCp(waLy, w) = aLyCp(aLy, 1). 
Aggregate production inefficiency occurs when LIR is steeper than PPF, as 
shown in figure 2.1: final output is produced using an amount of labour which 
exceeds the minimum required given the state of technological knowledge. Two 
conditions must simultaneously hold for aggregate production to be inefficient: 
upstream oligopolists must price above marginal cost (7u 54 0, thus p> aLyw 
and 7ru > 0) and input substitution has to be possible in downstream production 
(o 54 0). If either upstream producers price at marginal cost or downstream 
technology is Leontief (so that C,,, and Cp are independent of p), then LIR is on 
PPF and aggregate production is efficient. 
In summary, downstream and upstream market imperfections cause a welfare 
loss which in terms of figure 2.1 is represented by (a) LIR being steeper than PPF 
and (b) the CBC being steeper than LIR and having a negative intercept. ' If 
both industries were perfectly competitive then CBC and LIR would be on PPF 
and the resulting Pareto efficient allocation would be at point 0 on PPF. 
Consider the equilibrium with no taxation. Now suppose that the government 
selects two tax instruments 71,72 ET and seeks to increase consumer's welfare 
by introducing one tax and one subsidy while raising no revenue. 
For small taxes Tl = dr1 and r2 = dTr2 the impact on welfare is 
dV °= 
aV0 
dTi + 
V0 
dT2 
Ti ÖaT2 
where V' denotes that the partial derivatives are evaluated at tt, = iv = is = is = 
0. If the tax reform has to raise no revenue then dT-1 and dr2 are constrained by 
dR°= 
aR0 
dri+ 
R0 
dr2=0 
497-1 are 
'The absolute value of the intercept measures distributed profits in terms of the numeraire, 
see eq. (2.15). 
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Solving for drl and substituting into the differential of the indirect utility 
function 
av° - 
av° 
_ 
aR°/aTl av° dT (2.18) aTl aRolar2 aT2 1 
aR°/öri dT2 - 9R°/aT2 d7-1 (2.19) 
The element in brackets determines the direction of the tax reform. If this is 
positive then the government can increase consumer's welfare by introducing a 
tax r1 and a subsidy r2, while raising no revenue. A tax r2 and a subsidy 71 are 
needed if the term is negative. No welfare improving tax reform is feasible if it 
is equal to zero. 
The effect on prices and total profits is 
Qo dqo =- 
Ro/ Ti aqo 
dTl (2.20) 
a7i aRo/aT2 a72 
pa dpo = 
a_ aRo/art ap o dri (2.21) arl aRo/ar2 are 
drI° = 
(OHO 
_ 
aR°/DTi an° d7 l 1 aTl aR°/3T2 aT2 
In terms of figure 2.1, the government is seeking to shift the CBC and the LIR 
lines by means of distortionary taxes in order to move the market equilibrium E 
to a higher indifference curve. 
2.5 Tax Reform: ad valorem taxes 
The effect on consumer's welfare, prices and total profits of a tax reform that 
makes use of ad valorem taxes and is constrained to raise no revenue is 
0 
dV °_w mx (OqsQ + 9pP) dtv 
ud 
aid 
Q- 9siv - 9(1 - "Yd/E )-Cap 
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P=Qsu 'paap 
Vtv 
dQ° 
= _Sd Q dtv, 
div =-q dt 
PCP 
(2.23) 
The algebraic proofs are contained in appendix A. 2. Recall that sd ,sy and 
ap/ätz1 are defined in table 2.1 and that 9q and Op are defined in table 2.2. 
The sign of the term Oqs vQ +OP determines the direction of the tax reform: 
if positive then dV °>0 with dtz >0 and diz1 < 0. At the equilibrium without 
taxes °q >0 (it is equal to zero only if both downstream and upstream profits 
are zero), s id, ,>0 and 
Op >0 (it is equal to zero when upstream profits are 
zero or when downstream technology is Leontief). The terms Q and P can take 
positive and negative values and determine respectively the effect on the final 
and intermediate good prices: if dt >0 then dq <0 if Q ->` 0 and dp '-< 0 if P `-> 0. 
Notice that Q=P- q(1 - -yd/6d) and that q(1 - -yd/Ed) > 0.6 Therefore there 
are four cases of tax reform to consider, which are summarized in table 2.3. 
TR 1. Q>0 is sufficient for P>0. Welfare increases by taxing the final good 
and subsidizing the intermediate good. Both the final and the intermediate good 
prices fall; 7 the impact on total profits is undetermined. 
When 0<P< q(1 - yd/ed) and Q<0 the two following cases occur. 
TR 2. If Oqs 
vQ + 
O, P >0 then consumer's welfare can be increased by taxing 
the downstream industry and subsidizing the upstream sector. The price of the 
6The condition 6d > 7d must hold for the first order condition (2.6) to define a positive q. 
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dp° _-1P dt,,, d H° = mx[(Oq - 1)s vQ +O P] dtv Cp 
'The price of the final good does not change if Q=0. 
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dt di dq dp dU 
Q>0=ý P>0 Og4Q+8pP>0 + - - - ? TR 1 
o<P< q(1 -ydIEd) 
89svQ+9pP>0 + - + - + TR 2 
Q<0 
9gsd, Q + 9pP <0 - + - + ? TR 3 
P<O=: ý-Q<0 OgsüQ+OpP<0 - + - - ? TRH 
intermediate good falls and the price of the final good rises. Therefore profits 
must increase, otherwise welfare would not improve. 
TR 3. If Oqs vQ + 0pP <0 then the government subsidizes downstream producers 
and taxes upstream production. The price of the final good falls whereas the price 
of the intermediate good increases; the impact on total profits is undetermined. 
TR 4. P<0 is sufficient for Q<0. The government subsidizes the downstream 
industry and taxes the upstream sector. Both prices fall; ' total profits may rise 
or fall. Necessary (but not sufficient) condition for P<0 is that ap/at > 0. 
One point of section 2.4 was to show that if upstream oligopolists price above 
marginal cost and if downstream technology allows input substitution, then the 
market allocation brings about aggregate production inefficiency. Hence TR 3 
looks rather surprising, for the tax reform raises the price of the intermediate good 
8The price of the intermediate good does not change if P=0. 
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and by doing so causes additional inefficiencies (in terms of figure 2.1 the LIR 
line becomes steeper). Proposition 5 below will show that under isoelastic final 
demand TR 3 may arise when the degree of input substitution in downstream 
production is relatively low. 
The goal of the analysis is to establish a relation between the four types of 
welfare improving tax reforms and factors such as market structure in the two 
industries, the characteristics of final demand and the degree of input substitution 
in downstream production. 
Proposition 1 (Ad valorem taxation) Assume that upstream firms price at mar- 
ginal cost and downstream oligopolists price above marginal cost, i. e. ry" =0 and 
7d E (0,1]. Then TR 1 applies: welfare can be increased by taxing the final good 
and subsidizing the intermediate good. Both prices fall. If 0< 7d <1 then profits 
decrease, if yd =1 then profits do not change. 
Proof. yU =0 implies 0=0 (because 7r" = 0), aplatz1 =0 and sv=1. Thus 
Q= q(yd/ed) >0 and P=q>0, which correspond to TR 1. The impact on 
profits depends on the sign of eq - 1; from the definition of 0q and after some 
manipulations one finds that yU =0 implies °q -1= yd - 1. Q. E. D. 
Proposition 1 is the only result that can be given assuming a general demand 
function. The welfare loss is caused by downstream producers pricing above 
marginal cost. Aggregate production is efficient, for upstream producers price at 
marginal cost. The tax on final output tends to increase q. However, the subsidy 
on upstream firms reduces p and in turn downstream production costs, and this 
tends to lower q. The tax reform works in improving welfare because the second 
effect more than compensates the first. 
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2.5.1 Isoelastic final demand 
Assume that the utility function and the corresponding final demand are 
U(mx) =a_ (Mx)(f-i)/E - /3L 1 6- 
mx = (bq)-E 
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(2.24) 
(2.25) 
where a>0,0 > 0, b= 0/(wa) and e>1. Isoelastic final demand is convenient 
because it simplifies the comparative statics derivatives of table 2.1: Fd =0 and 
the elasticity of derived demand is 
wcw + pcp ýu(p, w, ts) = C, C, + is 
(2.26) 
Since Eu is independent of t, ap/at vanishes in (2.23) and 
nw = q(s -1+7 
d/e) (2.27) 
P=qsv>0 (2.28) 
Referring to the classification of table 2.3, TR 4 is ruled out, fo. r P>0. The 
crucial element that determines the direction of the tax reform is the indicator 
shifting coefficient s,, expressing the impact of the ad valorem tax i on upstream 
producers' net price. If s, >1 d/, ý then TR 1 occurs; if sv<1- -yd/, ýf then 
either TR 2 or TR 3 occurs. 
The goal is to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the direction of 
the tax reform which are related to the following structural parameters: final 
demand elasticity . ý, elasticity of input substitution in downstream production a,, 
upstream market structure -yu and downstream market structure -yd. 
The factor determining the direction of the tax reform is a function of the 
structural parameters and can be defined as 
w(oýIZ1ý( d, yu) = W1(0-! ý, -Yd, 7U) + kp2(0', e, yd«7u) (2.29) 
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where 
`x'1(011 Oqs Q (2.30) d 
lý2(O'i -! ýi'Yd, -(, ) = opP (2.31) 
From (2.28) and from the definition of Op in table 2.2, W2(0, ý, yd, yu) =0 and 
'N. )>0forallo >0, e> 1,7('E [0,1], . y"E(0,1]. 
Lemma 1 %J (o,, ýf, -yd, -yu) is continuous in all its arguments. 
Proof. °q, s v, 
Q, 0, and P are continuous functions of o, ý, yd, -yU and of 
equilibrium prices and profits. The cost function is a CES and is continuous 
in or. Final demand is continuous in e. Thus eqs. (2.6) and (2.9), determining 
equilibrium prices and profits, are continuous in a, e, ^yd and fyu. Q. E. D. 
When y" =0 then s, =1, Q>0, W1(. ) >0 and the result of proposition 1 
applies. This subsection focuses on upstream producers pricing above marginal 
cost. 
When -yU # 0, table 2.1 shows that 
Sv> 1 if Fu-pü <0 E 
(2.32) 
Since p, Eu > 0, the sign of F" is determined by the sign of eu, the derivative 
of (2.26) with respect to p. When is = 0, the expression for ep is 
ep - (1 
WC2Cp (2.33) 
C 
From (2.32)-(2.33) it follows that, for any E>1,7 dE [0,1], y" E (0,1], 
s v< 1 if aE [0,1) or aE (e, oo) 
s v= 1 if or 1 or a_ (2-34) 
sý >1 if oE (1, e) 
The next proposition follows directly from these price overshifting conditions. 
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Proposition 2 (Ad valorem taxation) Assume that final demand is of constant 
elasticity e>1. Assume that 7d E [0,1] and 7" E (0,1]. Assume that aE [1, e]. 
Them the welfare improving tax reform is TR 1. 
Proof. From (2.34), s! ' > 1 if oE Since ry dE [0,1], this is a sufficient 
condition for Q= q(s ,-1 +7 
dle) > 0, IV1(. ) > 0. Q. E. D. 
Putting together propositions 1 and 2, when aE the welfare improving tax 
reform is TR 1, whatever market structure in the two industries. The government 
levies a tax on downstream producers and subsidizes the upstream industry. Both 
prices fall. ' 
Next consider the case of downstream Leontief technology. Let Cp(p, w) = ay., 
and C,, (p, w) = aL., be respectively the units of commodity y and the units of 
labour services employed to produce one unit of the consumption good x. The 
input mix is independent of input prices. 
Proposition 3 (Ad valorem taxation) Assume that final demand is of constant 
elasticity e>1. Assume that -yd E [0,1] and -y" E (0,1]. Assume that o=0. 
Then 
a. TR 3 applies if 
, yd aLx 
>-; 
ayxaLy E- 'yd -yu 
b. there is no welfare improving tax reform if 
c. TR 1 applies if 
d 
aLx 
ayxaLy - ýd u 
Proof. Leontief technology (a = 0) implies 
Eu = 
PC, e ýu = 
wCý'CP Fu = 
wCw - CU C2 C 
aL, x 
E 'yd 
ayxaLy -yd 7u 
9The price of the final good does not change if 7d =0 and a=1 or yd =0 and o=E, for 
in both cases Q=0. 
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so that 
9p=1-yEu (1-F")=1-mau 
, yu pcp, ý yu 
S: v- 
u PC E 9'p C (E - yu) 
and 
n=Sv-1+ ý1'd 
-- 
wCº v 'yu + 
, ý, 
d 
If PC, 
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Let Cp = ay,, and C = aLx. The equilibrium price of the intermediate good is 
+aLy w 
ý (a' 
yu ayx E 
Therefore 
uaLx d 'i 
L. 
+- (2.35) Q 
'ýaLx + ýayxa 
so that Q<0, 'P1<Oiff 
aLx 
5_7d 
ý 
(2.36) 
ayxaLy e- -Yd 7 
and this proves the proposition. Q. E. D. 
Under Leontief technology, the welfare improving tax reform is either TR 1 or 
TR 3. With the former, the government taxes downstream producers and subsi- 
dizes upstream firms, whereas with the latter the downstream industry is subsi- 
dized and the upstream sector is taxed. 
The choice between TR 1 and TR 3 is contingent on eq. (2.36). Proposition 3 
in chapter 1 gives an economic interpretation of this result. Consider a tax tv 
and a tax i;, resulting in the same final good price q*. Let R(t*) and R(i, ) be the 
corresponding revenues. Then 
R(tv) z R(iv) i ff (1 _ z) 
aLx 
d77d u 
(2.37 1 
ay1aLy 7 
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The relation between eqs. (2.36) and (2.37) is evident, for the former has been 
computed assuming i = 0. Hence, if t is more effective than i., in raising 
revenue, then the government chooses TR 1, i. e. a tax dtv, >0 and a subsidy 
di, <0. 
Turning to the economic interpretation of eq. (2.36), notice that the left hand 
side depends on technological coefficients. The coefficient aL, ' gives the quantity 
of labour services directly employed to produce one unit of the final good. The 
term ay., aLy gives the quantity of labour services which are indirectly employed 
to produce one unit of the final good: each unit of output requires ay, units of 
intermediate good, that in turn requires aLy units of labour. The right hand side 
depends on the elasticity of final demand and on market structure in the two 
industries. Notice that -yd =0 (downstream producers pricing at marginal cost) 
is sufficient for TR 3 to occur. The tax reform TR 3 (dt < 0, div > 0) is more 
likely to apply (i) the more labour intensive is the downstream sector relatively 
to the upstream sector, (ii) the higher is 7", i. e. market power in the upstream 
industry, (iii) the lower is -yd, i. e. the more competitive is the downstream sector 
and (iv) the higher is the elasticity of final demand. 
Having determined tax reforms for a=0 (Leontief) and a=1 (Cobb- 
Douglas), the next natural step is to consider the interval o- E (0,1). So far, 
the following results have been established. 
Lemma 2 For any e>1, -yd E [0,1], -y" E (0,1], 
a. T2(00ý, 'Yd, 7") =0 and W2(1, ,. 'd, u) > 0; 
b. Q(O, ý, 7d, 1h) < Q(1, ý,, 7d, u); 
d 
aLx 
du C. ý1(ojý, ýidIiuý < 
2! 0 if < 
ayxaLy E7 
CHAPTER 2 70 
Proof. Part (a): if a=0, then Op =0 and if o=1, then n7r" > 0, Op > 0. Part 
(b): if a=1, then s, =1, thus Q whereas if or = 0, then Q< yd/ý, see 
eq. (2.35). Part (c): see proposition 3. Q. E. D. 
Lemma 2 describes the behaviour of T1, %12 and Q at the endpoints of the interval 
(0,1). The behaviour of these functions at interior points cannot be studied 
analytically. The following propositions make the regularity assumption that IV1 
and '*P 2 are strictly increasing. 10 The justification for assuming ä'2/äa >0 
comes from point (a). More critical is to assume äßl/äa >0 from point (b), 
for '1 = Ogsd, Q and (b) just states that Q(0, .)< 
Q(1, 
. 
). However, notice that 
v yd) independent of a. As for 9q, this term may be decreasing as well 
as increasing in a. 
Proposition 4 (Ad valorem taxation) Assume that final demand is of constant 
elasticity e>1. Assume that -yd E (0,1] and 7" E (0,1]. Assume that '1 and'P2 
are strictly increasing in oE (0,1) and that 
d 
aLx 
<_d 
yu (2.38 
ayx aLy i' i' 
Then for any o, E (0,1) the welfare improving tax reform is TR 1. 
Proof. Lemma 2-(a) and aW 2/0o >0 imply that 'F2 >0 for all aE (0,1). From 
lemma 2-(c), condition (2.38) implies that 'P1(0, e, 7 d, -y") > 0; then ä'Fl/äo- >0 
implies that 'P1 >0 for all oE (0,1). Q. E. D. 
Proposition 5 (Ad valorem taxation) Assume that final demand is of constant 
elasticity e>1. Assume that -yd E [0,1] and -y" E (0,1]. Assume that '1 and 'P2 
are strictly increasing in oE (0,1) and that 
a Lx 
> -! 
7 
ay., aLy - 'yd 7u 
(2.39) 
10The numerical computations of section 2.7 will show that this assumption is plausible. 
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Then there exist a unique o, * and a unique o, **, both depending on ý, yd and f 
such that 0<o, * < o, ** <1 and 
a. if cr E [0, o. *) then TR 3 applies; 
b. if a= or* then there is no welfare improving tax reform; 
c. if oE (a. *, o. **) then TR 2 applies; 
d. if aE [or**, 1] then TR 1 applies. 
Proof. Lemma 2-(a) and 19 1ý 2/190' >0 imply that \2 >0 for all aE (0,1). From 
lemma 2-(c), condition (2.39) implies that 'P1(0, ý, -yd, y") < 0; then lemma 2-(b), 
continuity of '1(. ), ail/aa >0 and X1(17 E, ryd,. yu) >0 imply that there exists a 
unique a** E (0,1] such that W1 <0 for or E [0, or**) and '1 >0 for aE (a**, 1]. 
Finally, there exists a unique a*, 0<o, * < or**, such that 4_ tP1 + P2 <0 for 
or E [0, o. *) and 'P >0 for aE (a*, 1]. Q. E. D. 
Corollary 1 If .. yd =0 then proposition 5 applies and o, ** = 1. 
Proposition 5 shows that when condition (2.39) holds and input substitution is 
relatively low (0 < or < a*), then the welfare improving tax reform is TR 3. Up- 
stream oligopolists price above marginal cost and there is aggregate production 
inefficiency. By taxing upstream producers and subsidizing downstream pro- 
ducers the government raises the price of the intermediate good and introduces 
additional aggregate production inefficiency: in terms of figure 2.1 the LIR line 
rotates in anticlockwise direction and this causes a welfare loss. Nonetheless this 
effect is more than compensated by the welfare gain of lowering the price of the 
final good, which causes the CBC line to become flatter. The intuition is the 
following. If o is low then the intermediate good and labour are almost perfect 
complements in downstream production, thus the input mix is not distorted by 
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much if p is set above marginal cost by upstream producers. A high proportion 
of the welfare loss arises from price-cost margins and only a low proportion from 
aggregate production inefficiency. Therefore the welfare gain of reducing q more 
than compensates the welfare loss of creating additional inefficiency by raising p. 
The final step would be to look at the case oE (e, oo). However, since 
no analytical results are available, this is left to the numerical computations of 
section 2.7. 
2.6 Tax Reform: specific taxes 
The effect on welfare, prices and profits of a tax reform that employs specific 
taxes and raises no revenue is 
dV° =0 mx (Oq43Q + OpP) dts 
Q_Ss_1-Cap 
ats 
P=s2 -cpap ats 
dq° = -s 
sQ dt3, dp° =-1P dts, d Ho = mx[(Oq - 1)s 
sQ +O P] dt3 CP 
dis =1 dts (2.40) C 
The algebraic proofs are similar to those referring to ad valorem taxes and 
therefore are omitted. The direction of the tax reform is determined by the sign 
of 0qs sQ +- O P. Notice that 
9q > 0, Sts > 0,9p >0 and Q= P-1. Therefore 
there are four cases of tax reform to consider, which are summarized in table 2.4. 
Assuming a general demand function, the only result is the following. 
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Table 2.4: Tax Reform: specific taxes 
dt3 dis dq dp dH 
Q>04P>0 0gs9Q+8pP>0 + - - - ? TR 1 
0<P<1 
9933Q+BpP>0 + - + - + TR2 
Q<0 
Oqs 3Q + BpP <0 - + - + ? TR 3 
P<O=> Q<0 0gs3Q+9pP<0 - + - - ? TR4 
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Proposition 6 (Specific taxation) Assume that upstream firms price at marginal 
cost and downstream oligopolists price above marginal cost, i. e. y" =0 and 
7E (0,1]. Then there exists no welfare improving Tax Reform. 
Proof. ryu =0 implies 0P =0 (because 7rß` = 0), äp/ät8 =0 and sy=1. Thus 
Q=0 and P>0. Q. E. D. 
Propositions 1 and 6 give an interesting result as far as the comparison between 
ad valorem and specific taxation is concerned. When the upstream sector prices 
at marginal cost then a tax reform which employs ad valorem taxes is effective, 
whereas specific taxes are ineffective. Ad valorem taxes manage to lower the price 
of the final good and downstream profits: in terms of figure 2.1 the CBC line 
shifts up and becomes flatter, so that the net effect is to allow the consumer to 
move to a lower indifference curve. Instead, specific taxes are unable to affect the 
consumer's budget constraint. 
To get further results, one has to resort to specific functional forms for final 
demand. Constant elasticity was suitable when considering tax reforms with ad 
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valorem taxes. As for specific taxes, a convenient functional form is exponential 
demand. 
2.6.1 Exponential final demand 
Assume that the utility function and the corresponding final demand are 
U(mx) =aI log A- log(mx) + 1] mx - /3L (2.41) 
mx =A exp(-bq) (2.42) 
where a>0,0 > 0, A>0 and b= 0/(wa). The properties of this functional 
form are that (i) the elasticity is linear in q, ed(q) = bq and (ii) the elasticity of 
the elasticity is constant and equal to Fd = 1. 
The elasticity of derived demand is 
9" = 
wcw 
0, + 
pCp (e: d- -f d) (2.43) 
C C+is 
From eq. (2.6) 
7d C(p, w) + is 
b+1- tv 
(2.44) 
so that 
E'(P, w, tv) = 
wcw 
Q+ 
pcý b (2.45) 
C1- tv 
Since E" is independent of t3, ap/at3 vanishes in (2.40) and 
Q=ss-1 (2.46) 
P=ss>0 (2.47) 
The tax reform TR 4 cannot occur, for P>0. The factor determining the 
direction of the tax reform is the indicator shifting coefficient s s. If ss1 then 
TR 1 applies, whereas if ss <1 then either TR 2 or TR 3 occurs. 
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When -yU =0 then sy=1, Q=0,0 =0 and the result of proposition 6 
applies. This subsection focuses on upstream producers pricing above marginal 
cost. 
When -yu 0, table 2.1 shows that 
s>1 if F`peu sp <1 (2.48) 
Differentiating (2.45), the expression for -FP is 
2 
p= 
(1 
- a)(6d -d- a) 
wC Cp + pCp 
b 
(2.49) 
C2 C1- tv 
Substituting (2.43) and (2.49) into F` and assuming is = 0, the condition for 
price overshifting (2.48) can be written 
(1 
- 0, 
) (. Ed - ^yd - 
TUCCW2J3Cp 
+ 
p2 
C1 -b t 
<CwCw +Cl 
__ 
red 
- yd) 11 
Multiplying both sides by C2/(wCwpCp) 
(1 -d- yd -+ 
PCPC bc+C 
WC 1- tv pCý WC" 
The right hand side can be written 
wcw 
+o, + 
PCP (6d _ 7d) + 6d 
PC, wCw 
l1 
Thus one gets 
2! I lý w lý !b 
`ý 
-Ed ryd - 2) <+ ýi `9 
d 
yd) 
2U 
lýýi lý 
1-t PCP 2Uw wv 
Finally, from (2.44) ed - -yd = bq - -yd = (bC)/(1 - tz1), so that 
WC" 
pCp 
The right hand side is positive. A sufficient condition for price overshifting is 
therefore the following 
>1 if Q< 6d + º'd +2 then s i, (2.50) 
This leads to the following proposition. 
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Proposition 7 (Specific taxation) Assume that final demand is exponential. As- 
sume that _yd E [0,1] and -yu E (0,1]. Assume that aE [0, Ed + . yd + 2]. Then the 
welfare improving tax reform is TR 1. 
Proof. From (2.50), if '< ed + yd +2 then sy>1. Thus Q>0 and TR 1 
applies. Q. E. D. 
This proposition shows that the welfare loss can be reduced by taxing downstream 
producers and subsidizing the upstream industry, provided that 0' < ed +d+2, 
and notice that this condition is weak. Indeed, Ed >1 and yd > 0, thus the lowest 
upper bound for o is 3. 
2.7 Numerical computations 
This section contains some numerical computations of the model of section 2.5.1, 
where final demand has constant elasticity and the government levies ad valorem 
taxes. The specification of the model is as follows. 
Final demand. Consumer's utility function and consumption demand are those of 
eqs. (2.24)- (2.25). The corresponding parameters are given the following values: 
= 2, a= 10, ,Q=1. The numeraire is fixed at w=1. 
Market structure. Both markets are assumed to be Cournot oligopolies, thus 
conjectural variations are vd =0 and vu = 0. There are eight firms in the 
downstream sector and four in the upstream, i. e. m=8 and n=4. Hence 
7 d=. 125and-y"=. 25. 
Upstream technology. It is assumed that aLy = 0.1. 
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Downstream technology. The average cost function is a CES 
C(p, w) = (1/H) 
{acpl_c + (1 - a)'wi-ol 
i/(i-a) 
where aE [0, oo). Three typical cases are 
a. =0 C(p, w) =(1/H)(p+w) 
a --> 1 C(p, w) = kpawi-a, k= (1/H)a-a(1 - a)a-i 
Or' oo C(p, w)=min 
1 
w, 
1p 
(1 - a)H aH 
It is assumed that H=2 and a=0.5. 
Leontief 
Cobb-Douglas 
Perfect substit. 
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Recall that in section 2.5.1 the coefficients of Leontief technology are denoted 
Cp = ay., and C,,, = aLx. The specification given here thus implies that ayx = 1/H 
and aLx = 1/H. 
Notice that the parametrization of the model is such that 
d 
10 = 
aLx 
>_d0.533 
avxaLy eY7 
and this means that the results of proposition 5 should apply. 
The numerical computations for some values of a in the interval [0,2.5] are 
contained in table 2.5. 
For each a, the first row shows equilibrium prices, profits and welfare in the 
absence of taxation. Consumer's welfare is increasing in a. 
Both prices fall as a increases. The explanation is simple. If the elasticity of 
substitution is low, derived demand is inelastic, for downstream producers cannot 
easily substitute labour for the intermediate good when the price of the latter 
increases. Thus upstream oligopolists can set a high price-cost margin, which in 
turn is transferred onto the price of the final good by downstream producers. 
Downstream total profits are increasing in a. The reason is the following. As 
o increases, q and p go down: the first effect augments revenues, for the elasticity 
of final demand is greater than one; the second effect reduces unit production 
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Table 2.5: Optimal ad valorem taxes 
78 
or t i q p m7rd nrr" V 'P1 'P2 'P 
. 6705 . 2571 9.32 17.47 175.94 -. 127 . 000 - . 
127 
0.0 -. 3904 . 7691 . 6282 . 6378 13.83 5.98 179.00 
. 6307 . 2108 9.91 15.44 183.91 -. 070 . 016 - . 054 
0.1 -. 0956 . 3785 . 6167 . 2878 11.10 11.21 184.48 
. 5947 . 1797 10.50 14.12 192.78 -. 034 . 032 - . 003 
0.2 -. 0042 . 0217 . 5942 . 1827 10.56 13.94 192.79 
. 5619 . 1597 11.12 13.52 202.62 -. 015 . 042 . 027 
0.3 . 0382 -. 2138 . 5647 . 1356 10.64 15.07 202.79 
. 5311 . 1468 11.76 13.51 213.56 -. 005 . 047 . 042 
0.4 . 0542 -. 2825 . 5335 . 1172 11.08 15.45 213.97 
. 5017 . 1381 12.45 13.96 225.75 . 001 . 047 . 048 
0.5 . 0607 -. 2772 . 5031 . 1097 11.66 15.92 226.34 
. 4732 . 1320 13.20 14.79 239.33 . 004 . 046 . 050 
0.6 . 0646 -. 2542 . 4739 . 1061 12.33 16.71 240.06 
. 4456 . 1276 14.02 15.94 254.39 . 005 . 043 . 048 
0.7 . 0679 -. 2307 . 4458 . 1041 13.06 17.84 255.23 
. 4190 . 1243 14.91 17.40 270.99 . 006 . 039 . 045 
0.8 . 0713 -. 2108 . 4188 . 1029 13.85 19.30 271.92 
. 3936 . 1219 15.88 19.14 289.11 . 007 . 035 . 042 
0.9 . 0750 -. 1950 . 3931 . 1021 14.70 21.05 290.13 
. 3693 . 1200 16.92 21.15 308.87 . 007 . 031 . 038 
1.0 . 0790 -. 1830 . 3686 . 1014 15.61 23.09 310.01 
. 3262 . 1174 19.16 25.82 351.55 . 007 . 023 . 030 
1.2 . 0882 -. 1684 . 3253 . 1004 17.52 27.83 
352.78 
. 2899 . 1159 21.56 31.20 397.73 . 006 . 017 . 023 
1.4 . 0991 -. 1639 . 2888 . 
0995 19.49 33.29 399.08 
. 2604 . 1150 23.99 
36.92 444.89 . 006 . 012 . 018 
1.6 . 1122 -. 1684 . 
2592 . 0984 21.40 39.11 446.33 
. 2371 . 1145 26.36 42.64 490.76 . 005 . 008 . 013 
1.8 . 1289 -. 1823 . 
2357 . 0969 23.09 44.94 492.28 
. 2188 . 1143 28.56 48.06 533.66 . 005 . 006 . 011 
2.0 . 1517 -. 2088 . 
2172 . 0945 24.40 50.53 535.29 
. 1884 . 1141 33.16 59.32 
623.15 . 004 . 002 . 006 
2.5 . 2770 -. 4180 . 
1858 . 0805 24.32 62.87 625.46 
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costs. Upstream total profits are decreasing for or < .4 and 
increasing for or > . 5. 
As o increases there are two effects on derived demand: on one hand it becomes 
more elastic and this reduces upstream profits; on the other hand it shifts upwards 
for there is a corresponding shift in final demand and this increases profits. The 
former effect prevails for o< . 4, whereas the latter 
dominates for a> . 5. 
The last three columns of the table report the values of W1, 'P2 and ., de- 
termining the direction of the tax reform. For each o-, the second row shows the 
welfare maximizing tax-subsidy scheme and the associated equilibrium prices, 
profits and welfare. 
As pointed out above, this numerical example illustrates proposition 5. It 
turns out that .2< a* < .3 and .4< o-** < . 5. 
When a=0, . 1, .2 the tax reform 
TR 3 applies. When a=0, the optimal 
taxes are t, = -. 39 and i = . 77; the price of the 
final good goes down from 
. 67 to . 62, the price of the intermediate good goes up from . 26 to . 64; profits of 
downstream and upstream producers increase and fall respectively. Consumer's 
welfare goes from 176 to 179. 
When a= . 3, . 4, 
TR 2 applies and the government taxes the dowstream 
industry and subsidizes upstream producers: q goes up, p goes down and welfare 
increases because total profits augment. 
For all or > .5 
TR 1 occurs: downstream producers are taxed, whereas up- 
stream producers are subsidized. Both prices fall. " Taxation reduces and raises 
downstream and upstream profits respectively. 
Numerical computations have been attempted for o>3. It turns out that 
the welfare maximizing tax-subsidy scheme has a corner solution, namely t -+ 1 
and i,, -> -oo. An explanation of this result has not 
been found. 
11The fact that q slightly increases for o= . 
5, 
. 
6, 
.7 
is due to the instability of the numerical 
model at these points. In fact the values of W1 are close to zero. 
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2.8 Conclusions 
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This chapter has examined tax reforms in a model of vertically related oligopolies. 
The analysis has shown that there is scope for improving market performance by 
designing tax-subsidy schemes that raise no revenue. Ad valorem taxes manage 
to increase welfare also when specific taxes are ineffective. 
The analysis suffers from some limitations that are now briefly mentioned. 
The government is assumed to have perfect knowledge of all the ingredients nec- 
essary for the design of tax reforms, such as consumer's preferences, firms' tech- 
nology and pricing behaviour in the two markets. Obviously, most policy makers 
do not possess such information and the learning process may involve substantial 
costs. 
Administrative costs have been ignored. If some revenue were to be raised in 
order to cover administrative costs, the tax-subsidy schemes considered here may 
turn out to be ineffective in raising welfare. 
Taxation may create incentives to vertical integration, an issue which has not 
been considered. 
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A Appendix 
A. 1 Proofs of the results in table 2.2 
Consumer's welfare, government's revenue and total profits are respectively 
V (q, p, T) =U 
(X(q)) 
- 
[wc(p, 
w) + waLyCp(Pi w)] X(4') + 
w 
- r(q, p, T) X(9) (2.51) w 
R(4, p, T) = r(q, p, T)X(q) (2.52) 
11(q, p, T) = m7rd + n7ru = 
= 
[q 
- wC,, (p, w) - waLYCP(p, w)] X(q) - r(q, p, T )X(q) (2.53) 
where 
T (q, p, T) =tq+ is + (ip + i3)Cp(p, w) 
Consumer's welfare. Differentiating (2.51) with respect to q 
av = U'X'-fl(Cw+aLycp)X/- wrX'- wt, X aq 
From the first order conditions of consumer's optimum U' = (Q/w)q. From the 
definition of price elasticity X' = -(, 6dX)/q. Thus 
aV ,Qd wC., + waLy Cp +r 
aq = -wE 
1-qx wtvX 
_- ýd 
qý l- tv) - is -C+ [(1 - iv)p - is - waLY}CP mx + 
to q 
- 
0tvmx 
w 
0d m7rd + n7ru 
wq 
m7rd+nir' 
w qmx 
0OgTX 
w 
-0 tmx 
w 
ed + t mx 
(2.54) 
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Differentiating with respect to p 
av 
09P 
= -ß(C,, p 
+ aLyCpp)X -w 
[(ivp + i8)cpp +i Cp] X 
From the properties of the cost function 
w Cw Cp Cwp 
=-w Cpp ) 
Cpp =- 
pC 
Q 
Thus 
äV pw Cý, Cp 
OP = ,ßw- aLy - PC 
cmx + 
W Cw Cp 
+ w(zvp + is) pC, 
Omx - wivCpmx 
= -ý 
p- waLy CpCw 
umx + 
PC 
+ fl ( ivp 
p+ 
is Cp 
c 
Cw 
ýmx -wß iCpmx 
p(1 - iv) - 
is - waLy 
-0 
CpCw 
PC 
olmx -wi, Cpmx 
_ß 
nor" w Cu, 
uwnC +2" Cpmx 
py 
epCpmx (2.55) 
w 
Finally, for any 'r ET 
ay 
- 
aVaq+ayap_ Qh(T)mx 
aT aq aT ap aT w 
_- 99 
aq 
+O CP 
ap 
+ h(T) mx (2.56) 
w aT aT 
where h(t) = q, h(i) = pCp, h(t3) = 1, h(is) = Cp. 
Government's revenue. Differentiating (2.52) with respect to q 
aR 
a=t, X+rX' 4 
r 
tv - -Ed mx 
9 
= pgrX (2.57) 
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Differentiating with respect to p 
aR 
OP _ 
[Zc, 
+( 
live + 
is)CPPJ x 
2vp + 23 WC. 
= 2v -CQ 
CPmx 
= ppCpmx (2.58) 
Finally, for any rET 
OR 
_ 
aR aq 
+ 
aR ap 
aT aq aT ap aT + h(T)mx 
= P9 
aq 
+ PpCp 
ap 
+ h(-r) mx (2.59) aT aT 
Total profits. Differentiating (2.53) with respect to q 
an 
aq = 
(q - wCu, - waLyCp)X' - rX' - tvX +X 
dq-wCu, - waLyCp -r 
q 
The first two terms are identical to the first row in (2.54), excluding , Q/w. Thus 
one gets 
an 
aq = 
(1 - Oq)mx (2.60) 
Differentiating with respect to p 
ap 
a_ 
_(wC,, p 
+ waLyCpp)X - 
[(ip+i3)C 
pp 
+ ZvCp] X 
This is equal to the first tow in (2.55), excluding , Q/w. Thus 
ari 
_ -BpCpmx (2.61) ap 
Finally, for any TET 
an 
= 
an aq + an ap -h (r) mx ar aq ar ap ar 
((_oq)_oc aq 
p 
ap 
- h( r) mx (2.62) or or 
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A. 2 Tax Reform with ad valorem taxes: proofs 
Recall that the tax reform has been defined as starting from the market equilib- 
rium with no taxation: partial derivatives are evaluated at t = i,, = ts = is =0 
and r=0. This implies that p9 = pp =0 (see table 2.2). Thus 
di=-aR°lot' dt=- q dtv (2.63) äR° l äiv PC" 
The effect on the price of the consumption good is 
d qo = 
q0 
-q 
aq0 
dt 
atv pcp aiv 
0 
= 
[(q 
+c sv-gsvsv dtv 
v 
dao 
_q1_d sd + s1 cpaý _ qs vsd dtv v 
d ao 
_ -sv 
[qs 
-q 
(1_ 
d -cpop dtv v 
_ -s 
Qdty (2.64) 
The effect on the price of the intermediate good is 
ddpo 
p0 q o9po 
= 19t, - PC, acv 
dtv 
0q= 
aý -c 
Ssv dtv 
vp 
I 
dtv 
(q3: 
J - 
cP po 
Cp ät 
_ 
iPdty 
(2.65) Cp 
The effect on consumer's welfare is 
dv° - 
av° 
-q 
av° dtv at, pcp azv 
q ° a° a° a° a (oq + epCp -+q-q eq q- 9p -q mxdt w atv atv pcp ai, p a7v 
Bq q-qq+ epCp -q 
aý 
mxdt, a° a° 
(apo ° 
w 
atv PCP a2v atv Pp a1v 
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Using the results in (2.64)-(2.65) one gets 
dV° = 'ý 
(Ogsd Q+ BpP) dtv (2.66) 
w 
The derivation of dII° is similar to the proof just given for consumer's welfare 
and therefore is omitted. 
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Chapter 3 
Income Tax Enforcement Policy 
with Risk Averse Agents 
3.1 Introduction 
The standard theory of optimal income taxation (Mirrlees, 1971) assumes that 
there is a population of individuals endowed with different ability (productivity) 
levels, which in turn determine labour supply decisions and the distribution of 
income. Although the government does not observe abilities, it costlessly observes 
labour incomes. Thus individuals are taxed on the basis of labour income and 
the objective of the government is to select the tax schedule that maximizes 
social welfare while raising the required revenue. Since the income tax causes 
distortions in labour supply, the policy maker faces a trade off between equity 
and efficiency considerations. 
In point of fact the taxing authority cannot directly observe taxable incomes 
unless it performs costly audits. Hence it usually requires taxpayers to report 
their own income by filling in an income declaration form. Obviously, this brings 
about the possibility of tax evasion. Therefore, in addition to the tax schedule, the 
87 
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government must design a tax enforcement policy that consists of a mechanism 
selecting how many and which taxpayers to audit and a system of penalties for 
detected tax evaders. 
The theory of optimal income taxation in the presence of costly enforcement 
has been the focus of a seminal paper by Reinganum and Wilde (1985). They 
assume that taxpayers are risk neutral and are endowed with different pre-tax 
incomes which are exogenously given. Taxes and fines are lump sum. The audit 
mechanism can take two forms: in the first, termed random audits, a taxpayer 
faces a probability of audit which is independent of the amount of income he 
or she reports; in the second, termed audit cutoff, a taxpayer is investigated 
with probability one if his or her reported income is below some threshold level 
and escapes the audit by reporting an income at least as high as the threshold. 
The government's objective is to maximize total, tax revenue net of audit costs 
by controlling taxes, penalties and the audit parameters. The main finding of 
Reinganum and Wilde is that the optimal audit cutoff policy weakly dominates 
the optimal random audit policy. The optimal lump sum tax and the optimal 
threshold are identical whereas the level of penalties is irrelevant. Moreover, the 
optimal tax-audit cutoff policy induces truthful reporting, or taxpayers declaring 
their true income to the taxing authority. 
Border and Sobel (1987) and Chander and Wilde (1992) extend Reinganum 
and Wilde's framework by assuming general tax and audit probabilities func- 
tions. Border and Sobel (1987) first place the restriction that a taxpayer caught 
evading is never asked to pay a penalty higher than his or her pre-tax income and 
show that in this case an optimal solution to the auditor problem may not exist. 
This occurs when the solution would involve offering taxpayers infinitely high 
rewards when they are found to report truthfully at infinitesimal audit probabil- 
ities. Therefore they place a constraint on rewards to honest taxpayers and show 
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that in general this will be a binding constraint. Optimal tax-audit schemes in- 
volve tax payments and audit probabilities which are respectively monotonically 
increasing and monotonically decreasing in reported income. Chander and Wilde 
(1992) provide a detailed analysis of the role of penalties, obtaining qualitatively 
similar results with three different specifications of the penalty function: the op- 
timal tax schedule is generally concave and the optimal audit probabilities are 
nonincreasing and determined by marginal tax rates. 
Sanchez and Sobel (1990) obtain a sharper characterization of the tax en- 
forcement policy by solving the problem of a tax collecting agency that controls 
the audit policy while taking taxes and penalties as given. They assume that 
the tax function is strictly increasing and differentiable and that the penalty is 
proportional to the evaded tax. The audit policy consists of a function which 
gives a probability of investigation for each level of reported income. Two ob- 
jectives of the tax enforcement agency are considered: one is the maximization 
of total tax revenue subjet to a budget constraint on audit costs; the other is 
the maximization of total tax revenue net of audit costs. In both cases, if the 
distribution of pre-tax income has an increasing hazard rate, the optimal audit 
policy is a step function which divides taxpayers into two groups on the basis of 
reported income: reports below a given threshold are audited at the probability 
level just sufficient to induce a risk neutral taxpayer to behave honestly whereas 
income reports above the threshold are never audited. 
Clearly, the optimal audit policy makes the effective tax payments to be quite 
regressive (on this point see Scotchmer, 1987). On one hand, the relatively poor 
individuals (with income below the threshold) are forced to behave honestly so 
that they pay in full the legislated income tax. On the other hand, the relatively 
rich individuals (with income above the threshold) report an income just sufficient 
to escape the audit (the threshold) and safely evade the difference. 
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This point has been taken up by Cremer, Marchand and Pestieu (1990) and 
Sanchez and Sobel (1990). They frame their models in a hierarchical setting 
where there are two levels of authority. At the top, the government chooses the 
income tax schedule and is concerned with the maximization of social welfare. 
At the bottom, the tax administration (enforcement agency) controls the audit 
policy and is concerned with the maximization of tax revenue net of audit costs. ' 
Penalties are assumed to be exogenously determined by social conventions. These 
models show that the government generally takes into account the behaviour of 
the tax enforcement agency and accordingly adjusts its instruments to trade 
off equity and compliance. For instance, when the income tax is linear, the 
optimal marginal tax rate under costly enforcement turns out to be lower than 
the corresponding one under costlessly enforcement. 
Another undesirable feature of the optimal audit policy is time inconsistency. 
The tax enforcement agency knows that all income reports below the threshold 
are truthful and that all taxpayers reporting an income equal to the threshold 
are evaders. However, the former are randomly selected to be audited whereas 
the latter are never investigated. To sustain such an outcome one has to assume 
that the tax enforcement agency is able to make a credible commitment that it 
will not deviate ex-post from the strategy announced ex-ante. For instance, when 
the tax enforcement policy is instituted by law and the process of reforming the 
law is costly and lengthy, then the precommitment assumption seems reasonable. 
Reputation effects may help to sustain the precommitment solution when one 
considers that the game between the government and the taxpayers is repeated 
'In addition to the tax schedule, Sanchez and Sobel (1990) assume that the government 
controls the provision of a public good. Also, they analyze the case of the tax enforcement 
agency maximizing tax revenue subject to an auditing budget constraint controlled by the 
government. 
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over time. Finally, time inconsistency can be avoided with delegation. 2 
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All models described above share the limitations of assuming risk neutral tax- 
payers and the absence of supply side effects. 3 The purpose of this paper is to 
examine to what extent risk averse behaviour affects the features of the optimal 
tax enforcement policy. The distinctive feature of the model consists in the fram- 
ing of risk aversion. Taxpayers maximize a utility function which is continuous, 
concave and linear with a kink at the level of after-tax income. This specification 
implies that the marginal utility of the prospective gains from evasion is lower 
(in absolute value) than the marginal disutility of the corresponding prospective 
losses. The merit of this approach lies in its analytical simplicity while retain- 
ing the traits of risk averse behaviour. The kinked utility function can be given 
two interpretations, which are illustrated in section 3.3. One is in terms of non- 
pecuniary costs of evasion, as in Gordon (1989). The other comes from portfolio 
2Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) present a model where the government delegates the 
authority of performing tax audits to an independent agency. They show that the full commit- 
ment solution can be obtained when the government makes only a limited commitment over 
some policy variables and selects a suitable incentive scheme for the tax enforcement agency. 
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) present a model where the government is not able to make a 
credible commitment to an announced audit strategy. 
3Mookherjee and Png (1989) study the problem of optimal auditing in the context of com- 
petitive insurance markets, debt contracts and tax enforcement policy. Taxpayers are risk 
averse and there is a moral hazard issue in that they first choose an action unobserved by the 
principal which then affects the level of pre-tax income. The government chooses taxes, penal- 
ties and audit probabilities to maximize the expected utility of the taxpayer subject to a tax 
revenue constraint. The main results are that optimal policies require all audits to be random 
(no income report is audited with probability one) and that the highest report is never audited. 
However, Mookherjee and Png's model, being derived from the principal-agent framework of 
Grossman and Hart (1983), is not directly comparable to Reinganum and Wilde type models 
described so far. 
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selection theory, namely the approach that takes the expected value of loss as 
measure of risk. 
The model is adapted from Reinganum and Wilde's (1985) framework and is 
described in section 3.2. The principal is the tax enforcement agency. Its ob- 
jective is to maximize revenue net of audit costs by controlling the audit policy, 
while taking taxes and penalties as given. The audit policy is restricted to the 
simple mechanism where the tax agency chooses an income threshold and then 
audits at different probabilities income reports below and above the threshold. 
Obviously, there is no assurance that this is the best audit policy. The main rea- 
son for this restriction is analytical tractability. Another is that in the real world 
governments usually rely on simple policies. 4 Taxpayers (agents) have different 
pre-tax incomes, exogenously given, and are assumed to choose an income report 
that maximizes expected utility. 
In section 3.4 taxpayers are assumed to have the same degree of risk aver- 
sion. Proposition 1 shows that the nature of the optimal audit policy under risk 
neutrality is preserved under risk aversion. Income reports below the threshold 
are audited at the probability level just sufficient to induce truthful reporting, 
whereas those above it are not audited. As illustrated above, the outcome is that 
the effective tax schedule is quite regressive. 
In section 3.5 attitudes towards risk vary across taxpayers. This enriches the 
model by allowing individuals with the same pre-tax income to send different re- 
ports to the tax agency. At a general level, a full characterization of the optimal 
audit policy cannot be given. Thus two constrained versions of the audit mecha- 
nism are considered, namely random audits and the enforcement policy where all 
taxpayers with income below the threshold are induced to report truthfully. In 
'When taxpayers are risk neutral, Sanchez and Sobel (1990) show that the optimal audit 
mechanism is a step function with at most three probabilty levels. 
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the latter case it is shown that the optimal policy may involve auditing income 
reports above the threshold at a positive probability. 
Section 3.6 contains some numerical results of the general model. Under 
plausible assumptions about the distribution of attitudes towards risk among 
taxpayers, the main finding is that the optimal tax enforcement policy causes 
only a limited regressive bias. Income reports above the threshold meet a positive 
probability of audit. Also, not all taxpayers with income below the threshold are 
induced to report truthfully. Section 3.7 concludes by suggesting lines for further 
research. 
3.2 Description of the model 
Consider a large population of taxpayers endowed with different pre-tax incomes 
I, exogenously given. The cumulative distribution of income is F(I), IE [0, I+], 
I+ > 0. Assume that F(I) is twice continuously differentiable and let f (I) _ 
F'(I), IE (0, I+), be the density function. 
Each taxpayer knows F(I) and costlessly observes his or her own income. The 
tax enforcement agency knows F(I) but it does not directly observe who earns 
which income. Taxpayers are thus required to send a report about their own 
income that the tax administration may then verify at a cost co >0 per audit. It 
is assumed that when performing an audit the tax agency observes true income. 5 
Consider a taxpayer with pre-tax income I and let r be reported income. If 
not audited, his or her transfer to the tax agency is tr, where 0<t<1 is the tax 
5A more realistic assumption about the audit technology would allow for the possibility 
of imperfect audits and decreasing returns to scale. Also, notice that it has been implicitly 
assumed that taxpayers bear no compliance costs when filling in the income report and that all 
taxpayers are known to the tax administration so that they cannot escape taxes by not sending 
a report. 
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rate. If audited, the taxpayer pays the income tax plus a proportional surcharge 
on the evaded tax (if any) at rate s>0: the transfer is tr + (1 + s)t(I - r) if 
r<I and tr if r>I. The assumption that the distribution of income is common 
knowledge implies that no taxpayer will report r<0. Also, since in the event of 
audit there are no rewards for overreporting, no taxpayer will report r>I. Thus 
attention can be restricted to 0<r<I. 
The tax enforcement agency decides how many and which reports to audit. 
Since the only information available is taxpayers' reports, it chooses a probability 
of audit for each level of reported income. The audit policy is restricted to the 
step function 
p(r)= 
'1 if r<I, 
p2 if r>I, 
(3.1) 
so that all income reports below a threshold I, are audited at a constant proba- 
bility p, and those above at a constant probability p2. The tax agency takes the 
tax and the penalty rates as given. These are fixed outside the model by a higher 
level of authority (say the government). It is assumed that (1+s)t < 1, which im- 
plies that a taxpayer audited and caught evading never pays taxes plus penalties 
exeeding his or her true incomes The objective of the tax enforcement agency is 
to maximize total revenue (taxes plus fines) net of audit costs by choosing pl, P2 
and I, while taking taxpayers optimal reports as given. 
Each taxpayer is assumed to select an income report that maximizes the 
expected utility of disposable income in the two states of the world (audit / no 
audit), taking pre-tax income, tax and penalty rates and audit probabilities as 
'More precisely, it implies that taxes plus fines on evaded income never exeed this amount. 
Chander and Wilde (1992) stress that the penalty function should be continuous in reported 
income and that a taxpayer caught evading must be left with a non-negative disposable income. 
The penalty function used herein satisfies both requisites. 
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given. The utility function is of the form 
fly if 0<y< (1 - t)I (3.2) 
(, Q - 1)(1 - t)I +y if y> (1 - t)I 
where y is disposable income and /3 >1 is a parameter capturing the degree of 
risk aversion. Eq. (3.2) is continuous, concave and linear in y with a kink at 
y= (1 - t)I. Marginal utility is constant and is equal to 0 if y< (1 - t)I and 1 
otherwise. 
When the taxpayer reports truthfully, his or her disposable income is (1 - t)I 
in both states of the world. On the other hand, when r 54 I, his or her disposable 
income is 
yi-(1-t)I+t(I-r)>(1-t)I 
if no audit occurs and 
y2-(1-t)I-st(I-r)<(1-t)I 
if an audit occurs. 
Eq. (3.2) implies that the prospective gain from evasion is valued, in utility 
terms, t(I - r), whereas the corresponding loss in the event of audit is valued 
/3st(I - r). A higher value of / means a higher degree of risk aversion, for it 
increases the welfare loss when evasion is discovered. Notice that risk neutrality 
corresponds to 0=1. 
In section 3.4 all taxpayers are assumed to have identical degree of risk aver- 
sion whereas in section 3.5 the parameter ß is allowed to vary across taxpayers. 
To avoid repetitions, in what follows I will refer to taxpayer with pre-tax income 
I and parameter of risk aversion 0 simply as taxpayer (I, /3). 
The expected utility of taxpayer (I, 0) is 
EU(r; 1,0) =(1- p(r)) U(yi) + p(r)U(y2) 
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Given the utility function (3.2), the taxpayer problem is 
max EU(r; IQ) _ /3(1 - t)I ý- t 
ýl 
-ß(r)(1 + ßs)ý (I - r) (3.3) rE[O, I) 
Notice that EU(r; I, 0) is linear in r and is discontinuous at r=I, when p, P2 
and I>I, Linearity implies that the optimal report may not be unique. The 
following assumption is made to rule out multiple solutions. 
Assumption 1 Whenever a taxpayer is indifferent between reporting ro and ri, 
where ro < r1, then he or she always chooses to report rl. 
Let the solution to (3.3) be denoted by r(I, 0), where the arguments (pi, p2, Ic) 
have been omitted to keep the notation simple. The expected revenue from a 
taxpayer (1,3) is T(I, /3) = tr(. ) + p(r(. ))(1 +s)t(I - r(. )) and the corresponding 
expected audit cost is C(I, ß) = cpp(r(. )). The set of admissible audit policies is 
Ao={(pi, p2, Ic)10<_pi, P2<1,0<Ic<I+I (3.4) 
The next section deals with the economic interpretations of the kinked utility 
function. The analysis of the problem of the tax enforcement agency will resume 
in section 3.4. 
3.3 Kinked utility function: interpretations 
This section presents two economic justifications for adopting the utility func- 
tion (3.2). The first comes from the consideration of non-pecuniary costs of 
evasion, as in Gordon (1989). The second is in terms of portfolio selection the- 
ory, namely the approach that takes the expected value of loss as measure of 
risk. 
Using the notation of section 3.2, Gordon's utility function is of the form 
U(y; I, v) = u(y) - v(I - r) (3.5) 
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where u(y) is a standard utility of disposable income, u' > 0, u" < 0, and v is a 
constant, v>0. The term v(1- r) represents the non- pecuniary cost of evasion, 
incurred with certainty. Quoting Gordon (1989, p. 798): "One possibility is 
that evasion generates psychic costs incurred irrespective of whether the act of 
evasion is observed (by the authorities or anybody else). For example, a false 
income declaration may induce anxiety, guilt or a reduction in self-image". 
Assume risk neutrality, i. e. u(y) = y. To ease the notation let p(r) = p. Then 
expected utility is 
EU(r; I, v) = (1 - t)I + t[1 - p(1 + s)](I - r) - v(I - r) 
The kinked linear utility function (3.2) gives 
EU(r; I, Q) = /3(1 - t)I + t[1 - p(1 + os)](I - r) = 
= ß(1 - t)I + t[1 - P(1 + s)](I - r) + 
-(ß - 1)pst(I - r) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
It is now straightforward to spot the difference between the two models. In 
eq. (3.6) the non-pecuniary cost of evasion is incurred with certainty and depends 
on the amount of evaded income, whereas in eq. (3.7) it depends on the expected 
value of penalties on the evaded tax. 
Turning to the interpretation in terms of optimal portfolio choice, 7 suppose 
that the taxpayer selects his or her income report on the basis of the expected 
return and a measure of risk of the evasion activity, where the measure of risk is 
the expected value of loss. ' Formally, the taxpayer's return is M(r; I) =I- tr 
'The framing of the tax evasion decision in terms of optimal portfolio choice dates back 
to the original contribution of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), where it is assumed that a risk 
averse taxpayer maximizes the expected value of a strictly concave utility function of disposable 
income. Cowell (1990) refers to this model as the evader as gambler model. 
'This measure of risk is used by Domar and Musgrave (1944) to analyse the impact of 
taxation on risk taking. 
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with probability 1-p and M(r; I) = I-tr-(1+s)t(I-r) with probability p. The 
loss is L(r; I) =0 with probability 1-p and L(r; I) = st(I -r) with probability p. 
Markowitz (1959, p. 291) shows that "If an investor (a) maximizes the expected 
value of some utility function, and (b) chooses among utility functions solely on 
the basis of expected return and expected loss, then his utility function must be 
of the form U= c+ aM + bL. " Without loss of generality let U=M+ vL, v>0. 
Applying this theorem one gets 
EU(r; I, v) = (1 - t)I + t[1 - p(1 + s) - vps](I - r) = 
= (1 - t)I + t[1 - p(1 + s)](I - r) - vpst(I - r) (3.8) 
and comparing eqs. (3.7) and (3.8) one immediately notices that the two models 
are equivalent when v=0-1. 
3.4 Identical degree of risk aversion 
Assume that all taxpayers have the same degree of risk aversion 0>1. Then the 
problem of the tax enforcement agency is to solve 
I+ 
max R(pi, p2, Ic) =f 
[T(I, i) C(I, ý3)] dF(I) (3.9) (Pi 
9P2, c)EAo 
The following lemma states that the optimal audit policy is contained in a 
subset of A0. 
Lemma 1 Let (pl, p21 I, ) E Ao be some audit policy. Then there exists an audit 
policy (pi, p'2, ID E Al such that R(pi, p'2, Ic) > R(pl, p2, Ic), where 
A, ={(PliP2iIc)10CPa<PI <_(1+M-I 1 0<Ic <I+l 
Proof. See appendix A. I. 
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Optimal probabilities do not exceed (1 + 0s)-1, the level of enforcement just 
sufficient to induce truthful reporting, for a higher probability would increase 
audit costs without raising more tax revenue. Also, reports below the threshold 
must meet a higher probability of audit than those above it, for otherwise the 
audit policy would not work as a screening device, separating low and high income 
taxpayers according to their reports. 
The following lemma characterizes taxpayers' optimal reports. 
Lemma 2 For any (pl, p21 Ic) E A1, taxpayers' optimal reports are 
If pi < (1 + gis)-1 then 
r(I, ý3) =0 
if I< min(kII, I+) 
Ic if I> min(kII, I+) 
If pi = (1 + ýs)-1 then 
_I 
if I<I 
r(I, /3) Ic if I) Ic 
where 
ý_ 
(1 + is)-i - P2 
Pi - P2 
Proof. See appendix A. I. 
Taxpayers are divided into two groups. When pi < (1 + es)-', then k>1 and 
individuals with I< kI, report no income whereas those with I> kI, report the 
threshold. Notice that if the difference between pi and p2 is small, then it may 
occur that kI, > I+ and all taxpayers report zero income. When Pi = (1 +ßs)-1, 
then k=1 and individuals with I< Ic report truthfully, whereas those with 
I>I, report the threshold. 
Let v- min(FcI, I+). Applying lemma 2 the net revenue function is 
R(p,, P21 IC) =v 
ItPi(1 + S)I - 4Opi]dF(I) + 
0 
1+ 
+ [tI+tp2(1 + s)(I - Ic) - ýOp2]dF(I ), if Pi <11 (3.10) 
v+ ýs 
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R((l + $s)-'i P27 Ic =J 
Ic [tI 
- ý(1 + ý3s)-' dF(I) + 
I+ [tie + tP2(1 + s)(I - Ic) - cOP2] dF(I), if P1 =1- (3.11) JI 1+s 
The parameter ß has an effect equivalent to an increase in s when the taxpayer 
is risk neutral; so it may appear that this model can be reduced to the model of 
Reinganum and Wilde by a suitable redefinition of variables. But this is not the 
case and the reason is the following. When Q=1 (taxpayers are risk neutral, i. e. 
the standard Reinganum and Wilde model) the net revenue function is continuous 
in all its arguments. In particular, notice that although from lemma 2 optimal 
reports are discontinuous in pi the revenue function is continuous in pl: when 
pi < (1 + s)-1 taxpayers with I< RI, report r(. ) =0 and the gross revenue is 
fo' tpi(1 + s)IdF(I), whereas when pl = (1 + s)-1 taxpayers with I<I, (i = 1) 
report r(. ) =I and the gross revenue is fo' tIdF(I). On the other hand, when 
,Q>1 
(taxpayers are risk averse) the net revenue function is continuous in p2 and 
I, whereas it shows a discontinuity in pi at pi = (1+, s)-1 which takes the form of 
an upward jump: optimal reports are discontinuous at pi = (1 +/ s)-1 < (1 +s)-1 
so that gross revenue (for I< v) jumps from fo' t(1 + ßs)-1(1 + s)IdF(I) to 
fo' tldF(I). About the differences between the two models (, Q =1 and > 1) 
see also the comment to eq. (3.14) below. 
The following assumption is made to ensure that the solution of the tax en- 
forcement problem is well behaved, namely that the optimal threshold is unique. 
Assumption 2 F(I) has a strictly increasing hazard rate. That is, h(I) >0 
for all IE (0, I+), where h(I) -f (I)/[1 - F(I)]. 
Since h(I) > 0, assumption 2 implies f (I+) > 0. The following assumption 
is somewhat arbitrary and not strictly necessary, its purpose being to ease the 
presentation, for it ensures that the optimal threshold is an interior point of its 
support set. 
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Proposition 1 Under assumptions 2-3, the optimal audit policy is unique and 
is given by p1 = (1 + Is)-1, p2 =0 and I, E (0, I+) that solves 
1_v 
h(Iý) (1 + ßs)t 
(3.12) 
Proof. The proof is given in two steps. The first shows that eq. (3.10) does not 
have an interior maximum in pl and that its optimal value is pi -+ (1 +, 3-s)-1. 
Since the revenue function has an upward jump at pi = (1 + this proves 
that pi = (1 + Os)-1. The second step shows that eq. (3.11) has a maximum at 
p2 =0 and determines I, *. 
Step 1. After some algebra involving integration by parts one finds that, for any 
I, E [0, I+/R], eq. (3.10) can be written as 
R(pi, P2, I, ) = t(1 + s) 
N: 
7 pi 
ýKIýý(I 
i p2)dI + P2 
%1 
41 (I, p2)dI (3.13) 
!ý J0 
IRI 
where 
(Ii P2) =1- F(I) -K- If(I) - . 
f(I), (3.14) 
K(1+s)t 
1_(S1- 
ý- 
(l+ s) 1ýa 
and k- 
1+P2 
(3.15) 
P1 - P2 Pi - P2 
Notice that IV(. ) is independent of p1 and I, and that ic > R. Also, when ,Q=1 
then K=k and the third term of eq. (3.14) vanishes. 
Differentiating with respect to I, the first order condition for an interior 
solution is 
aR 
aIc = 
t(pi - p2)(1 + 8)K'(KIc, p2) =0 (3.16) 
Let z- kIt. Since I, E [0, I+/k], then zE [0, I+]. After this change of vari- 
able, the first order condition (3.16) is simply 1ý(z, p2) = 0. From assumption 3, 
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'P(O, p2) >0 and from assumption 2, qV(I+, p2) < 0. Continuity of W(. ) and 
assumption 2 then imply that there exists a unique z*(p2) E (0, I+) such that 
Cz, p2) = 0. In particular, z*(p2) solves 
-z= (3) h(z) K r, (1 + S)t . 
17 
The revenue function (3.13) can now be written as 
z P2)W(I, 
p2)dI + R pi ip2i 
z* p2) 
= tpi (1 + s) 
I "( 
k+ 
tp2(1 + s) 
I+ 
W(I, p2)dI (3.18) 
lz" 
Differentiating with respect to pl 
R= 
t(1 + s) 
,z (ý2)W(I, 
p2)dI >0 (3.19) apl K 0 
Since W(. ) >0 for all zE [0, z*) and kP (. ) <0 for all zE (z*, I+], the deriva- 
tive (3.19) is positive for any p2. Thus pl --ý (1 + However, since the 
revenue function has a positive jump at pi = (1 + this implies that 
pi = (1 + 
Step 2. After some algebra, eq. (3.11) can be written as 
R(p IP2, Ic) =tI. 
Iý 
1- F(I) 
tf 
(I) dI -ý (1 +, ýS) 
I+ 
+ tp2(1 + s) 
I, ": 1- F(I) -1 ýs tf (I) V (3.20) 
The first order condition for an interior solution with respect to Ic is 
äR 
- to -p2(l +s)] 1- F(IS) -p f(I, ) + älc l (1 + s)t 
f(Iý)=0 (3.21) 
1+S 1ý-ý3s 
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From assumptions 2-3 there exists a unique Ic(P2) E (0, I+) that solves eq. (3.21). 
In particular, Ic(P2) solves 
h(I, ) (1 + s)t 
(1 +is)-1 -P2 
(1-ßs)-i-P2 
(3.22) 
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The revenue function (3.20) can now be written as 
R(pi, p2, Ic(p2)) =tf 
Ic(P2) 
1- F(I) - 
P- 
-f (I) dl + o (1 + ý3s)t 
+ tp2(1 + s) 
I+ 
1- F(I) - f(I) dI 1ý(P2) (1 + s)t 
Differentiating with respect to P2 
äR 
_t(l+S) 
I+ [1_F(I)_(l)tf(I)]dI<o 
p2 I(P-2 ) 
From eq. (3.22), h(I) < V/[(1 + s)t] for all IE (Ic(p2), I+] 
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(3.23) 
(3.24) 
Therefore the 
derivative (3.24) is negative for all p2, which implies p2 = 0. Also, I, solves 
eq. (3.12). Q. E. D. 
Proposition 1 shows that the introduction of risk aversion (, Q > 1) does not 
affect the qualitative properties of the optimal audit policy under risk neutrality 
Income reports below the threshold are audited at the probability level 
just sufficient to induce truthful reporting, whereas those above it are not audited. 
This causes the effective tax schedule to be regressive: the effective average tax 
rate of a taxpayer with I< Ic is t (the legislated tax rate), whereas that of an 
individual with I>I,, * is tI, */I, which is less than t and is decreasing in I. 
However, for given distribution of pre-tax incomes f (I), a higher degree of 
risk aversion '3 implies a lower pi and a higher I, *. Thus more taxpayers are forced 
to report truthfully and this reduces the size of the regressive bias. 
The assumption that taxpayers have the same degree of risk aversion is quite 
restrictive, for it implies that all individuals with the same pre-tax income make 
the same report. This point is taken up in the following section, where the 
concavity of the utility function is allowed to vary across taxpayers. 
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3.5 Different attitudes towards risk 
Suppose that taxpayers have different degrees of risk aversion. Let G(ß), 0E 
[1, oo), be the cumulative distribution of Q. Assume that G(ß) is twice continu- 
ously differentiable with density function g(ß) = G'(ß), ,3E (1, oc). Notice that 
it has been implicitly assumed that I and 0 are independently distributed. The 
independence assumption has been made for the sake of analytical tractability 
even though intuition would suggest as plausible a negative correlation between 
the level of pre-tax income and the degree of risk aversion. 
The tax enforcement agency solves 
=fj 
oo 
max R(pl, p2i Ic) 
I+ 
[T(1,0) 
- C(I, ß)] dG(ß)dF(I) (3.25) (pi, P2, Ic)EAo 0 
The following lemma states that the optimal audit policy is contained in a 
subset of A0. 
Lemma 3 Let (pl, p21 Ic) E AO be some audit policy. Then there exists an audit 
policy (pl, p'2, Iý) E A2 such that R(pi, p2, Iý) > R(pl, p2, Ic), where 
A2={(pi, p2) Ic) 10<_P2 <Pi <(1+3)-1,0<Ic <I+I 
Proof. See appendix A. 2. 
The following lemma characterizes taxpayers' optimal reports. 
Lemma 4 For any (pl, p2, I, ) E A2, taxpayers' optimal reports are 
0 if (I, 13) E [0, I, ) x [1, ß) ai 
I if (I, 13) E [0,1, ) X [0i, 00) a2 
r(I ý) = 
0 if (1,0) E [Ic, min(K I, I+)) x [1, ß) a3 
+ 1ý if (1,0) E [I,, min(kIc, I )) X P, 02) a4 
if (1, Q) E [min(KII, I+), I+] X [1,02) a5 
I if (1,0) E [Ic, I+J X [02100) a6 
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where 
Pi =-1 
pl 
SPi 
Figure 3.1: Illustration of lemma 4 
1-p2 02 = 
spe 
ý(I) = 
(1 732)Ic - (P1 - P2) I 
S[P2Ic + (PI - P2) I] 
Proof. See appendix A. 2. 
lý- 
1+5)-1 
-P2 
Pi - P2 
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Notice that 0l and 02 are decreasing functions of pi and p2 respectively and that 
from lemma 3,1 < ßi < /92 < oo. Also, K>1. 
Lemma 4 is illustrated in figure 3.1. Taxpayers (I, 0) with IE [0, I, ) are 
separated into two groups: those with 0E [1,01) reporting no income and those 
with 0E [01, oo) reporting truthfully. An increase in pl lowers X31 so that the 
number of individuals reporting truthfully increases. 
Taxpayers (I, 13) with IE [I,, I+] report zero income if ,QE 
[l, /), report the 
threshold if 0 E [, a, 02) and report truthfully if 3E [02, oo). The separation 
I+ I Ic r, I, 
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of individuals declaring zero income from those declaring the threshold is not 
clearcut, for /3(I) is a strictly decreasing convex function of I such that ß(II) _X31 
and ý(KI, ) = 1. When icI < I+, see figure 3.1, r(. ) =0 if (I, 0) E [Ic, tIc) X [1, ý3) 
and r(. ) = I, if (1,0) E [Ic, KIc) x [I , 
02) and if (I, ß) E [KIc, I+] X [1, ß2). 
When KIc > I+, r(. ) =0 if (I, 0) E [Ic, I+] x [1, 
ý) and r(. ) = Ic if (I, 0) E 
[Ic, I+] x [/ ' 
02), where / (Ic) = 01 and 1< 
ý(I+) < ß1. 
Lemma 4 shows that the interaction between pre-tax income and degree of risk 
aversion in determining optimal reports is quite rich. Taxpayers with the same 
pre-tax income but differing attitude towards risk may have distinct optimal 
reports. In turn, individuals with the same degree of risk aversion but distinct 
pre-tax income may send different reports. 
Let v= min(#cI,, I+). Applying lemma 4 the net revenue function is 
R(pi, P21 Ic) = Ti + T2 + T3 -C 
where 
Iý v 
tpi(1 + s) G(01) 
f If (I)dI +f IG(ß) f (I)dl T1 =0 Ic 
T2 =f 
[tIc + tp2(1 + s)(I - Ic)] 
[G(ß2) 
- G(T )] f(I)dI + 
c 
+f [tie + tp2(1 + s)(I - Ic)] G(ß2)f (I)dI 
I 1c 1+ 
T3 = t[i - G(ßi)] 
f If(I)dI +t [1 - G(ß2)J 
L If(I)dI 
o 
C= copj F(Ic) +fv G(Q)f (I )dI + 1c 
+ ýap2 1- F(IS) - 
I"" v G(O)f (I )dI 
(3.26) 
The term Tl contains penalties collected from individuals reporting zero income, 
the size of the group being 
(/. 3(I)) f (I)dI G(ß1)F(Iý) + 
Iv 
G 
1C 
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The term T2 is gross revenue collected from taxpayers reporting I, the number 
of them being 
if 
{G(ß2) 
- G((i)) 
}f(I)dI + G(ß2) [i_ F(v)] 
The term T3 is the tax revenue collected from truthful taxpayers, the size of the 
group being 
[1 
- G(Ql)] F'(1, ) + 
[1 
- G(Qz)] 
[1- F(I<)] 
Finally, C represents audit costs. The first term in braces is the number of 
taxpayers whose income report is below I, The second term is the number of 
individuals with an income report at least as high as the threshold. 
Before examining the general model, two constrained versions of the tax en- 
forcement policy are considered. 
3.5.1 Random audits 
Consider the constrained version of problem (3.25) where I, = 0, so that all 
income reports meet the audit probability P2. From lemma 4, taxpayers optimal 
reports are 
if (I, ß) E [07 I+] X [1, ß2) 
I if (I, 0)E[O, I ]X[021 o°) 
Individuals with 0< 02 report zero income, whereas those with 0> 132 report 
truthfully. 
The tax enforcement agency solves 
max R(p2) = P2(1 + s)tlG(02) + tI 
[1 
- G(ß2) - (PP2 (3.27) 
p2 E[O, (1+s)-1I 
where 1= fö 
+ IdF(I) is average income. The first term in the revenue function 
represents fines collected from taxpayers reporting r=0, the size of the group 
being G(/32) " 
The second term represents taxes collected from truthful taxpayers, 
CHAPTER 3 108 
the number of them being 1- G(ß2). Problem (3.27) is well defined, for R(p2) is 
continuous on a compact set. 
The first order necessary condition for an interior solution is 
dR 
= -t 1_ p2(1 + s) Ig(02)d02 + t(1 + s)IG(ß2) -=0 (3.28) d P2 p2 p2 
The first term, which is positive, shows the gain in gross revenue that springs 
from the fact that as p2 increases more taxpayers are induced to report truthfully. 
The second term, as well positive, shows the increase in fines collection as more 
audits occur. The third term is negative and is equal to minus unit audit costs. 
The second order condition for a maximum is 
d2R 2tI d02 d02 ()2g'(ß2) 
= 9(ß2) -t 
[i 
- p2(1 + s)] I<0 (3.29) 
2 p2 d2 P2 
The first term is negative whereas the sign of the second is determined by g'(ß2), 
the slope of the density function of /3. 
For the sake of comparison, suppose that all taxpayers are risk neutral. Then 
the revenue function is R(p2) = tp2(1 + s)I - pew, which is linear in p2. Thus 
the optimal random audit policy is p2 = (1 + s)-1 if (1 + s)tI > and p2 =0 
otherwise. In the first case the taxing authority induces all taxpayers to report 
truthfully, whereas in the second gives up the task of enforcing compliance. Of 
the two, it seems more plausible to assume that (1 + s)tI > cp. 
Eqs. (3.28)-(3.29) clearly show that the optimal random audit probability 
crucially depends on the distribution of ß. From (3.28), dR/dp2 = -cp at p2 = 
(1+s)-1 and dR/dp2 = t(1+s)I-pat p2 = 0, provided that limP2'og(ß2)dp2 = 0. 
Therefore, if t(1 + s)I > cp, there exists at least a p2 E (0, (1 + s)-1) such that 
dR/dp2 = 0. Notice that t(1 + s)I > cp is sufficient but not necessary for the 
existence of an interior solution. 
Sufficient conditions for uniqueness cannot be given, for d2R/dp2 is unlikely to 
be everywhere negative. However, suppose that g(ß) has a unique mode /ý > 1, 
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so that g'(ß) >0 for all 0E [1, ý) and g'(ß) <0 otherwise. Then there exists a 
p2 such that g'(ß2) <0 for all p2 < p2 and g'(ß2) >0 for all P2 > P2. In this case 
the first order derivative (3.28) may behave as illustrated in figure 3.2, where a 
unique solution occurs. 9 
'Suppose that the distribution of 0 is exponential with standard deviation o. Then g'(ß) <0 
for all ß so that the second term in (3.29) is always positive. However, one can show that 
>0 for all p2 < (2sa+1+s)-' and d2R/dp2 <0 otherwise, so that when t(1+s)I > cp d2R/dp2 22 
the graph of aR/42 is as illustrated in figure 3.2 and the optimal random audits policy is 
unique. Numerical computations show that the optimal random audit probability is unique 
also when g(ß) is normally distributed. See section 3.6 for the numerical results when g('3) is 
normal or exponential and f (I) is lognormal. 
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3.5.2 Another constrained problem 
Suppose that the tax enforcement agency fixes pi = (1 + s)-1. From lemma 4, 
optimal reports are 
I if (I, ß) E [0, Ic) x [1,00) 
r(I ý) = Ic if (I) Q) E [Ic, I+] X [1) 02) 
I if (17 0) E [Ic, I+] X [02, oo) 
Taxpayers with I<I, are forced to report truthfully regardless of their attitude 
towards risk. Those with I>I, report truthfully if 0> 02 and report the 
threshold if 0< 02. 
The tax agency solves 
maxR 
1 
p2iIc 
JIC (tI 
P2, 'c +sI=- 
f(I)dI-}- 
1s 
+ G(ß2) f 
1+ 
[tI+tp2(1+3)(I-I) - (Pp2] f(I)dI + 1c 
1+ 
+ [1- G(ß2) 
I(tI 
- Vp2)f(I)dI (3.30) 
c 
After some algebra, the net revenue function can be expressed as 
R1 'P2, 
Ii =t 
fIc G(ß2)(1 F(I)) (I) dI + 
1s1st 
I+ 
+ tp2(1 + s) 
fic G(ß2) F(I)) ``ý f (I) dI + (1+s)t 
+t [l - G(ß2) 1 (3.31) 
The first order condition for an interior solution with respect to I, is 
äR 
=t 
ji 
- 72(1 + s)] 
[G(ß2)(1 
- F(I, )) - .f 
(Ic 
äIc l (1 + s)t 
)=0 (3.32) 
Under assumptions 2-3, for any 0< P2 < (1 +s)-1, there exists a unique Ic(p2) E 
(0,1+) that solves eq. (3.32). In particular, it is defined by 
1 cý 1 
h(Iý) (1 + s)t G(/32) 
(3.33) 
Notice that as P2 increases, Ic(P2) decreases and that limes-(l+s)_l Ic(p2) - 0. 
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To obtain the optimality condition for p2, first replace I, with Ic(P2) into the 
revenue function (3.31) and then differentiate to get 
R= 
t(1 +s) 
I [c(ß2)(i 
- F(I) - IdI + ä 
lc 
(P2 )1st 
-t1- P2(1 + s) 9(ß2)dO2 
I+ 
1- F(I) dI =0 (3.34) 
d JI I P2 jc(p2) The first term is negative because, from the definition of Ic(p2), see eq. (3.33), 
1 cp 
h(I) < (1 + s)tG(ß2) 
for all IE (Ic(p2), I+]. The second term is positive. 
At a general level, the only result is that 
aR 1+ 
a= 
1-F(I) - ý2 
P2=0 
aR 
=-(p<o ap2 
P2-+(1+$)_1 
1 
lps 
tf 
(I) dI <0 (3.35) 
(3.36) 
Eq. (3.35) implies that p2 =0 is a local maxima of problem (3.30). Notice that 
this corresponds to the optimal audit policy under risk neutral taxpayers. 
Clearly, the graph of aR/19p2 subject to I, = Ic(P2) is shaped by the dis- 
tributions of 0 and I. Numerical computations, see section 3.6 for the results, 
show that this graph is as depicted in figure 3.3, when f (I) has a lognormal dis- 
tribution and g(ß) is normal or exponential. As illustrated, there are two local 
= 0,1, = Ic(p2) and one at p** < (1 +3)-', Iý* = II(p2*). The maxima: one at p* 22 
numerical results show that the second audit policy raises more revenue. Also, 
notice that it is markedly more equitable, for p* < p** and 1, > I, *. 22 
3.5.3 The general problem 
The analysis of the two constrained problems has shown that the characterization 
of the optimal audit policy is not straightforward even when attention is restricted 
to simple audit mechanisms. 
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Consider the unconstrained problem. Differentiating eq. (3.26) with respect 
to I, the first order condition for an interior solution is 
äR 
= t(1 + s)(pi - P2)ß 
{G(ß2) [i_ F(II)] - G(O)f(I)dI + 
f 
äIc c 
fVg(f(I)dI} 
I P2) 
i- G(ßß) f (4) ++ 
-t1+s Pl - P2) 
L v(rI, 
- I)9(ß) f (I)dI =0 (3.37) ()(0 Ic 
The first term in braces is the number of taxpayers reporting r=I, The second 
term in braces is the derivative, with respect to I,, of the number of individuals 
reporting an income below the threshold. No interpretation can be given to the 
third term. 
Eq. (3.37) gives a grasp of the complexity of the problem of solving for the 
optimal audit policy. The first order conditions with respect to the audit proba- 
bilities are not presented because of their length and because no useful economic 
interpretations can be given. At this level of generality, the following proposition 
gives two limited results. 
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Proposition 2 Under assumptions 2-3, for any 0< P2 < pl < (1 + s)-1 there 
exists at least a I, (PI, P2) E (0, I+) such that aR/aII = 0. Also, p1 < (1 + s)-1. 
Proof. From (3.37) and assumptions 3 and 2 one gets respectively 
aR 
=t 1- P2(i + s) G(ß2) >0 ar c I"-o 
aR 
arg = -(P(m -p2)[1- G(01)]f(I+) <0 IC= I+ 
Then continuity of aR/aI, implies that there exists at least one I, E (0, I+), 
which depends on pl, p21 such that aR/aI = 0. To prove the second part of the 
proposition, simply differentiate the revenue function with respect to pi to obtain 
aR 
apl Pi=(l+s, -ý 
= -VF(I, ) <0 
which is strictly negative for any I, E (0, I+). Q. E. D. 
As for the first part of the proposition, notice that the assumption that the 
distribution of income has a strictly increasing hazard rate is no longer sufficient 
to ensure that the optimal threshold is unique. The second part shows that it 
does not pay to induce all taxpayers with I<I, to report truthfully. Nothing 
can be said about the probability P2. 
3.6 Numerical results 
In this section the results of some numerical computations are presented. The 
purpose is to explore the relation between the distribution of attitudes towards 
risk among taxpayers and the properties of the optimal audit policy. 
The specification of the model is as follows. 
Distribution of income. The density function f (I) is a truncated lognormal with 
parameters of the associated normal distribution µ=1.533, a=0.4 and trun- 
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cation point at 1+ = 15. The resulting distribution has mode i=3.95, median 
150 = 4.63 and mean (national income) I=5.00. The poorest 5- percent of the 
population has incomes below 2.39, whereas the richest 5-percent has incomes 
above 8.96. The poorest 25- percent of the population possesses 14.2% of na- 
tional income, the second 25-percent possesses 20.4%, the third 26.4% and finally 
the richest 25-percent owns 39.0% of national income. 
Attitudes towards risk. The numerical computations differ about the specification 
of the distribution of ß. 
Model 1. Taxpayers are risk neutral. That is, /3 = 1. 
Model 2. All taxpayers have the same degree of risk aversion 0=5. 
Model 3. The density function g(ß) is a truncated normal with parameters 
of the associated normal distribution y=5, o= 1.33 and truncation point at 
,Q=1. The resulting distribution has mode /3 =5 and mean ,Q=5.006. Notice 
that 54.7 percent of taxpayers have ,Q E (4,6) and 86.8 percent have 0E (3,7). 
Only 1.08 percent of them are almost risk neutral, with 0E (1,2). 
Model 4. Attitudes towards risk are distributed according to the exponential 
density g(ß) = a-1 exp(-(ß - 1)/o), with c=4. The mode is ý3 = 1, the median 
05o = 3.77 and the mean ý=5. Although the average degree of risk aversion 
is the same as model 3, notice that 22.1 percent of taxpayers are almost risk 
neutral, with 0E (1,2). The share of taxpayers with ßE (4,6) is 18.6 percent, 
whereas those with 0E (3,7) are 38.3 percent. 
Tax and penalty rates and unit audit costs. These are fixed at t=0.2, s=4, 
V=2. Notice that average income is 2.5 times unit audit costs. 
Let T be gross revenue, C total audit costs and R=T-C net revenue. The 
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numerical results are as follows. 
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Model 1. When taxpayers are risk neutral, the optimal audit policy is pi = . 
2, 
p* = 0, I, = 5.544, R= . 6139, 
T= 
. 8835, 
C= 
. 2696. 
The optimal threshold 
is just above average income I=5, the percentage of taxpayers with I< Ic* 
and reporting truthfully is 67.41%, whereas the remaining 32.59% report the 
threshold and evade the difference between I and Ic. In terms of net revenue 
collected, the optimal cutoff policy does just better than optimal random audits, 
where I, = 15, pl = . 
2, R= 
. 
6, T=1.0, C= 
. 4. 
However, audit costs are 
much higher with random audits. As for the equity issue, with random audits 
all taxpayers are forced to behave honestly and therefore the effective and the 
legislated tax schedules coincide: the average tax rate is equal to 0.2 for all 
income levels. Instead, the audit cutoff policy causes a considerable regressive 
bias: for I<I, the effective and legislated average tax rates are equal, whereas 
for I>I, the effective rate falls below the legislated rate and is decreasing in I. 
To illustrate, the average tax rate is . 184 
for a taxpayer with I=6, . 138 when 
I=8, . 092 if 
I= 12 and . 074 
for the highest income level I= 15. 
Model 2. When all taxpayers have $=5, the optimal audit policy is p1 = . 
0476 
(the level of enforcement just sufficient to induce truthful reporting), p2 = 0, 
I, = 14.45, R= . 
9048, T= . 
9999, C= . 
0951. Since the optimal threshold is 
close to the top income level I+ = 15, the proportion of taxpayers with I<I: 
and reporting truthfully is 99.94%. Thus the optimal policy is almost that of 
optimal random audits. The regressive bias is kept to a minimum. 
Next consider models 3 and 4. The quest for the optimal policy has been made 
using a grid-search procedure. The net revenue function and the associated par- 
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tial derivatives have been computed for the selected values of the instruments 
(p1, p2, I, ). The visual inspection of both grids suggests the following statements. 
Fact 1 For any (pl, p2), there exists a unique Ic(pl, p2) such that äR/DIc >0 for 
all I, < Ic(pi, p2) and aRlälc <0 for all I, > Ic(pl, p2). 
This allows to extract a reduced grid by choosing, for each (pl , P2), the value of 
I, that maximizes net revenue. A second round of visual inspection suggests the 
following. 
Fact 2 For any p2, there exists a unique p1(p2) such that aR/op1 >0 for all 
Pi < P1 (P2) and aR/apl <0 for all pi > pi (p2). 
A further reduction of the grid is thus obtained by selecting, for each P2, the 
value of p, that maximizes net revenue. The remaining data show the following. 
Fact 3 The graph of aR/19p2 on p2 exhibits the pattern illustrated in figure 3.3 
in section 3.5.2 above. 
This means that there are two local maxima, one at p2 =0 and one for P2 E 
(0, (1 + s)-1). The numerical results show that the latter is the global maximum, 
which gives the optimal audit policy. 
Model 3. Table 3.1 shows the results when g(, 3) is normally distributed. The 
optimal audit policy is under the label gm (global maximum). Notice that (i) 
the optimal threshold is low, I9m = 2.70, so that the proportion of taxpayers 
with I< I9"ß is 8.87% and (ii) pi' = . 
0992 and p2' = . 
0728 are alike, implying 
that the regressive bias caused by plm > pg2' is not strong. Also, the table shows 
that 92.05% of individuals report truthfully, whereas . 
90% report no income and 
7.05% declare an income equal to the threshold and are thus evaders. 
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Ic Pi P2 R T C r=0 r=Ic r=I F(IS) 
gm 2.70 . 0992 . 0728 . 8219 . 9726 . 1507 . 90 7.05 92.05 
8.87 
(0) (0) (0) 
im 13.69 . 0815 . 0000 . 8078 . 9705 . 1627 4.96 0.17 94.88 
99.83 
(0) (0) (-) 
ra 15.00 . 0815 . 8076 . 9706 . 1630 4.96 0.00 95.04 100.00 
(-) (0) 
bb 5.54 . 2000 . 0000 . 6140 . 8836 . 2696 . 00 32.59 67.41 67.41 
(0) (-) (-) 
bb' 1.81 . 2000 . 0759 . 8182 . 9723 . 1541 . 00 6.93 93.07 . 94 
(0) (-) (0) 
Columns 2-4: The sign in parentesis refers to the sign of the corresponding 
first order derivative. 
Columns 8-10: r=o, t, ,, l, 
is the percentage of taxpayers reporting o, tc, i respectively. 
The second row of the table shows that the local maximum (im) is at Ism = 
13.69, pm= . 0815, 
p2 = 0. Notice that T9m > Tim and C9m < Cim. The local 
maximum is virtually equal to the optimal random audits (ra), where Icra = 15 
and pla = . 0815. 
Consider the issue of the regressive bias. Taxpayers declaring r=I pay the 
legislated tax liability so that the average tax rate is t. For those reporting r=0 
the expected average tax rate (EATR) is pit(1 + s), whereas for those declaring 
r= I, is 
tIc 
+ p2t(1 
+ s)(I - Ic) 
II 
With the optimal audit policy gm, the EATR for an individual reporting r= 
0 is . 0992, which 
is less than a half of the tax rate t= . 2. The EATR for 
taxpayers declaring r= Igm varies with I, few values are the following (income 
in parenthesis): . 187 
(3), 
. 130 
(6), 
. 115 
(8), 
. 101 
(12), 
. 095 
(15). This pattern 
is similar to that of the optimal audit policy with risk neutral taxpayers, see 
model 1. However, the regressive bias is higher in model 1, where 32.59% of 
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Ic pl p2 R T C r=0 r=Iý r=I F(IS) 
gm 2.97 . 1593 . 0935 . 7245 . 9309 . 2064 2.45 24.53 73.02 
13.34 
(0) (0) (0) 
lm 11.61 . 1273 . 0000 . 6865 . 9390 . 2525 16.31 0.80 
82.89 99.08 
(0) (0) (-) 
ra 15.00 . 1271 . 6860 . 9402 . 2542 16.41 0.00 83.59 
100.00 
(-) (0) 
bb 5.54 . 2000 . 0000 . 6139 . 8836 . 2697 . 00 32.59 67.41 67.41 
(0) (-) (-) 
bb' 2.55 . 2000 . 0982 . 7200 . 9304 . 2104 . 00 25.77 74.23 6.83 
(0) (-) (0) 
Columns 2-4: The sign in parentesis refers to the sign of the corresponding 
first order derivative. 
Columns 8-10: r=o, t,, i, is the percentage of taxpayers reporting o, tc, t respectively. 
individuals are tax evaders, whereas with gm the evaders add up to 7.95%. 
The last two rows pertain to the constrained model of section 3.5.2, where 
pl = . 2, so that all taxpayers with 
income below the threshold are induced to 
report truthfully. The first local maxima is called bang- bang policy (bb), 1° where 
Ibb = 5.54, pib = .2 and p2b = 0. 
The share of taxpayers with I<I bb is 67.41%. 
This policy raises the lowest gross and net revenues and is the most expensive in 
terms of audit costs. Notice that bb is the optimal audit policy when taxpayers 
are risk neutral, see model 1. Finally, bb' is the second local maxima, confirming 
that the graph of aR/49p2 given Ic(P2) is as illustrated in figure 3.3. Notice that 
the threshold is down to Ibb' = 1.81 and that pbb' = . 0759. Also, bb' raises more 
net revenue than lm and ra. 
Model 4. The examination of table 3.2 shows that qualitatively similar results are 
obtained when g(ß) is exponentially distributed. As for the quantitative figures, 
10The term bang- bang is taken from Cowell (1990). Notice however that he applies this term 
to the case pl = 1. 
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audit probabilities are higher in model 4 than in model 3. The explanation is 
simple: the proportion of taxpayers with 0<5 (the average) is 50.1% in model 
3 and 63.2% in model 4. 
The global maximum is 1,9' = 2.97, gm = . 1593, pgm = . 0935. 
The EATR 
for an individual reporting r=0 is . 1593, which 
is about 75% of t= . 2. 
The 
EATR for taxpayers declaring r= I9-'ß is (income in parenthesis): . 198 
(3), 
. 146 
(6), 
. 133 
(8), 
. 119 
(12), 
. 114 
(15). Since the proportion of evaders is only 26.98%, 
this fall in the EATR does not cause a strong regressive bias. 
To conclude, the numerical computations have shown that the form of the distri- 
bution of attitudes towards risk among taxpayers is a crucial factor in determining 
the nature of the optimal tax enforcement policy. When all taxpayers have the 
same degree of risk aversion, the optimal audit policy may cause the effective tax 
schedule to be quite regressive. Instead, when attitudes towards risk vary across 
individuals, the optimal audit policy introduces only a limited regressive bias. 
The optimal threshold is generally low and p2"ß < pra < pinn. 
3.7 Conclusions 
This final section suggests few lines for further research. 
The assumption of a kinked linear utility function gives a weak model of in- 
dividual behaviour. Taxpayers with pre-tax income below the threshold operate 
a zero-one decision in response to the audit policy, the optimal choice being ei- 
ther to conceal all income or to report truthfully. Taxpayers with income greater 
than the threshold restrict their choice to declaring zero income, declaring the 
threshold or reporting truthfully. Also, the tax rate does not affect the eva- 
sion decision. The obvious generalization is to assume a strictly concave, twice 
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continuously differentiable utility function. 
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The audit policy has been restricted to the one-threshold, two-probabilities 
form. Although it has the merit of being operationally simple, there is no assur- 
ance that it is the optimal audit probability function. 
A proportional income tax has been assumed. One could add the government 
to the model, its objective being to maximize a social welfare function by choice 
of the tax schedule, while taking into account the behaviour of the tax agency. 
On this point see Sanchez and Sobel (1990) and Cremer et al. (1990). 
Efficiency aspects could be added to the analysis, by letting the audit policy, 
taxes and penalties to affect pre-tax incomes. 
Finally, the assumption that the only information available to the tax agency 
is taxpayers reports is quite restrictive. The efficacy of the audit policy can be 
improved by using signals other than taxpayers reports, which are correlated with 
taxable income. On dividing taxpayers into audit classes, see Scotchmer (1987) 
and Cremer et al. (1990). 
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A Appendix 
A. 1 Identical degree of risk aversion 
Proof of lemma 1. The proof is given by establishing two properties. Let 
b- (1 + ßs)-1. Let pi, p2 denote optimal audit probabilities. 
P1. For any I, max(pi, p2) < b. 
Proof. The arguments are taken from Cremer et al. (1990, appendix, proper- 
ties 1-3) and adapted to the model herein. The property is proven by contradic- 
tion. 
Consider first a taxpayer with I<I, His or her expected utility is 
EU(r; I, 0) = , Q(1 - t)I + t(1 - pi/b)(I - r), rE [0, I] (3.38) 
Assume that pi >b (the value of p2 is irrelevant). Then the optimal report is 
r(. ) = I. Replacing p1 with p1 =b leaves the optimal report unchanged (from 
assumption 1) whereas reduces audit costs. Thus pi > bis not optimal. 
Next consider a taxpayer with I>I, His or her expected utility is 
EU(r; I Iý) _ 
ý(1 - t)I + t(1 - pilb)(I - r), rE [0, I, ) (3.39) 
0(1 - t)I + t(1 - P2/b)(I - r), rE [I,, I] 
Assume that P1 does not hold. Then there are five cases to consider: (i) pi > b, 
p* > b, (ii) pi = b, p2 > b, (iii) pi < b, p2 > b, (iv) pi > b, p2 = b, (v) pi > b, 
p2 < b. Let p' = min(p , 
b), i=1,2. One can show that replacing pi, p2 with 
pi, ý2 leaves taxpayers optimal reports unchanged whereas decreases audit costs. 
Thus pi, p2 are not optimal. To illustrate, two cases are examined. Consider first 
case (iii). Then r(. ) =0 for all I. Switching to pi = pi < b, p2 =b leaves both 
optimal reports and audit costs unchanged. Next take case (v). Then r(. ) =0 
for all I< Ic and r(. ) = Ic for all I> Ic. Switching to pi = b, p'2 = p2 <b does 
not affect optimal reports whereas reduces audit costs. Q. E. D. 
P2. For any I, p2 < pi. 
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Proof. The arguments are taken from Scotchmer (1987, p. 231). Let 0< pi < 
p'2 < b, I, ' E [0, I+] be some audit policy. Then r(. ) =0 for all I and all reports 
are audited at the probability pl. Next consider the audit policy 0< pi = p2 < b, 
I, '. This change of policy does not affect optimal reports as well as audit costs. 
Finally, provided that pi > 0, consider the audit policy 0< p'2' < pi < b, I, = I+. 
Again, both optimal reports and audit costs are not affected and this proves the 
property. Q. E. D. 
Proof of lemma 2. Linearity of expected utility and assumption 1 imply that a 
taxpayer with I<I, chooses his or her optimal report r(. ) from the discrete set 
{0, I}, whereas a taxpayer with I>I, chooses from the set 10,1,11. Let EU(r) 
denote the expected utility when the report is r. Let b= (1 + $s)-1. 
Consider first a taxpayer with I<I, Eq. (3.38) implies that EU(I) > EU(O), 
thus r(. ) = I, if pi > b. Therefore, for all IE [0, Is), r(. ) =0 if pi <b and 
r(. )=Iifpl=b. 
Next consider a taxpayer with I>I, Eq. (3.39) implies that (i) EU(I) > 
EU(0) if pi >b and EU(I) > EU(II) if p2 > b, (ii) EU(I, ) > EU(I) if 
P2 <b and EU(I, ) > EU(O) if I> kIt, (iii) EU(O) > EU(I) if pl <b and 
EU(O) > EU(I, ) if I < kIt. From lemma 1, P2 < b, thus case (i) never occurs. 
When pi < b, then r(. ) = I, if I> inin(kI,, I+) and r(. ) = 0 if I< min(iII, I+) 
When pi = b, then k= 1 and r(. ) = I, for all I E [Is, I+]. Q. E. D. 
A. 2 Different attitudes towards risk 
Proof of lemma 3. As for lemma 1, the proof is given by establishing two 
properties. Let b- (1 + s)-1 and let pi, p2 denote optimal audit probabilities. 
P1. For any I, max(p , p2) < 
b. 
Proof. The property is proven by contradiction. 
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Consider first a taxpayer (I, 0) with I<I, His or her expected utility is 
EU(r; I, /3) = , Q(1 - t)I + t[1 - pi(1 + ßs)](I - r), rE [0, I] (3.40) 
Assume that pi >b (the value of p2 is irrelevant). Then the optimal report is 
r(. ) =I for all 0E [1, oo). Replacing pi with pi =b leaves the optimal report 
unchanged (from assumption 1) whereas reduces audit costs. Thus pl > bis not 
optimal. 
Next consider a taxpayer (I, 0) with I>I, His or her expected utility is 
EU(r; I, ý) = 
Q(1 - t)I + t[1 - pß(1 + ßs)](I - r), rE [0, I, ) (3.41) 0(1 - t)I + t[1 - P2(1 + ßs)](1 - r), rE [I,, I] 
Assume that P1 does not hold. Then there are five cases to consider: (i) pi > b, 
p2 > b, (ii) p=b, p2 > b, (iii) p* < b, p2 > b, (iv) pi > b, p2 = b, (v) pi > b, 
P; < b. Let pi = min(p, b), i=1,2. One can show that replacing pi, p2 with 
pi, p'2 leaves taxpayers optimal reports unchanged for all /9 E [1, oo) whereas 
decreases audit costs. Thus pi, p2 are not optimal. 
To illustrate, two cases are examined. Consider first case (iii). For all I, 
r(. )=0if0E [1, /. 31) andr(. )=Iif/3E [01, oo), where /3 (1-pl)/(spi)> 1. 
Switching to pi = pi < b, p2 =b leaves optimal reports unchanged whereas 
audit costs are reduced. Next take case (v). For all IE [0, I, ), r(. ) = I. For 
all IE [I,, I+], r(. ) = Ic if QE [1,02) and r(. ) =I if 0E [02,00), where 
, 
Q2 = (1 - p2)/(sp2) > 1. Switching to p'1 = b, p2 = p2 <b does not affect optimal 
reports whereas reduces audit costs. Q. E. D. 
P2. For any I, p <p . 
Proof. Let 0< pi < pä < b, I, ' E [0,1+] be some audit policy. For all 
I, r(. ) =0 if 0E [1,01) and r(. ) =I if /E [/31, oo). Notice that optimal 
reports are independent of p2. Next consider the audit policy 0< pi = p'2 < b, 
I, '. This change of policy does not affect optimal reports whereas reduces audit 
costs. Finally, provided that pi > 0, consider the audit policy 0< p2' < p, < b, 
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I, = I+. Both optimal reports and audit costs are not affected and this proves 
the property. Q. E. D. 
Proof of lemma 4. Linearity of expected utility and assumption 1 imply that a 
taxpayer with I<I, chooses his or her optimal report r(. ) from the discrete set 
{0, I}, whereas a taxpayer with I>I, chooses from the set {0, I, I}. Let EU(r) 
denote the expected utility when the report is r. Let b= (1 + S)-1- 
Consider first a taxpayer with I<I, Eq. (3.40) implies that EU(I) > EU(0), 
thus r(. )=I, iff0>ß1. 
Next consider a taxpayer with I>I, Eq. (3.41) implies that (i) EU(I) 
EU(0) if ,Q> 0l and EU(I) > EU(I, ) if 0> 02i (ii) EU(II) > EU(I) if 
,ü< 02 and EU(I, ) > EU(O) if Q>,, (iii) EU(O) > EU(I) if ß< ßl and 
EU(O) > EU(II) if ß< /3. From lemma 3, p2 < pi, thus , 
Q2 > ßl. Also, /3 is 
decreasing in I and /3 = 01 at I = I, 1 at I= KI,. Hence (i) r(. ) =I if 
, Q>ß, 
(ii)r(. )=I, ifQE[ßQ2), (iii)r(. )=0if0< /. Q. E. D. 
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Chapter 4 
Presumptive Income Coefficients 
and Tax Enforcement Policy: a 
Theoretical Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
In 1989 the Italian government introduced a new tax enforcement mechanism, 
called Presumptive Income Coefficients (PIC), with the objective of reducing 
tax evasion in the non-corporate sector. The system applies to small size firms, 
professionals and freelance, where it is a common practice to evade the income 
tax and the value added tax by under-reporting revenues. 
Consider a homogeneous group of professionals or firms operating in the same 
sector of activity. The rationale of the mechanism is simple and is based on two 
considerations. The first is that sales revenues are easily concealed to the tax- 
ing authority whereas production costs are not. On one hand, selling under the 
counter for cash is a common way of not reporting revenues and it is costly, if 
not impossible, for the tax agency to discover the true amount when performing 
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an audit. On the other hand, expenditures such as wages to regular employees, 
telephone and electricity bills are difficult to hide and can be monitored at a 
low cost. The second consideration is that when examining various firms, one 
observes a similar relation between production costs and the corresponding rev- 
enues, the discrepancies being due to different technologies, locations and demand 
conditions. Hence it is possible to estimate actual revenues and income by ap- 
plying simple algorithms on observed production costs. The choice of the Italian 
tax administration has been that of determining the PIC by regressing (ordinary 
least squares) revenues on production costs over a sample of taxpayers. 
The PIC audit policy works as follows. For each group of taxpayers (classi- 
fied according to the sector of economic activity) the taxing authority publishes 
the list of PIC, one for each type of expenditure. The application of the coeffi- 
cients to production costs then determines the so called presumptive income. If 
reported income is at least as high as the presumptive income, the taxpayer is 
subjected to random audits. Otherwise the taxpayer is expected to pay the tax 
on presumptive income, unless he or she demonstrates that the actual income is 
lower than presumptive income. Section 4.2 illustrates in more detail the PIC 
audit mechanism implemented by the Italian government. ' 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of the PIC tax 
enforcement policy. The basic model, described in section 4.3, consists of a large 
population of professionals producing and selling a homogeneous commodity in 
a competitive market. Each professional supplies labour services into his or her 
own business and makes earnings from sales into the market. Pre-tax incomes 
and production costs vary across individuals, for they are endowed with different 
'A similar system, called tachshiv, is used in Israel since 1954, see Lapidoth (1977). Pro- 
cedures to estimate taxable incomes in the agricultural sector have been used in France since 
1935, see Kelly and Oldman (1973). 
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Tax compliance and tax enforcement policy are introduced in section 4.4. 
Following Reinganum and Wilde (1985), the game between the taxing authority 
and taxpayers is modelled in a principal-agent framework. Taxpayers choose an 
income report that maximizes expected utility, taking taxes, penalties and the 
audit policy as given. The tax agency observes production costs and income 
reports and chooses the audit policy that maximizes the tax revenue net of audit 
costs. The audit policy is restricted to the simple mechanism where income 
reports below and above a given mark-up on production costs are audited at 
different probabilities. When the mark-up coefficient is meant to give an estimate 
of taxable income, its interpretation is that of presumptive income coefficient. 
Two types of presumptive coefficients are considered: the weighted average of 
individual mark-up coefficients and the ordinary least squares coefficient with no 
intercept term. 
Section 4.5 examines the case of exogenous labour supply. Proposition 1 
characterizes the nature of the optimal tax enforcement policy when the mark- 
up coefficient is set at the net revenue maximizing level. Income reports below 
the corresponding mark-up on production costs are audited at the probability 
level just sufficient to induce honest behaviour, whereas those above it are not 
audited. This result mirrors those obtained in Reinganum and Wilde (1985) type 
models, 2 where the tax agency observes only income reports and audits at differ- 
ent probabilities reports below and above a given income threshold. Proposition 2 
deals with optimal probabilities of audit when the mark-up is constrained to be 
a presumptive income coefficient. It is shown that either the result of proposi- 
tion 1 applies or random audits is the best policy. In the latter case the notion 
of presumptive coefficient becomes meaningless. 
'See for instance Cremer, Marchand and Pestieu (1990) and Sanchez and Sobel (1990). 
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In section 4.6 labour supply and pre-tax incomes are endogenously deter- 
mined by the tax enforcement instruments. ' An analytical characterization of 
the optimal audit policy cannot be given. Thus some numerical computations 
are examined. It is shown that the properties of the optimal audit policy depend 
on the size of unit audit costs relative to the size of average pre-tax income. If 
audit costs are relatively low, the optimal audit policy is random audits, and thus 
the mark-up coefficient is a redundant instrument. If audit costs are relatively 
high, income reports below the optimal mark-up on production costs are audited 
at the probability level just sufficient to induce truthful reporting, whereas those 
above it meet a lower but positive probability of audit. Finally, when unit audit 
costs are of considerable size relative to average income, income reports above 
the mark-up level should be audited at probability zero. The numerical coinpu- 
tations also show that the net revenue maximizing mark-up coefficient is lower 
than the presumptive income coefficients. This is an important result, especially 
when one considers that in taxpayers' minds a high value of the mark-up is likely 
to be perceived as unfair. Conclusions are given in section 4.7. 
4.2 Presumptive income coefficients 
The PIC audit policy is a recent innovation of the Italian tax code. Not sur- 
prisingly, the provisions of the tax law are numerous and it would be lenghty 
to describe them all. Also, recently the original system has been modified. The 
purpose of this section is to give a short illustration of the basic features. 
3Mookherjee and Prig (1989) allow for pre- tax income to be endogenous. However their 
model is derived from Grossman and Hart's (1983) framework and it is not directly comparable 
to the model presented herein. 
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The PIC mechanism applies to firms in the non-corporate sector with revenues, 
or invoiced sales proceeds, lower than a given threshold (about 180,000 English 
pounds). These taxpayers have the opportunity to opt for two alternative book- 
keeping systems. One is the Ordinary Book-Keeping (OBK), which is expen- 
sive to run because the entrepreneur must fill in numerous accounting books. 
When opting for the OBK, the taxpayer is subjected to a pure random audits 
mechanism. ' The other is the Simplified Book-Keeping (SBK), which consists of 
keeping a book of invoiced sales proceeds and a book of invoiced expenditures. 
Thus book-keeping costs are low. Clearly, the opportunites to evade the income 
tax and the value added tax are higher under SBK than OBK. Taxpayers opting 
for SBK are subjected to the PIC audit mechanism. 
Although the system applies to both the income and the value added tax, in 
what follows the focus will be only on the income tax. Under SBK, each year the 
taxpayer fills in an Income Tax Declaration Form (ITDF) by entering the amount 
of the Invoiced Sales Revenues and a list of Invoiced / Registered Expenditures, 
the difference being taxable income. The PIC audit mechanism operates in two 
steps. The first uses the Standard Revenues Coefficients (SRC) to determine 
whether reported revenues are suspiciously low. In case of an affirmative answer, 
then in the second step the tax authority computes the presumptive income using 
the Presumptive Income Coefficients. 
Step 1. Let R' be declared revenues. Let Cd, i=1, .... 
k, be the list of 
expenditures the taxpayer is required to enter into the ITDF and let 'd; be the 
corresponding SRC. The tax authority then computes R= = t9tCd, the standard 
revenues associated to expenditure i. If the number of Rj for which R= > Rd 
4The OBK is compulsory for non-corporate firms with revenues above the threshold and for 
all corporations. 
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is greater than two then the tax agency suspects that revenues are too low and 
proceeds to step 2. Otherwise the taxpayer is subjected to the ordinary random 
audits. 
Step 2. The taxing authority determines the presumptive revenues and income 
on the basis of the PIC at, i=1,... , 
k. Presumptive revenues are equal to 
RP = >I(1 + ai)Cd, and the presumptive income is P' = ý1 a1Cd. If RP < Rd, 
the taxpayer is subjected to the ordinary random audits. When RP > Rd, the 
taxpayer is expected to pay the income tax on the basis of presumptive income, 
unless he or she demonstrates that the declared income is equal to the actual 
income. 
4.2.2 The 1993 regime 
In 1993 the system has been modified as follows: 
" the Standard Revenue Coefficients have been suppressed (so that step 1 
described above no longer applies); 
" the revenue threshold below which the PIC audit mechanism operates has 
been increased (for firms in the manufacturing industry the level is about 
450,000 English pounds); 
" In some instances the PIC apply also to firms opting for the OBK system; 
" taxpayers are expected to pay a minimum tax, which is computed on the 
shadow labour income of the entrepreneur, that is the part of profits that 
are attributed to labour services supplied by the taxpayer into his or her 
own business. 
The most relevant innovation concerns the minimum tax. The estimate of the 
shadow labour income is based on several elements: sector of activity, location, 
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age, expertise (measured by the years of activity) and number of employees. 
Presumptive income is Ip = Im +> a=Cd, where the shadow labour income IM 
is the intercept term in the equation determining IP. The analysis that will follow 
is conducted assuming Im = 0, the main reason for doing so being analytical 
tractability. 
4.3 The basic model 
This section describes the basic framework. Tax compliance and tax enforcement 
policy issues will be introduced in the next section. 
The model consists of a large population of professionals producing and selling 
a homogeneous commodity, or a service, in a competitive market. The term pro- 
fessional is meant to characterize an independent producer who provides labour 
services into his or her own business and derives earnings from the sale of his or 
her products into the market. ' 
Assume that the professionals have identical preferences over disposable in- 
come y and labour supply L. The utility function is of the form 
U(y, L)=y - 
1L2 
2 
(4.1) 
The government levies a proportional income tax at rate t, 0<t<1, on pre-tax 
income I, so that y= (1 - t)I. 
Let it be the price of the service and assume that inverse demand is horizontal 
so that 7r is fixed. The key feature of the model is that individuals are endowed 
with different production technologies, which are characterized by the pair of 
parameters (c, w), 0<c< 7r, w>0. The first is an efficiency parameter and 
represents the cost of producing one unit of output (materials, telephone calls, 
5Alternative terms for professional are freelance and self-employed worker. 
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wages to employees). The second is a skill parameter and gives the units of 
output for each unit of labour services supplied by the professional. Thus gross 
income is I= (7r - c)x and labour supply is L= (1/w)x, where x is individual 
output. Notice that c and w are constant so that technology is constant returns 
to scale. 
To avoid repetitions, in what follows I will refer to professional with efficiency 
parameter c and skill parameter w simply as professional (c, w). 
Professional (c, w) solves 
maxU=(1-t)(ir-c)x- 
12 
2w2 
(4.2) 
From the first order condition of this problem one obtains x(c, w) = (1 - t)w2(7r - 
c) and I(c, w) = (1 - t)w2(7r - c)2. Clearly, gross income is increasing in w and 
decreasing in c. Also, notice that the income tax is distortionary, for gross income 
is decreasing in t. 
The distribution of the efficiency and skill parameters across individuals com- 
pletes the description of the model. Assume that c and to are independently 
distributed with cumulative distributions F(c), cE [0,7r], and G(w), wE [0, oo). 
Assume that F(c) and G(w) are twice continuously differentiable and let f (c) = 
F'(c), CE (0,7r), and g(w) = G'(w), wE (0, oo), be the corresponding density 
functions. 
4.4 The problem of the tax enforcement agency 
The information set of the tax enforcement agency is as follows. The agency 
knows F(c) and G(w) but it is unable to observe the characteristics (c, w) of each 
individual, as well as the output x. Therefore pre-tax income I= (7r - c)x is not 
directly observed. 
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Professionals are thus required to fill in an income declaration form. showing 
separately total revenues and total production costs. It is assumed that taxpayers 
are unable to over or under-report production costs, or alternatively that the 
agency costlessly observes cx. To evade the income tax, professionals must then 
under-report total revenues. The cost of verifying an income report is equal to 
cp >0 and it is assumed that when performing an audit the tax agency observes 
the true revenues 7rx. 
Consider a professional (c, w) and let 
r=R-cx 
be reported income, where R is the amount of declared revenues. 
If not audited, his or her transfer to the tax agency is 
tr if r>0 
0 if r<0 
When audited, the professional pays the income tax plus a proportional surcharge 
on the evaded tax (if any) at rate s>0, so that the transfer is 
tr+(1+s)t(I-r) if 0<r<I 
tr if r>I 
(1 + s)tI if r<0 
Since in the event of no audit the income tax is zero for negative reports, 
no taxpayer will report r<0. Also, since in the event of audit there are no 
rewards for over-reporting, no taxpayer will report r>I. Thus attention can be 
restricted to 0<r<I, or cx <R< 7rx, where professionals declare an amount 
of revenues at least as high as total production costs. 
The tax enforcement agency decides how many and which reports to audit. 
The available information is taxpayers' reports, showing r, R and cx. The agency 
fixes a mark-up coefficient a>0 and the audit policy is restricted to the step 
function 
p1 if r< acx 
p(r) P2 if r>acx 
(4.3) 
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A professional is audited at a constant probability p, if reported income is less 
than a times the amount of production costs, whereas the probability is p2 if 
reported income is at least as high as acx. Notice that the way in which an audit 
is triggered differs from the real PIC mechanism described in section 4.2. In 
particular, the two systems coincide when reported income is at least as high as 
presumptive income: taxpayers face a probability P2 of audit and the tax agency 
can verify an income report at a cost co per audit. However, the model and the 
real PIC mechanism differ when reported income is less than presumptive income. 
In the former, taxpayers meet a probability pi of audit and the taxing authority 
may verify an income report at the same unit cost yo. In the latter, the taxpayer 
is expected (with probability one) to pay the tax on presumptive income, unless 
she or he demonstrates (and this means costly effort) that the actual income is 
lower than presumptive income. The tax agency bears no audit costs. 
The tax agency takes the tax and the penalty rates as given, these being fixed 
outside the model by a higher level of authority. Its objective is to maximize total 
revenue (taxes plus fines) net of audit costs by choosing the tax enforcement 
instruments pi, p2 and a, while taking taxpayers optimal reports as given. A 
few words about the instrument a are in order. When a is unconstrained, its 
interpretation is that of a mark-up threshold, where the level of enforcement 
changes from pl to p2. However, the actual value of a may bear some importance 
in a taxpayer's mind, especially when pi > p2. In other words, a taxpayer may 
feel that reporting an income below acx makes the tax agency to believe that the 
income declaration is suspiciously low. In this case a high value of a is considered 
unfair, for it attaches a kind of stigma to individuals with actual income below 
cacx. Hence the tax agency may opt for constraining a to an average mark-up, 
and in this case a is interpreted as a presumptive income coefficient, so that 
acx is the presumptive income and (1 + a)cx are the corresponding presumptiz'e 
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Each professional is assumed to select an income report and an output level 
that maximize expected utility in the two states of the world (audit / no audit), 
taking tax and penalty rates and the audit policy as given. Labour supply is the 
same in both states of the world. As for disposable income, when the taxpayer 
reports truthfully, his or her income is (1 - t)I in both states of the world. On 
the other hand, when rýI, disposable income is 
Yi = (1-t)I+t(I-r)= 
_ (1 -t)(ir-c)x+t[(ir-c)x-r] 
if no audit occurs and 
Y2 = (1 - t)I - st(I - r) = 
= (1 - t)(7r - c)x - st[(7r - c)x - r] 
if an audit occurs. 
Hence the expected utility of professional (c, w) is 
EU(x, r; c, w) p(r)) yi + p(r)y2 - 
12 
x2 2w 
Notice that the utility function (4.1), which is linear in y, implies that profes- 
sionals are risk neutral over random realizations of income. 
Professional (c, w) solves 
max EU(x, r; c, w) _ (1 - t)(7r - c)x + 
x, T 
+t [1 - P(r)(1 + s)] 
[(7r 
- c)x - r, - 2w2 x2 
(4.4) 
where 0<r< (ir - c)x. Notice that EU(. 
) is linear in r and is discontinuous at 
r= acx when pl 54 P2 and (7r - c)x > acx. Linearity implies that the optimal 
report may not be unique. The following assumption 
is made to rule out multiple 
solutions. 
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Assumption 1 Whenever a professional is indifferent between reporting ro and 
ri, where ro < rl, then he or she always chooses to report r1. 
Let the solution to (4.4) be denoted by x(c, w), r(c, w), where the arguments 
(pl, p2, a) have been omitted to keep the notation simple. Gross income is 
I(c, w) = (ir - c)x(c, w). 
The set of admissible audit policies is 
Ao={(PI, p2, a)10<_pi, P2<_1, a>0} (4.5) 
When a is interpreted as a mark-up threshold, the problem of the tax enforcement 
agency is 
max T(p, 7p2,0) _ 
rtr(. ) + p(r(. ))(1 + s)t[I(. ) - r(. )] (PI 
iP2, a)EA 
t 
o 
foo 
0 
-, pp 
(r(. ))}dF(c)dG(w) (4.6) 
When the mark-up coefficient is constrained to be a presumptive income coeffi- 
cient, the maximization is over the audit probabilities with a fixed. 
The following lemma states that the optimal audit policy is contained in a 
subset of A0. 
Lemma 1 Let (pl, P21 c) E AO be some audit policy. Then there exists an audit 
policy (pi, p'2, a') E Al such that T(pl, p'2, a') > T(pl, p2i a), where 
Ai ={(pi, P2, a) 10<P2<Pi !ý (1+s) -1, a>01 
The proof is omitted. ' Optimal probabilities do not exceed (1 + s)-1, the level 
of enforcement just sufficient to induce truthful reporting, for a higher probabil- 
ity would increase audit costs without raising more tax revenue. Also, income 
6The proof follows the same lines of the proof of lemma 1 in chapter 3, to which the reader 
is referred to. 
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reports below acx must meet a higher probability of audit than those above it, 
for otherwise the audit policy would not work as a screening device, separating 
low and high income taxpayers according to their reports. 
The next section examines a constrained version of this model, where labour 
supply and therefore pre-tax incomes are assumed to be exogenously fixed. The 
case of endogenous labour supply is postponed to section 4.6. 
4.5 Exogenous labour supply 
Assume that labour supply is fixed at L= L°. In other words, all professionals 
provide the same amount of labour services into their own business. The output 
of a professional (c, w) is x(c, w) = wL°. Hence total production costs and pre-tax 
income are respectively 
cx(c, w) = cwL° 
I (C, w) = (7r - c)wL° 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
4.5.1 The information set of the tax enforcement agency 
Although the tax enforcement agency observes the individual production costs, 
this piece of information is not sufficient to infer the corresponding individual pre- 
tax income, for two professionals with the same level of production costs will have 
different incomes whenever they have different skill and efficiency parameters. 
To illustrate, consider professionals (cl, wl) and (c2, w2). Let L° =1 and 
suppose they have identical production costs ciwl = c2w2. Without loss of gen- 
erality, suppose that cl < c2 and wi > w2. Thus I2 = 
(7r - c2)w2 = irw2 - c1w1 
and Il = (ir - cl)wi > 12, so that the more skilled and efficient professional 
has 
a higher income.? Graph (a) in figure 4.1 shows production costs and pre-tax 
'Conversely, professionals with the same gross income may have different total production 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 4.1: Exogenous income and production costs 
cx 
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incomes as a function of c for two different levels wl > w2 of the skill parame- 
ter. Graph (b) shows the resulting relation between production costs and pre-tax 
income. 
One point worth mentioning is that the restriction to the audit function with 
no intercept term and positive a given in (4.3) is potentially quite strong, for 
the correlation between total production costs and income may, in some cases, 
be negative. When the correlation is negative, a more reasonable audit func- 
tion would be one with an intercept term (minimum income) which allows for 
a negative mark up threshold a<0. For the sake of illustration, suppose that 
the efficiency and the skill parameters are uniformily distributed with support 
cE [cj, Ch] and wE [0, Wh] respectively; also let L° = 1. After some tedious 
computations, one finds that the covariance between I= (7r - c)w and C= cw 
is SIC = (1/144)wh[67r(cl + Ch)- 3(cß+ ch)2 - 4(ch -cß)2]. If cl =0 and Ch = 7r 
(as assumed at the end of section 4.3) then aIc = -(1/144)whir2 so that average 
income, conditional on C, decreases with C. On the other hand, if cl =0 and 
Ch <r then ajc = (1/144)w 2 (67r - 7ch)ch so that o jc >0 if 7r > (i /6)ch. 
costs. 
7rw2 7rw1 
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The mark-up of a professional (c, w) is independent of the skill parameter w 
and is defined by 
lý(c) =I 
(c' w) -c 
cx(c, w) c 
(4.9) 
The presumptive income coefficient, or presumptive mark-up, can be defined in 
different ways. Here two alternatives are considered. The first approach is to 
define the presumptive income coefficient as the average of individual mark-up 
coefficients 
am = 
0Ir 
7r - Cf (c) dc 
C (4.10) 
The second approach is to define it as the least square coefficient obtained when 
regressing pre-tax incomes over total production costs with a line constrained to 
pass through the origin. Thus a solves 
jf 
min [(r - c)wL° - acwL°]2f(c)g(w)dc dw 
and the solution gives 
call 27rc _2 -1 
(4.11) 
where c and o, 2 are respectively the mean and the variance of unit costs. 
The next subsection looks at the unconstrained problem of the tax agency, 
where net revenue is maximized over pl, P2 and a. The search for the opti- 
mal probabilities with a constrained to be a presumptive income coefficient is 
examined in subsection 4.5.3. 
4.5.2 Optimal audit policy 
The following lemma characterizes professionals' optimal reports. 
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Lemma 2 For any (pl, p21 a) E A1, taxpayers' optimal reports are 
If pi < (1 + s)-1 then 
0 if (Cl W) E (v, 7r] x [0,00) r(c) w) _ 
acwL° if (c, w) E [0, v] x [0, oo) 
If pi = (1 + s)-1 then 
r(c, w) 
(ir - c)wL° if (c, w) E (v, ir] x [0, oo) 
acwL° if (c, w) E [0, v] x [0, oo) 
where 
ir 
vl+ 
ica 
Proof. See appendix A. I. 
(1 + s)-1 - P2 
Pi - P2 
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Taxpayers are divided into two groups and the separation is related to the effi- 
ciency parameter c. When pi < (1 +s)-1, then K>1 and the relatively inefficient 
professionals, those with c> it/(1 + ica), report no income, whereas the relatively 
efficient, those with c< 7r/(1+ica), report an income equal to the mark-up thresh- 
old on production costs. When pi = (1 + s)-1, then K=1 and individuals with 
c> 7r/(1 + a) report true income, whereas those with c< 7r/(1 + a) report acx. 
The decision on whether to report no income, the mark-up threshold on pro- 
duction costs, or true income is independent of the skill parameter. In other 
words, the qualitative response to the audit policy is independent of w. The rea- 
son is that the audit policy sets two different levels of enforcement on the basis 
of the coefficient a which is a mark-up on production costs, and individual mark- 
up coefficients are independent of w, see eq. (4.9). However, the skill parameter 
affects the quantity of reported income, for pre-tax income and production costs 
are greater the higher is w. 
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Applying lemma 2 the net revenue function is 
7'(p1 Pz, a) _f 
{tpl (1 + s)(- c)tL° - pi 
}dF(c) 
-ý- 
-{- 0f 
v {tacwL° + tp2(1 + s) [(7r - c) - ac, wL° - yPp2}dF(c) 
where w= fo wg(w)dw is the average skill level. 
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(4.12) 
Notice that T(. ) is continuous in all its arguments. Making the change of 
variable a= (ir - v)/(Kv) and rearranging eq. (4.12) one gets 
°- pl 
ý(7r 
- c) ýy}f (c)dc + t(1 + s)wL 
+ P2 
V {(7r 
- c) - 
}f(c)dc + (pi - P2) 
_-v fcf(c)dc 
J o 
where 7= co/(t(1 + s)wL°). 
From the formula of integration by parts 
j1 
cf(c)dc = vF(v) - 
%v 
Jo 
F(c)dc 
vf 
cf (c)dc = 7r - vF(v) - 
f F(c)dc IV 
(4.13) 
Using these expressions, and after some algebra, eq. (4.13) can be written as 
T(pi7P27v) 
t(1 + s)ii L° 
=P2 
v fv F(c) - -Yf (c) dc + 
0 
"F(c) 
- 7f (c) dc - pi's 
-V /''f F(c)dc + Piv o vvf 
Differentiating with respect to v 
T= 
t(1 + s)wL°(pi - P2) v2 
v 
F(c)dc -vv F(v) +- .f 
(v) 
jo 
äv o 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
Let 
, 
F(v) = fö F(c)dc. From eq. (4.15) the first order necessary condition 
with respect to v is 
T (V) 2. ß(v) -v F(v) + 'Yf (v) =0 (4.16) 
v 
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Unfortunately this expression does not have a straightforward interpretation. 8 
Consider the values of '(v) at the extreme points of its support set 
lim'(v) = yyf(0) >0 v-. O 
lim k(v) c+ ^ff (ir) V-*Ir 7r 
where c= f0 cf (c)dc is the average unit production cost. The second limit is 
likely to be negative if f (7r) is sufficiently small. 
When eq. (4.18) is negative the following assumption is sufficient to ensure 
that the optimal audit policy is unique. 
Assumption 2 There exists a v* E (0,7r) such that '(v) >0 for v< v* and 
T(v) <0 for v> v*. 
Proposition 1 Under assumption 2, the optimal audit policy is unique and is 
given by pi = (1 + s)-1, p2 =0 and a* = (7r - v*)/v*, where v* E (0,7r) solves 
I'(v) = 0. 
Proof. Assumption 2 implies 
v. 
kP (v) dv =-v. 
1 F(v) - -y f (v) dv >0 (4.19) 0ov 
*T 
(v)dv =-fy F(v) - 7f (v) dv + 
Jv 
v V 
+ 'r -vf F(v)dv <0 (4.20) 
v* o 
(4.17) 
(4.18) 
Let v= v* into eq. (4.14). Since v* is independent of pi and p2, one immediately 
notice that the revenue function is linear in the audit probabilities. Differentiating 
DT/ape - F(c)-f(c) dc<0 
JV 
s 
IV (4.21) 
t(1 + s)wL° 
aT/api 
t(1 + s)wL° 
-% F(c) -7f (c) 
}dc 
- *v 
f F(c)dc >0 (4.22) 
JIvc v 
'In Reinganum and Wilde's (1985) model, the corresponding first order condition for the 
income threshold can be expressed in terms of the hazard rate of the distribution of pre-tax 
incomes. Under the assumption of increasing hazard rate the optimal threshold is then unique. 
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so that optimal probabilities are pi = (1 + s)-1 and p2 = 0. Q. E. D. 
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The optimal tax enforcement policy is such that income reports below the cor- 
responding mark-up on production costs are audited at the probability level just 
sufficient to induce truthful reporting, whereas those above it are not audited. 
The relatively inefficient professionals, those with c> v*, are forced to behave 
honestly and pay in full the legislated income tax. On the other hand, the rel- 
atively efficient business, those with c< v*, report acx and this is sufficient to 
escape the audit, so that they evade the difference between true income and acx. 
4.5.3 Presumptive income coefficients 
Suppose that the taxing authority constrains the mark-up coefficient to one of 
the presumptive income coefficients defined in eqs. (4.10)-(4.11) and chooses 
audit probabilities to maximize net revenue. Let a&c be the presumptive income 
coefficient, where apic is either &m or als. Let vpic = 7r/(1 + K& ). 
Proposition 2 Let the tax enforcement agency fix a presumptive income coeffi- 
cient apts. Under assumption 2 optimal probabilities are 
Ifapic<a* then pi=(l+s)-1 and 
vp$c 
if I tP(v)dv >0 
0 
, vpic 
if '(v)dv <0 
0 
then p2 =0 
then p2 
If apic > a* then p=0 and 
if W(v)dv <0 
pie 
ir 
if 7vptc 'P(v)dv >0 
then p; = (1 + s)-1 
then p: _*0 
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Proof. From eqs. (4.19) and (4.21) and eqs. (4.20) and (4.22) 
I ýPic I W(v)dv In 
f W(v)dv 
OT/19p2 
t(1 + s)wL° 
_ 
äT/(9p1 
t(1 + s)wL° 
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(4.23) 
(4.24) 
If aPtC < a* then vp` > v*. From assumption 2 f,. '(v)dv < 0. Thus 
fv ; c'(v)dv <0 and äT/äp1 >0 from eq. (4.24), so that pi = (1+s)-1. Eq. (4.23) 
can be either positive or negative. 
If c> a* then vP'c < v*. From assumption 2 fo i ýV(v)dv > 0. Thus 
fo Pic '(v)dv >0 and DT/ape <0 from eq. (4.23), so that p2 = 0. Eq. (4.24) can 
be either positive or negative. Q. E. D. 
When the presumptive income coefficient is lower than the optimal mark-up 
threshold (cxpic < a*), then the best audit policy may collapse into random audits 
at probability (1+s)-1, and in this case the notion of presumptive income becomes 
meaningless. Of course, if a&tc is sufficiently close to a*, then optimal probabilities 
are pi = (1 + s)-1, p2 = 0. A sufficient condition for ruling out random audits 
can be obtained from the following expression 
ir 
- 
in W(v)dv=-(ýr-c)--y=-(7r-c)- 
0 t (I + s) w L° 
(4.25) 
If eq. (4.25) is positive, that is t(l + s)(ir - c)wL° < cp, then random audits never 
occur, because in this case äT/äp2 <0 for all vptc, see eq. (4.23). To interpret 
this condition, notice that (ir - c)wL° is the average pre-tax income. 
When aP" > a*, then the tax agency may opt for no enforcement, thus raising 
no revenue. However, if apt` is sufficiently close to c, then optimal probabilities 
are p= (1 + s)-1, p2 = 0. Also, from eq. (4.25), the no enforcement solution 
never occurs if t(1 + s)(7r - c)wL° > co. 
CHAPTER 4 146 
4.6 Endogenous labour supply 
In this section labour supply and output levels are endogenously determined 
from the utility maximization problem (4.4). The following lemma characterizes 
optimal reports, equilibrium outputs and pre-tax incomes. 
Lemma 3 For any (pl, p2, Ic) E A,, professionals' optimal reports are 
If pi < (1 + s)-1 then 
10 
r(c, w) = 
acw2X**(P2, a; c) 
If p1 = (1 + s)-1 then 
if (c, w) E (v, 7f] X [0, °°) 
if (c, w) E [0, v] x [0, oo) 
r(c w) _ 
w21*(pi; c) 
2 
if (c, w) E (v, 7r] x [0, °O) 
, acw x**(p2, a; c) if (c, w) E [0, v] x [0, oo) 
where 
Ir 
v=1+ 
Ka, 
(1 + s)-1 - P2 
P1 - P2 
Equilibrium outputs are 
w2x*(pl; c) = w2 
[1 
- tpi(1 + s)] (7r - c), cE (v, 7r] 
w2X**(p2) a; c) = w2 
[1 
- tp2(1 + s), (7r - c)+ 
-w2tac[1 - p2(1 + s)ý, 
and pre-tax incomes are 
w2I*(pi; c) _ (Ir - c)w2x*(pi; c) 
w2I **(P2i a; c) _ (ir - c)w2X**(P2, a; c) 
Proof. See appendix A. 2. 
cE [0, v] 
Professionals with c>v report no income if p, < (1+s)-1 and report true income 
when pl = (1 + s)-1. Professionals with c<v report a times production costs. 
Notice that the tax enforcement policy affects equilibrium pre-tax incomes. In 
particular äx*/äpl < 0, öx**/19p2 < 0: an 
increase in audit probabilities lowers 
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equilibrium outputs because it causes an increase of the expected tax rate on 
concealed income. Also, ax**/äa < 0, for taxpayers with c< (7r - a)/a meet the 
higher probability p1 over a larger range of income reports r. 
Applying lemma 3, the problem of the tax agency is 
max 
AT 
(p,, P2, a) =f 
{tpi(1 + s)wI *- Sops 
If (c)dc + (Pl, p2,1 v 
+v {tcwx** + tp2(1 + s)w(I** -acs**) - 4OP2}f (c) dc (4.26) 0 
where w=o, + w2 and ýw is the variance of w. 
4.6.1 The information set of the tax enforcement agency 
When labour supply is endogenous, the relation between production costs and 
pre-tax incomes is affected by the tax enforcement instruments. As for the case 
of exogenous labour supply, the knowledge of individual production costs is not 
sufficient to determine the corresponding individual pre-tax income, for identical 
levels of production costs will result in different incomes whenever the skill and 
efficiency parameters differ. 
To illustrate, suppose that t=0, so that incomes and production costs are 
those in the absence of taxation. Graph (a) in figure 4.2 shows production costs 
and pre-tax incomes as a function of c for a given value of the skill parameter. 
Graph (b) shows the relation between production costs and pre-tax income for 
two different levels wl > w2 of the skill parameter. 
As for the case of exogenous incomes, individual mark-up coefficients are 
independent of w. They are defined by 
Q* (c) =- 
W 2I * (pl ; c) 
_ 
7r -c for cE (v, 7r) 
cw x *(pi; c) c 
0**(p2, ai c) _ 
w2I ** (p2, a; c) 
cw2x**(p2i a; c) 
(4.2T) 
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o 5 
cx 
Figure 4.2: Endogenous income and production costs 
_ 
[1 - tp2(l + s)](7r - c)2 - tca[1 - p2(1 + s)](ir - c)c 
[1 - tp2(1 + s)](ir - c)c - tcr[1 - p2(1 + s)]c2 
for cE [0, v] (4.28) 
The computation of the presumptive income coefficients is complicated by the 
fact that ß** is endogenously determined by p2 and a. However, suppose that 
the tax agency considers the individual mark-up coefficients under the hypothesis 
of a random audits policy with probability pi, in which case one can show that 
0** = 0*. 
Then the presumptive income coefficient computed as the average of individ- 
ual mark-up coefficients is 
am 
-- 
Cf (C)d 
0C 
(4.29) 
and this is equal to the corresponding coefficient in the case of exogenous labour 
supply. 
The minimum least square coefficient (of a line passing through the origin) is 
7r/2 it c 
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obtained from 
min 
00 7r [(1 
- t)w2(7r - c)2 - a(1 - t)w2(7r - c)c, 
2 f (c)g(w)dcdw 
a0o 00 
and the solution is 
C)3Cf (c)dc 
a- (4.30) f (7r - c)2c2 f (c) dc 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. The next subsection examines 
the case of random audits policy. The first order necessary conditions for solving 
the general problem are presented in subsection 4.6.3. Since an analytical solution 
cannot be found, subsection 4.6.4 considers some numerical computations of the 
model. 
4.6.2 Random audits 
Suppose that the tax enforcement agency audits all professionals at a constant 
probability p independent of the level of income reports. Random audits are a 
constrained version of problem (4.26), where a=0 and P2 = P. 
Under random audits, government's net revenue and taxpayers' equilibrium 
pre-tax incomes are respectively 
p(1 -1- s)I(p; c, w) - p}dF(c)dG(w) (4.31) T(p) = 
J°°[ 
lt 
I(p; c, w) _II- tp(1 + s)] w2(7r - c)2 (4.32) 
Aggregate, or average, income is 
it f 0oo I(p) -j1 (p; c, w) f (c)g(w)dcdw 
= [1 - tp(l + s)]A 
(4.33) 
where 
A= (aw + w2) [(7r - c)2 +-0, 
C, (4.34) 
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is aggregate income in the absence of taxation (t = 0). 
The problem of the taxing authority is to solve 
max T (p) = tp(1 + s) I (p) - Opp (4.35) 
The first order condition is 
-=t(1+s)I(p)-4o+tp(l+s)-=6 (4.36 dp dp ) 
The first term is positive and shows the increase in fines collection as more audits 
occur. The second is negative and represents the marginal cost of increasing the 
audit probability. The third term is negative because an increase in the level of 
enforcement reduces aggregate pre-tax income. The first order condition is also 
sufficient, for d2T/dp2 < 0. 
It is immediate to show that the optimal random audits probability is 
Pý _ 
where 
0 if 
if 
and 
(1 + s)-1 if 
** E 
(o, (1 + 3)-i), 
t(1 +s)A-ýo <0 
t(l+s)A-cp>0 
t(1 + s)A(1 - 2t) -<0 
t(l + s)A(1 - 2t) ->0 
** _ 
t(1 + s)A - cp 
2t2(1 + s)2A 
(4.37) 
When labour supply and pre-tax incomes are exogenous, the optimal random 
audit probability is either p=0 or p= (1 + s)-1, whereas with endogenous 
incomes also interior solutions may occur, the reason being that an increase in p 
causes aggregate income to fall. 
4.6.3 Optimal audit policy: first order conditions 
Returning to the general problem (4.26), the first order condition with respect to 
the mark-up threshold a is 
** OT 
as 
tw[1 - p2(1 + *3)] ov 
cx** + ac as 
f (c)dc -ý 
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 0I** +tWp2(1 +s) 
0 as 
f(c) dc + 
-p2)f(v)av =0 äa 
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(4.38) 
The first and the second term represent the net benefit, in terms of tax and 
fines collection, from a marginal increase in the mark-up coefficient. The second 
term is negative and shows that as a increases the aggregate pre-tax income of 
professionals with c<v falls. The third term is the marginal cost of increased 
tax enforcement. 
The corresponding first order conditions for the audit probabilities are 
aT = t(l +s)w I* +pial* a .ý pi api 
+ p(Pl - P2)f(v) 
av 
- 1- F(v)] =0 (4.39) api 
aT = tw v [1 p2(1 ý- s)acaý** +P2(1 ý-s)ÖI** f(c)dc+ a P2 P2 o P2 aP2 rv 
+ t(1 + s)w J (I** - acx**) f (c)äc + 0 
19V + 4'(pi - P2) f (v) 
v 
aP2 _'F(v) =0 
(4.40) 
To solve for the optimal tax enforcement instruments from these first order condi- 
tions is not an easy task. Hence some numerical computations will be considered. 
4.6.4 Numerical results 
The specification of the model is as follows. The price of the service is 7r = 4, the 
tax rate t= . 35 and the surcharge rate s=4. 
The density function f (c) of unit 
production costs is a truncated normal with parameters of the associated normal 
distribution it = 2, o= .8 and truncation points at c=0, c=4. 
The resulting 
distribution has mean c=2 and standard deviation o= . 764. There is no need 
to specify the form of the distribution g(w) of labour productivity. It is assumed 
that w=Vý". 5 andorw =ý. 
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Table 4.1: Audit policies. 
Optimal policy r. a. cg's = 1.235 cm=1.730 
cp a* Pi P* F(v*) P* dis p2 Pi P2'n 
1.0 any a . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 
1.5 any a . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 
2.0 . 745 . 2000 . 1929 . 644 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 . 2000 
2.5 . 638 . 2000 . 1618 . 712 . 1967 . 1967 . 1967 . 1967 . 196 7 
3.0 . 588 . 2000 . 1318 . 745 . 1789 . 2000 . 1258 . 1789 . 1789 
3.5 . 557 . 2000 . 1025 . 765 . 1610 . 2000 . 0903 . 1610 . 1610 
4.0 . 537 . 2000 . 0733 . 778 . 1432 . 2000 . 0548 . 1432 . 1432 
4.5 . 523 . 2000 . 0443 . 787 . 1254 . 2000 . 0195 . 1254 . 1254 
5.0 . 511 . 2000 . 0157 . 794 . 1076 . 2000 . 0000 . 1076 . 1076 
6.0 . 442 . 2000 . 0000 . 837 . 0720 . 0720 . 0720 . 0720 . 0720 
7.0 . 379 . 2000 . 0000 . 875 . 0363 . 0363 . 0363 . 0363 . 0363 
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The optimal audit policies corresponding to various values of the unit audit 
cost yo are shown in table 4.1. To give a scale to the level of c, o, notice that 
average (aggregate) income is 4.583 in the absence of taxation and 2.979 with 
perfect enforcement (the income tax is distortionary and affects the incentive to 
work). When < 1.5 the optimal audit policy is random audits at probability 
(1 + s)-1 = . 
2, the level of enforcement just sufficient to induce honest reports. 
For higher values of co, there is a unique optimal mark-up threshold separating 
taxpayers into two groups. Income reports below cccx are audited at probability 
pi = . 2, whereas those above at a 
lower probability p2. Notice that a* and p2 
decrease as cp increases and that for yo >6p=0. 
The value of F(v*) gives the proportion of taxpayers audited at probability 
p2. For instance, when cp =4 the mark-up threshold is . 
537, so that 77.8% of 
professionals are audited at probability . 
0733 and 22.2% at probability . 
2. Notice 
that for all values of cp the mark-up threshold a* is relatively low: in fact, the 
proportion of professionals audited at the higher probability p1 ranges 
from 36% 
to 13%. This is a good property of the tax enforcement policy, for it is reasonable 
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to expect that taxpayers would not tolerate a high value of the mark-up threshold. 
The column labelled r. a. shows the optimal random audits probability p*. 
Notice that p2 < p* < pi and that p* decreases as V increases. 
The last four columns contain the optimal probabilities when a is constrained 
to be a presumptive income coefficient. The minimum least squares coefficient, 
defined in eq. (4.30), is equal to ca's = 1.235; 39.48% of professionals have a mark- 
up higher than a's, whereas 60.52% have a lower mark-up. The average mark-up 
coefficient, defined in eq. (4.29), is equal to aam = 1.730 and leaves 24.88% of 
professionals with a higher mark-up. Notice that a's and aam are larger than 
a* for all values of cp. As for the audit probabilities, consider a's first. When 
V<2.5 or cp > 6, optimal probabilities collapse into random audits and the 
notion of presumptive coefficient becomes meaningless. When 3<V<5, pis 
and p2 differ: notice that pis = p* = .2 and 
p2 < p2. Turning to aar, optimal 
probabilities collapse into random audits for all values of V. 
Let Ti be government's net revenue and P be aggregate income under policy 
i, where i= op, ra, is means respectively optimal policy, random audits and least 
squares presumptive income coefficient. As expected, table 4.2 shows that TOP is 
decreasing in cp, for tax enforcement becomes less profitable as audits are more 
expensive. However IOP increases, for a lower level of enforcement has a positive 
incentive effect on labour supply. The table also shows the loss in net revenue 
and aggregate income associated to policies ra and Is. For instance, when cp = 4, 
TTa = . 
84T°p and Ira = . 
951°p. The loss of revenue is large for high values of 
whereas the incentive effect on average income is not relevant. 
Let GT= and Cl be respectively gross revenue and audit costs associated to 
policy i. For each audit policy, table 4.3 shows GTt/I=, the effectiz'e average tax 
rate. Recall that the government levies a proportional income tax at rate t= . 35, 
which is the legislated average tax rate. With costly audits, tax enforcement 
is 
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Table 4.2: Net revenue and aggregate income. 
ýo Top 
Tra 
Top 
T' 
Top Iop 
Ira 
Iop 
Irs 
I°p 
1.0 . 8410 1.000 1.000 2.974 1.000 1.000 
1.5 . 7410 1.000 1.000 2.974 1.000 1.000 
2.0 . 6373 1.000 1.000 2.992 1.994 0.994 
2.5 . 5466 0.990 0.990 3.139 0.956 0.956 
3.0 . 4667 0.959 0.960 3.293 0.955 0.954 
3.5 . 3983 0.910 0.919 3.447 0.953 0.938 
4.0 . 3418 0.838 0.852 3.603 0.952 0.922 
4.5 . 2972 0.739 0.752 3.759 0.950 0.908 
5.0 . 2645 0.610 0.612 3.915 0.949 0.885 
6.0 . 2260 0.318 0.318 4.068 0.983 0.983 
7.0 . 1980 0.091 0.091 4.138 1.035 1.035 
TahlP 4 A" Gross revenii and audit , costs 
GT°p GTTa GTIS Cop Cra Cis Cop Cra C' 
Jop Ira Its lop Ira Its GT°p GTTa GTrs 
1.0 . 350 . 350 . 350 . 
067 . 067 . 067 . 192 . 192 . 192 
1.5 . 350 . 
350 . 350 . 101 . 
101 . 101 . 
288 . 288 . 288 
2.0 . 344 . 349 . 
349 . 131 . 134 . 134 . 380 . 
386 . 386 
2.5 . 312 . 
344 . 344 . 
138 . 164 . 164 . 441 . 476 . 476 
3.0 . 278 . 313 . 
306 . 136 . 171 . 163 . 490 . 
545 . 533 
3.5 . 243 . 
282 . 283 . 127 . 
171 . 170 . 524 . 609 . 600 
4.0 . 207 . 
251 . 259 . 113 . 
167 . 172 . 543 . 667 . 662 
4.5 . 172 . 
219 . 235 . 093 . 
158 . 170 . 540 . 720 . 722 
5.0 . 136 . 
188 . 221 . 
068 . 145 . 175 . 
503 . 769 . 789 
6.0 . 103 . 
126 . 126 . 048 . 
108 . 108 . 463 . 857 57 
7.0 . 090 . 
064 . 064 . 042 . 
059 . 059 . 470 . 
934 . 934 
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not perfect and the effective tax rate falls short of the 
legislated rate. The table 
also shows audit costs in percentage of aggregate income and 
in percentage of 
gross tax collection. Notice that audit costs are much higher with ra and is than 
with op. 
The analysis of the numerical computations of the model with endogenous 
labour supply is summarized as follows. The first result is that the nature of the 
optimal tax enforcement policy crucially depends on the size of unit audit costs 
relatively to the average income of the group. When audit costs are relatively 
low, see table 4.1, the best policy is random audits. When audits are relatively 
expensive, then the two-probabilities policy is effective. The relatively inefficient 
professionals, those with an individual mark-up lower than a*, meet the proba- 
bility of audit just sufficient to induce truthful reporting, pi = (1 + s)-1, whereas 
the relatively efficient individuals, those with a mark-up higher than a*, face the 
lower probability p2. Notice that p* >0 for intermediate values of cp, whereas 
p* =0 when cp is very large. 
The second finding is that the optimal mark-up coefficient a* is generally low 
and is lower than the presumptive income coefficients a's and aam. This means 
that constructing presumptive income coefficients with statistical measures that 
underestimate the actual coefficients is probably a good policy in terms of net 
revenue collected. In addition, this normative prescription is supported by the 
consideration that taxpayers favours a low value of the mark-up threshold. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This paper has examined in a principal-agent setting the Presumptive Income 
Coefficients tax enforcement policy implemented by the Italian government since 
1989. 
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When labour supply is fixed, the net revenue maximizing audit policy 
is such 
that income reports below the the corresponding mark-up on production costs 
are audited at the probability level just sufficient to induce truthful reporting, 
whereas those above it are never audited. Also, when the mark-up coefficient is 
constrained to be a presumptive income coefficient, the best audit policy may 
collapse into random audits. 
The numerical computations of the model with endogenous labour supply 
show that the properties of the optimal policy crucially depend on the size of 
taxpayers' average income relative to unit audit costs. If average income is rela- 
tively high the best policy is random audits. If average income is relatively low, 
the two probability policy is effective: income reports below the corresponding 
mark-up on production costs meet the probability of audit just sufficient to in- 
duce honest behaviour, whereas those above it face a lower, but positive, level of 
enforcement. Also, the optimal mark-up coefficient is generally low and is lower 
than the presumptive income coefficients. 
The rest of this section suggests few lines for further research. The profes- 
sional's utility function, which is linear in income and quadratic in labour supply, 
could be generalized to allow for risk aversion and substitution between income 
and labour. Also, the homogeneity assumption about professionals' output could 
be relaxed, allowing for product variety and different demand conditions. 
A simple audit technology has been assumed: the cost of verifying an in- 
come report is constant and when performing an audit the tax agency observes 
true income. Instead, the audit mechanism applied by the Italian government is 
asymmetric. If reported income is at least as high as presumptive income, the 
taxpayer is subjected to random audits and the task of demonstrating any dis- 
crepancy between reported and actual income is on the tax agency. If reported 
income is lower than presumptive income, the taxpayer is expected to pay the 
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tax on presumptive income, unless he or she demonstrates that the actual 
income 
is lower than presumptive income. This implies that monitoring reports below 
the corresponding presumptive income is less costly than auditing those above 
it. Also, a taxpayer with actual income lower than presumptive income bears the 
cost of demonstrating that his or her report is truthful. 
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For a given audit policy, professionals are divided into two groups. 
Those with (7r - c)wL° < acwL° solve 
max EU = (1 - t) (7r - c)wL° +t 
[1 
- pl(1 + s)] 
[(7r 
- c)wL° - r] + T 
- 
12 
(wL°)2 
2w ,0<r< 
(7r- c)wL° (4.41) 
Linearity in r and assumption 1 imply that r(c, w) =0 if pi < (1 + s)-1 and 
r(c, w) = (7r - c)wL° if pi = (1 + s)-1. 
Professionals with (ir - c)wL° > acwL° solve 
(1 - t) (7r - c)wL° +t 
[1 
- 
1 
(wL° 
max EU = 2w2 r (1 - t)(7r - c)wL° + t11- 1 (wL° 
2w2 
pi(1 + s), 
[(7r 
- c)wL° - r] + 
2,0 <r< acwL° (4.42) 
P2(1 + S)] 
[(7r 
- c)wL° - r] + 
2, acwL° <r< (ir - c)wL° 
Let EU(r) be the expected utility when the report is r. Linearity in r and 
assumption 1 imply that the professional chooses his or her optimal report from 
the discrete set {0, acwL°, 1}, where I= (7r - c)wL°. From eq. (4.42) one obtains 
(i) EU(I) > EU(O) ifipl > (I +s)-1 and EU(I) > EU(acwL°) iffp2 > (I +S)-17 
(ii) EU(acwL°) > EU(I) if p2 < (1 + s)-1 and EU(acwL°) > EU(O) if c< 
it/(1 + ica); (iii) EU(0) > EU(I) if pl < (1 + s)-1 and EU(0) > EU(acwL°) if 
c> it/(1 + #a). From lemma 1, p2 < (1 + s)-1, thus case (i) never occurs. When 
pi < (1 +s)-1, then r(. ) = acwL° if c< 7r/(1 +rca) and r(. ) =0 if c> lr/(1 +Ka). 
When p1 = (1 + s)-1, then #=1 and r(. ) = acwL° for all c< 7r/(1 + a). This 
completes the proof. 
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A. 2 Proof of lemma 3 
For a given audit policy, professionals are 
divided into two groups, according to 
the level of the efficiency parameter c. The relatively 
inefficient entrepreneurs, 
those with (7r - c) < ac, solve 
max EU = (1 - t) (7r - c)x + t[i - pl(1 + c)x - r, 
+ 
x, r 
- 
1x2,0 
<r< (r - Ox 2w2 
whereas the relatively efficient, those with (ir - c) > ac, solve 
(1 - t)(7r - c)x + t[1 - PI(1 + s)11( r- c)x - r, + 
2w2 
x2,0 <r< acx 
max EU = x, r (1 - t)(7r - c)x +t 
[1 
- P2(1 + S)] 
( 
l(7r - c)x - rI + 
--X 
2I 
acx <r< (7r - c)x 
2w2 - 
(4.43) 
(4.44) 
For given x, eqs. (4.43) and (4.44) are identical to eqs. (4.41) and (4.42) re- 
spectively. Thus applying the results of the previous proof the optimal reports 
are 
r(c, w) .10 
if (c, w) E (v, ir] x [0, oo) 
acx if (c, w) E [0, v] x [0, oo) 
if pi < (1 + s)-1 and 
r(c, w) 
(Ir - c)x if (c, w) E (v, 7r] x [0, oo) 
1 acx if (c, w) E [0, v] x [0, oo) 
ifp1=(1+s)-1. 
To determine optimal outputs, substitute the optimal reports into eqs. (4.43)- 
(4.44). Thus professionals with c>v solve 
(1 - t)(7r - c)x +tII- pl(1 + s)] (7r - c)x+ 
21w2 X2, if Pi 
< (1 + S)-1 (4.45) max EU 
(1 - t)(7r - c)x -1 x2 if pi = (1 + S)-i 2W2 
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and it is straightforward to show that the solution is 
X *(pi; c7w) = w2x*(pi; c) = w2[I_ tpl (1 + s)](7r - c) 
Professionals with c<v solve 
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max EU- (1 - t)(7r - c)x +t 
[I 
-p2(1 +3)][7r- (1 +a)c, X- 
x22 (4.46) 
2w 
and the solution is 
X **(P21 c; c, w) = w2x**(p2, a; c) = w2 
[1 
- tp2 (1 + s)] (7r - c) + 
-w2tac[1 - 72(1 + s), 
This completes the proof. 
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